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Public Administration Review

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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IN THIS NUMBER

ARTHUR S. FLEMMING is director, Office of Defense Mobilization, on leave from Ohio Wesleyan University where he has been president since 1948. He was director, School of Public Affairs, American University, 1934-39; member, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1939-48. He has been a member of the War Manpower Commission, 1942-45; the advisory council, Retraining and Reemployment Administration, Department of Labor, 1944-47; and the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. He is now a member of the President's Reorganization Committee.

JAMES A. PERKINS is vice president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He has been director of the paper division of the Office of Price Administration and assistant to the administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration. He has also been a member of the faculty of Princeton University and vice president of Swarthmore College.

PHILIP L. GRAHAM has been publisher of *The Washington Post* since 1946. He was attorney, Office for Emergency Management and Office of Lend Lease Administration, 1941-42; was in the U.S. Army, 1942-45; was president, WINX Broadcasting Corporation, 1946-49; and is now president, WTOP, Inc.

WENDELL G. SCHAEFFER is a member of the headquarters staff of Public Administration Service. During the past three-and-a-half years he has completed a variety of survey and technical assistance projects in the United States, El Salvador, Puerto Rico, and Nicaragua. In Puerto Rico he had major responsibility for assisting the Commonwealth Government in reorganizing its system of judicial administration. From 1948 to 1950 he was assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida. He has a Ph.D. degree from the University of California (Berkeley).

CARL J. SCHNEIDER received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1943. He was with the U.S. Army overseas, 1944-46; was a member of the faculty, University of New Hampshire, 1946-48; and has been assistant professor of political science, University of Nebraska, since 1948. He is the co-author of *Background of European Governments* (3d ed., 1951).

MILTON M. MANDELL has been in charge of the work in administrative and management testing of the U.S. Civil Service Commission since 1945. He was previously chief analyst, President's Committee for Congested Production Areas, and held personnel positions in several federal agencies and in the City of Los Angeles.

JOSEPH E. MCLEAN is a member of the faculty, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He has performed necessary staff work for the Committee on Selection for the Rockefeller Public Service Awards.

H. STRUVE HENSEL is a practicing lawyer who has had governmental experience as general counsel, Navy Department, 1941-45; Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1945-46; and special consultant to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. He has been a member of the firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, New York, since 1946.

C. GIRARD DAVIDSON is a member of the law firm of Davidson & Nikoloric, with offices in Portland, Oregon, and Washington, D. C. He was attorney, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1934-37; attorney, U.S. Housing Authority, 1939; consulting attorney, Bonneville Power Administration, 1940-42; consultant, Office of Production Management, 1941-42; general counsel, BPA, 1943-46; assistant general counsel (on loan) War Production Board, 1944-45; and Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 1946-50.

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The Civil Servant in a Period of Transition

By ARTHUR S. FLEMMING

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

I THINK that most of you have probably gathered from the stories which have appeared in the press that the three of us who are serving on the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization really regard ourselves as members of the President's staff. We are working with him in an effort to perfect plans for improving the organizational side of the executive branch of the federal government. We shall never file any public reports with anyone. We simply work on a particular issue by becoming acquainted with all of the studies that have been made on it; by asking for additional studies in some instances; and by talking with the members of the President's Cabinet, the other heads of departments and agencies, and the President. Then we size up the situation as best we can and file an informal memorandum with the President. If anything happens as a result of the matters that we have under consideration, it will be reflected in an Executive order, a reorganization plan, a message to the Congress, or possibly simply in a statement from the President.

Also, I must make it clear that I do not have any operating responsibilities in the personnel field at the present time. I am simply serving as acting head of an agency that, among a great many other agencies, is serviced by the civil service system and the Civil Service Commission. In other words, I am now a consumer and may tend to look at the civil service system a little differently from the way I looked at it in the days when I was

a member of the Civil Service Commission. I do not know whether that is true or not. I will let you judge that as I move along with the course of our discussion.

Certainly, in the light of my own interest in the development of a strong civil service system in the federal government, I am more than happy to talk on the subject of the civil servant in a period of transition. It is obvious to all of us that the federal civil service system is going through an important transition period, perhaps the most important transition period in the history of the system. It is also clear that it is a period of real uncertainty for the career civil servant. And as far as I can see, that is something that cannot be avoided in light of the fact that the party that has been responsible for the operation of the executive branch of the government for twenty years has been replaced by another party.

As we go through this transition period, it seems to me that there are certain points which the career civil servant, and all of us who are interested in the development of a career civil service, must keep in mind.

I

FIRST, I believe that we must remember that although better than 90 per cent of the positions in the executive branch of the government are under civil service, only about 52 per cent of the persons now on the federal payroll have full civil service status. It is very easy, it seems to me, for some people to jump to the conclusion that because better than 90 per cent of these positions are in the civil service system it automatically follows that all incumbents of these positions have a full civil service status. That is not the case.

NOTE: This article is based on notes of a talk that Mr. Fleming gave at the opening session at the annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration March 6 and his answers to questions from the floor.

It is my understanding that the following rough breakdown gives us a picture of the situation as it stands today. Approximately 1,300,000 civilians who are now on the payroll of the executive branch of the government have what we refer to as a full civil service status. Another 900,000 have indefinite appointments, and another 300,000 have temporary appointments or are serving in what are referred to as excepted positions. Of the 900,000 who have indefinite appointments, it is my understanding that approximately 50 per cent have received their appointments as the result of being certified in the regular manner from civil service lists. The remaining 50 per cent have not been certified from civil service lists, although I assume in most instances their qualifications have been passed upon and approved in accordance with the normal civil service procedure. Normally, of course, heads of departments and agencies can make temporary appointments without regard to any civil service rules or regulations.

We must recognize, it seems to me, that different policies can, and in many instances should, be applied to the indefinites and temporaries than are applied to those with a full civil service status. If we insist that the same policies be applied to all of these groups, we are confusing the issues and are seriously diluting the significance attached, or that should be attached, to the acquiring of a full civil service status.

I think it is clear that persons with indefinite appointments who have been selected from civil service lists or have come into the government through the competitive process are entitled to more consideration than those who have not been selected as the result of participating in an open competitive examination. But I also feel that even as far as this group is concerned, we should not insist on rapid action. The new heads of departments and agencies should have the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the manner in which these persons have been selected, and of deciding for themselves just what kind of recommendations they desire to make in the interests of effective administration.

The number of persons holding full civil service status is limited by the provisions of an appropriation rider that says the number

of such persons shall not exceed the number that were on the payroll in September, 1950, which is roughly 1,500,000. Thus, the number at present on the rolls who have status is about 200,000 below the ceiling.

The indefinite and temporary appointees who have not been selected from regular civil service lists number between 750,000 and 800,000. I do not believe that persons in these groups should be permitted to acquire full civil service status without competing successfully in open competitive examinations. Such a requirement would be in the best interests of the individual, the civil service, and the nation. During the past twenty years we have approached this problem in two different ways.

We all recall that in the early days of the Democratic administration, the Congress in creating a great many agencies inserted in the law a provision that personnel were to be appointed without regard to the civil service law. After these agencies had been functioning for a period of four or five years, a law was enacted which made it possible for the incumbents of these positions to acquire civil service status on a noncompetitive basis, simply by qualifying in a civil service examination. I doubt that as a result of that procedure we, in all instances, obtained the best available persons for the competitive civil service. Moreover, there is no question but that that group as a group has been more or less suspect from that time right down to the present—and that is not fair to the individuals who fall within that classification, many of whom would have qualified at the top of the list in an open competitive examination.

Following World War II, the federal service had on its payroll a great many persons who had war service appointments. With a very few exceptions, those war service appointees were required to participate successfully in an open competitive examination if they were to become a part of the permanent career civil service with full civil service status. Although this procedure placed a considerable burden on the Civil Service Commission and the operating departments and agencies of the government, it seems to me that in the long run it was more satisfactory than the one that was followed in connection with persons who had

been put into the so-called New Deal agencies on a political basis and were then given the opportunity of qualifying on a noncompetitive basis. I believe that in the long run it provided better qualified persons for the nation's career civil service.

And so it seems to me that if those persons who are now on the federal payroll and who have not been selected for their positions as a result of an open competitive examination desire to become a part of the career civil service, they should be required to participate in an open competitive examination.

However, in talking about this 45 to 48 per cent of the present federal employees who do not have full civil service status, we must recognize that many of these employees are now surrounded with the same procedural safeguards against removal from the service as surrounds those with full civil service status. Personally, I think this does not make good sense, and that it dilutes the significance attached to acquiring a full civil service status. In many instances these procedural safeguards result from the operation of the Veterans' Preference Act. It seems to me that those who are interested in veterans' preference and those who are interested in developing a sound civil service system in this country should sit down together and take a look at this particular problem.

I do not mean, of course, that persons with indefinite or temporary appointments should be treated in an arbitrary fashion or on the basis of purely political considerations. That is not good administration. On the other hand, when the head of an agency wants to make a change that he feels is in the interest of good administration, he should not be limited by the procedural safeguards that surround the career civil servant.

II

NEXT, it seems to me that the career civil servant, and those of us who are interested in strengthening the civil service in the executive branch of the government, must recognize that the civil service system should not encompass positions where the incumbent has received delegations of authority either from the Congress or from the head of the agency to shape policies in his particular area of ac-

tivity or positions where there should be a close continuing personal and confidential relationship between the incumbent and the head of the agency. I appreciate very much the difficulties that are involved in drawing that line of demarcation, and I sympathize with any individual or with any group of individuals who are called upon to draw it. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is a line of demarcation that must be drawn.

From the very beginning of the civil service system in 1883 there has been provision in it for Schedule A positions, and it has been understood that the types of positions that I have just described are the types that would be placed in Schedule A. Also, it has been understood from the beginning that when such positions were placed in Schedule A, the head of the agency would have complete freedom in deciding who is to serve in them; that is, he would have complete freedom in hiring and firing persons occupying those positions.

Now, as time has gone on, a number of things have happened which have tended to dilute the significance of Schedule A. In some cases the head of an agency would write to the Civil Service Commission that "this job or this class of position over the years has been in Schedule A, but I have arrived at the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of sound administration if these positions were placed in the classified civil service." His objective may have been stated correctly; conceivably, however, it might have been "the best interests of the incumbent or incumbents of the Schedule A positions."

The general attitude of the Civil Service Commission when it received a communication of that kind has been: "This is another victory for the civil service system. Here is the head of an agency who has decided that he would rather have this job or this type of position under civil service than in Schedule A. Therefore, of course, we will put it under civil service."

I think that those of us who have served on the Civil Service Commission have been wrong in not making a more careful analysis of the duties and responsibilities of these positions to determine whether or not they really belonged in Schedule A. There is no doubt that some positions that belong in Schedule A have

been taken out of it and put in the classified service. In my judgment, where that has happened we have not strengthened the civil service system but have tended to undermine it.

There has also been a trend toward providing the incumbents of Schedule A positions with the same procedural safeguards surrounding removal that surround the career civil servant. Some of those procedural safeguards are a byproduct of the Veterans' Preference Act. Some are the result of Executive orders. For instance, one Executive order provides, among other things, that the career civil servant who goes into a Schedule A job should be entitled to the same procedural safeguards surrounding removal as a career civil servant occupying a career civil service job. Another Executive order divides Schedule A positions into policy-formulating and non-policy-formulating, and gives the non-policy-formulating positions the same procedural safeguards when it comes to removal that attach to the career civil servant in a career civil service job. Of course, if there are jobs in Schedule A that are non-policy-formulating, they just don't belong in that schedule.

I think it is clear that those two trends have served to destroy the real significance of Schedule A in the civil service rules. I personally am happy that President Eisenhower has asked the Civil Service Commission to examine the positions that are now in Schedule A, to determine whether there are some there that do not belong there. Personally, it seems to me, for example, that not all of the legal positions belong in Schedule A. Some of them undoubtedly do, but not all of them. I do not know just what the Commission can do about these positions in view of the fact that the Congress has made it impossible for the Commission to bring them in under the classified service. I guess the only thing to do is to develop a brand new schedule for lawyers.

The President has also asked the heads of the departments and agencies to examine their positions and to recommend to the Civil Service Commission positions that are not now in Schedule A that in their judgment belong there. And he has, in effect, given the Civil Service Commission a standard to work by, which is the traditional standard in determin-

ing whether positions belong in Schedule A. The agency head has a responsibility to indicate how he plans to delegate authority to shape policy and in what policy areas he intends to delegate it. Unless he arrives at some clear conclusions himself, it will be almost impossible for the Civil Service Commission to pass on his recommendations. The Commission has been directed to consider these questions and to report to the President on the actions taken.

In a large, complex government dealing with dynamic issues where it is desirable for department and agency heads to delegate authority to shape policy, the heads will want to delegate to people they are confident will make policy decisions in conformity with the broad framework of policy established by the head. The line of demarcation on these positions is difficult to draw, and I appreciate that there can be real debate over individual cases, yet it would be unfortunate from the point of view of the system as a whole if we did not attempt to draw a line. I recognize also that the line may be a moving one as we have more experience with the civil service system, but I do not think we can say that everything below the Assistant Secretary level should be in the career civil service.

It is pretty clear that some bureau chief positions will fall within the definition for inclusion in Schedule A. They are positions to which the head of the agency should make delegations of authority to shape policy in the interest of sound administration. Other bureau chief positions, however, would not fall within that definition, particularly some responsible for scientific and technical activities. The alternative to including in Schedule A bureau chiefs who exercise authority to shape policy on behalf of the heads of their agencies would be to withdraw such delegations of authority; such withdrawal would, however, create bottlenecks. The federal government is so huge, and the duties and responsibilities of the heads of some departments and agencies so great, that we should encourage delegation of authority not only in administrative matters but also in the shaping of policy in certain areas.

The President has also directed that an Executive order be drafted which would have

the effect of nullifying some of the procedural safeguards relative to removal that now surround occupants of Schedule A jobs. Obviously, this new order cannot in any way nullify the provisions of the Veterans' Preference Act.

I have the feeling that when Schedule A positions conform to the traditional standard set forth in the President's statement, the incumbents of those positions should present their resignations to the new heads of departments and agencies, just as the incumbents, for example, of Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary positions have presented their resignations. Obviously, not all of the resignations would be accepted, just as not all of the resignations of Assistant Secretaries have been accepted, but the heads of departments and agencies should have the opportunity of making up their own minds whether they desire to retain the incumbents.

If a real effort is made to apply the standards suggested in the President's statement in drawing the line between positions in the classified service and positions in Schedule A, persons may be more careful in the use of the terms "policy-making" in job descriptions. I think it is possible to draw this line and still provide adequate incentives for people to enter and rise in the career service. I would make a plea, however, that when a person moves from a career job into a political or policy-making job, both the person and the government should recognize the fact.

III

NEXT, the career civil servant, or the employee who desires to become a career civil servant, must do everything within his power to insure that every policy the newly elected representatives of the people desire to put in effect is administered in an effective and expeditious manner, whether he believes in it or not. A career civil servant who cannot bring himself to do this should have the courage to leave the career civil service. Otherwise he is setting himself above the duly elected representatives of the people. This he has no right to do, and in the long run the public will not stand for it.

I have always been very much interested in a handbook that the Treasury Department in

England prepared for the new civil servant in Great Britain. That handbook states:

As a civil servant you must never forget that however well qualified and expert you may become in your job, you have not been elected to it by any vote, and in a democratic country it is the elected representative, the member of Parliament, who must settle the lines on which the government of the community is to work.

Your Minister holds his office because he belongs to the majority in Parliament which has formed the government, and therefore what you do must be in accordance with what he wants you to do. He, after all, has the job of explaining to Parliament what you are doing and justifying it if Parliament chooses to ask questions about it. He is not allowed to blame you if things go wrong. The responsibility for the doings of his department is his, and he must shoulder it. So you must serve him loyally to the best of your ability and carry out his decisions and the decisions of senior officers acting on his behalf. All of this means, moreover, that when after a general election a new party comes into power in Parliament and new ministers take office, the Civil Service may very well find itself carrying out measures opposite to those it has carried out in the past. You may be inclined to feel that this is nonsense and that the civil servant who can do this must be a pretty spineless creature. But this is the tradition of service which has been accepted for many years by a great body of civil servants, many of whom have been highly intelligent and able and not at all spineless. They have accepted it because they have believed that parliamentary democracy is the right form of government for this country, because they care more for public service in accordance with the wishes of the majority than for any particular fixed policy.¹

It seems to me that the basic principle which is reflected in this handbook for the British career civil servant is one that must be accepted by the career civil servant in our country. The career civil servant who has become so attached intellectually, and possibly emotionally, to the policy of one administration that he believes that he would be stultifying himself or injuring the country if he should dedicate his life to making an opposing policy of a new administration work, should resign in his own interest, in the interest of the career civil service, and in the interest of the country.

Of course, the British system of government

¹ *Handbook for New Civil Servant*, 2d ed. (H. M. Treasury, 1947).

is different from the American. This quotation emphasizes the obligation of the career civil servant to conform to the wishes of Parliament; but the head of his Ministry is, of course, a member of Parliament who is responsible for interpreting for him what the policy of Parliament is. In the United States, the career civil servant has an obligation to carry out the policies of the head of his department, and must leave it to the head to make sure that his program is in line with the policies established by the Congress. We should, of course, do everything possible to encourage career employees to make suggestions they think are sound in the realms both of administration and policy, but there their responsibility rests. The policy heads are responsible for deciding whether to accept these suggestions and to put them into effect.

I have no doubt that a very high percentage of the career civil servants, way up in the nineties, are prepared to give the kind of loyal service that is called for. In return, the heads of departments and agencies have an obligation to do everything they can to strengthen the morale of their employees and to see that things are not done that will tend to undermine it. They have an obligation to develop ways and means of learning about outstanding services of career civil servants and of calling them to the attention of the public. Some progress has been made in this respect in the federal government, but the surface has only been scratched. They have an obligation to create an atmosphere wherein career civil servants can render the kind of loyal service that is needed.

The heads of departments and agencies are in a better position than anyone else to refute irresponsible criticism of the career service and to help raise its prestige. Looking back, I should say that the prestige of the service is higher than it was twenty years ago as a result of a whole series of steps that have been taken within the executive branch and by the Congress. But if we set up a scale of 100, we have a long way to go to reach 100. Department heads have an obligation to refute unfair criticisms. They also have a positive obligation to set forth the positive accomplishments of the career service, to engage in what former chairman of the Civil Service Commission Robert Ramspeck has referred to as a "truth cam-

paign"—a campaign that calls attention to the positive accomplishments of the career civil service, not just this month or next month or for two or three months, but that constantly hammers home the kind of fine, loyal, constructive service that is being rendered by a very large percentage of the career civil service. I think that is definitely unfinished business that we have to keep driving away at all the time.

IV

THE next thing we need to keep in mind in this transition period is this: the executive branch, when it becomes involved in political battles, must keep the career civil servant out of the front lines. I believe that when the head of an agency is called upon to participate in a political battle on Capitol Hill, he should go up there and participate in it himself, or should ask one of his own political officeholders in the agency to go up and participate in it. He should not under any circumstances ask a career civil servant to get into the front lines. I appreciate that it is more difficult to adhere to that particular concept in our form of government than in the British, but I hope that the new heads of our departments and agencies will adhere to it. If we are going to expect our career civil servant to keep out of political activity, we should not put him in the position of carrying the torch in a political battle on Capitol Hill.

Under our system of government, a congressional investigating committee may, of course, subpoena career civil servants to testify before the committee. Oftentimes, however, that follows upon the failure of a political head to assume full responsibility for what goes on in his department. If he has delegated authority to the wrong people, he is responsible for that fact. I am not saying that there are no instances where a legislative committee should reach down into the career civil service, but, rather, that if we could get a more complete and wholehearted acceptance of the principle that in relationships with Congress the political officeholder should carry the responsibility we would get much less reaching down than we now have.

V

THERE is one other point that reflects a weakness in our present civil service system. We must make it possible for senior career civil servants to transfer more easily than they can at present from one agency to another. A situation may occur, for example, in which a personality conflict develops between a senior career civil servant and the head of his agency. When a situation of that kind develops, the senior career civil servant should have an opportunity to serve in another agency, and the department head should have an opportunity to acquire the services of another career civil servant.

Apply that principle, for example, to the top posts most recently placed in the career civil service, those of Assistant Secretary for Administration. I remember over the years talking a great many times with W. A. Jump, whom many of us remember, honor, and revere, about the creation of that type of position. He believed there should be that type of position, but also that a new head of an agency should never be required to utilize the services of the career civil servant he happened to find in that particular position when he came into office. Some provision should be made for moving the Assistant Secretary for Administration to another responsible job if the new head desired to select another career civil servant for that position.

I always agreed with him, and I think that principle also applies to certain other jobs in the departments and agencies that properly are in the career civil service and are occupied by senior career civil servants.

The British service has a setup in the Treasury that makes it possible to work out shifts of that kind from one Ministry to another. And as I understand it, such shifts usually are made immediately following a change in the party in power as a result of an election. We are tied too closely to specific jobs rather than to classes of positions in which a person has certain

privileges, duties, and responsibilities that attach to his class. Here we can draw lessons from the British civil service and adapt them to our own system, which should, of course, be based on our own institutions and way of life.

I believe that it is imperative for the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget, the two agencies that have a bird's-eye view of the entire service, to get together and develop recommendations that will enable us to put into operation machinery that makes it easier for top career people in the executive branch of the federal government to move more freely among agencies. If that is not done, once again I think that in some instances the career civil service will be discredited and will tend to be undermined.

VI

IN CONCLUSION, I would like to say that I have had the privilege and the opportunity of working with President Eisenhower on certain matters in the field of organization and personnel. As a result of that opportunity, I am absolutely convinced that President Eisenhower is going to provide the whole field of personnel administration with the most effective leadership it has ever received from a President of the United States. As a result of that leadership the civil service system, as such, will be strengthened and will emerge as a system that can render a truly effective service in administering the affairs of this government in an effective and expeditious manner.

I have simply tried to outline some of the points which, it seems to me, those of us who are interested in achieving such a goal must keep in mind during the transition period. I appreciate the fact that it is going to be a difficult period. I appreciate the fact that at times there is going to be a great deal of uncertainty, but personally I believe that we are going to emerge from this period with a stronger civil service system than we have ever had before.

Administration of the National Security Program

By JAMES A. PERKINS

Vice President, Carnegie Corporation

THE National Security Act of 1947 provides the organizational structure in the executive branch for managing our program of national security. This act was amended in 1949 to correct some deficiencies, but the agencies of today are essentially those established in 1947. Before attempting an analysis of the present working of our security structure, let us make a quick review of the cast of characters and the roles they were and are expected to play.

I

THE legislation of 1947 was designed to correct the deficiencies in our World War II machinery. These deficiencies were four in number.

The first was the absence of adequate machinery for providing satisfactory coordination between the armed services. War experience had demonstrated the need for field commanders who had jurisdiction over both Army and Navy units operating in their theaters. Centralized field management led inevitably to the demand for centralized headquarters management. A complementary pressure arose out of our dealings with the British. When the Combined Chiefs of Staff was organized the service members on our side of the table did not speak with one voice while our British opposite numbers did. This situation led to the formation of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was generally agreed that some such unified arrangement would have to continue after the war.

The second failing in our World War II

NOTE: This paper was presented at the session on "Organization for National Security" at the annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration, March 7, 1953.

management was the absence of proper coordination between diplomatic and military matters or, to put it in terms of institutions, adequate coordination between the State Department and the two military departments. The need for this coordination led to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee established toward the end of the war, but as John J. McCloy recently pointed out in his Godkin lectures,¹ SWNCC was a very imperfect instrument infrequently used. We had come to understand that political and diplomatic considerations were inextricably entangled with military strategy, and it was felt that administrative machinery should reflect this central fact.

The third consideration was the need for rationalizing our overseas intelligence operations. Anyone who was in Europe in the spring and summer of 1945 was well aware that our overseas intelligence operations had gotten out of hand. An Army major in Ludwigshafen once complained to me that he had had to deal with thirteen different intelligence teams within a period of three weeks. In addition to this multiplicity of intelligence outfits, there was the growing realization that the nature of modern warfare requires intelligence on a broad spectrum of matters ranging from troops and supplies to factory location and design and the state of mind and health of peoples all over the globe. Thus, there was need both for a centralization of our intelligence operations and for an organization that could employ and exploit a wide variety of special talents.

The fourth lesson was the need for better planning of our domestic economic mobilization. The work that had been done, largely un-

¹ Delivered at Harvard University in January, 1953, and to be published by the Harvard University Press.

der military auspices, prior to World War II was hardly even studied, let alone used as a basis for actual mobilization activities. It was believed that this responsibility should be given to a civilian agency which would be kept in close touch with those concerned with political and strategic planning.

The need for mobilization staff work was met by the establishment of the National Security Resources Board. The rationalization of our intelligence operations was taken care of by the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The unification of the services and the maintenance of civilian control was provided for by the formation of the Department of Defense and the legal establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the coordination of all these activities within the general framework of national security planning was institutionalized in the National Security Council.

Two other instrumentalities must be mentioned as part of the general machinery for national security planning and operations. The United Nations was the agency through which we would adjust our conflicts of interest with the Soviet Union. The assumption that such conflicts could be resolved was certainly a cornerstone of our immediate postwar security policy and the UN was the chosen instrument. We must also mention the Atomic Energy Commission as having a key part in this play, even though its role in security planning was but dimly understood when that agency was created. It is worthy of note that the UN and the AEC, representing respectively the instrument for negotiating with the Soviet Union and the chief instrument for restraining the Soviet Union, were both far removed from the council tables where national security policy was being developed.

At the outbreak of the Korean War in July, 1950, the machinery had been in operation exactly three years. In large measure it had failed to perform the functions for which it was established. It had not provided the necessary guidance for our program in Germany. It had not anticipated or successfully dealt with the explosive problems in the Middle East and Far East. It had not been able to produce adequate plans for equating our military strength with our growing commitments. The Korean War caught us unprepared in terms both of policy

and of military potential. We had shown considerable capacity for reacting to demonstrated dangers. The Berlin Airlift, the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the mobilization of the UN to deal with the Korean crisis are the most notable examples. I suspect, however, that careful case studies of these events will tell a story of improvisation rather than planning—of policy formed after the fact and commitments continually outrunning domestic arrangements.

The net effect of the Korean War was to bring about a restatement of our security policy in line with our actions of the preceding three years. The security organization began to function first by codifying the doctrine of containment (largely through State Department leadership) and then by hammering out programs of foreign aid and remobilization to fit the implications of the doctrine. Much of the muddiness of the pre-Korean days was cleared up under the pressure of actual warfare, threats of greater dangers, and the happy circumstances of friendly working relations between the heads of the State and Defense Departments and the chairman of the JCS.

II

Now let us turn to an analysis of the existing organization and see if we can identify the main issues that require the attention of those who are concerned with improving the management of our security program. On a subject as vast and complex as this it will be possible to select only a few problems for even the briefest treatment. The problems I have selected are: the organization of the Department of Defense, the contribution of the State Department, the functioning of the National Security Council, and the role of Congress in security planning. Obviously, each of these topics warrants a paper by itself but perhaps we can point up some basic considerations that must be a part of more extended studies.

The Department of Defense almost defies precise administrative analysis, largely because it has within it four different focuses of executive power and each focus of power was established for different reasons. The Chief of Staff of each of the three individual services is the central and dominant instrument for manage-

ment within the Pentagon. It is under his direction that coordination of logistics, tactics, research, and personnel takes place. The other three sources of managerial power are of a lesser order of importance and serve either as checks or irritants on the service chief, depending on your point of view.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution is the second source of managerial power. Provided by statute with broad responsibilities for coordinated planning, it has a chairman who has no vote and is largely a presiding officer. It is hard to tell how far the JCS represents anything more than the sum of its parts. Certainly the service members thereon are not continually forced to modify their external operations because of the existence of a collective will they recognize as more powerful and binding than their own internal necessities. It is an essentially unexamined question whether the compromises effected in JCS meetings have advanced or hindered imaginative military planning.

The third power position in the Department of Defense is the civilian Secretary of an individual service. Former Secretary James Forrestal has said that a civilian Secretary is like an ant on a log floating downstream who believes he is a fast swimmer. Certainly the actual authority of a civilian Secretary is a fraction of that exercised by his Chief of Staff. The Secretary may persuade, admonish, and request. But only if he has been on his job a long time and is very wise and very determined will he actually have any measurable influence on the substance of the activity of the military establishment under his control.

The fourth and highest ranking power position is, of course, the Secretary of Defense. On paper he has the widest powers, but as Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett has indicated in his *ave atque vale*, there are few real tools at his command for exercising the authority he possesses.

Military planning on a unified basis can only be accomplished by increasing the collective will of the JCS at the expense of the individual service Chiefs of Staff. Neither unified planning nor unified headquarters management can be provided unless the position of the chairman and membership is reformulated. Unification cannot take place through the efforts of the

civilian Secretaries no matter how much paper power is devolved on them. The key to real unification rests on provisions for the Joint Chiefs and nowhere else.

Early considerations of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs with power to override his colleagues on matters affecting unified planning were dismissed because of fears of creating too powerful a military figure. I would question whether this danger has been properly weighed on the scale with the advantages of unified planning. My vote would go to giving the chairman an overriding veto on all service proposals that are contrary to the dictates of unified planning and the equally important power of bringing positive proposals for unified activity before the JCS with power of appeal to the Secretary of Defense if they are not accepted. The Joint Staff of the JCS would have to be placed under his control with powers of fitness ratings within his sole jurisdiction.

While strengthening the position of the chairman of the JCS is the pivot for progressive unification, there remains the problem of the current work load of the JCS which acts as a major barrier to effective planning. Unified planning involves both effective leadership and time.

It has been suggested that both unified leadership and time for planning can be accomplished if the JCS is divorced from command responsibilities. This is the thesis in a brilliant speech given by Dr. Vannevar Bush at Rochester, New York, and repeated at Tufts College. With some modifications it was the gist of Mr. Lovett's parting letter to the President.

The problem of the work load of the JCS is indeed a critical one, but I must confess to considerable uneasiness with the Bush-Lovett therapy. Planning that does not involve the constant participation of those responsible for carrying out the plans is a formula with built-in hazards. Planning soon takes on an academic tone and the operators ignore the plans. Then who sees to it that the plans are enforced or carried out?

At this point Bush and Lovett suggest a quite radical rearrangement of lines of authority. Once the JCS is established as an advisory body, the line of command would run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of a department to the appro-

priate service chief. The pattern is logical, but it presents two major difficulties that, in my judgment, undermine the whole scheme.

First, it puts impermanent and possibly inexperienced civilian officials into the middle of the military machinery. I cannot believe that the civilians would be anything else than disrupting factors in such a scheme. Second, since the newly constructed JCS would have to have constant contact with the operating heads of the military establishments, would there not be developed a second chain of command for the JCS to the service chiefs? The necessity for close contact between planning and operations would require such a close working relationship. But two lines of authority surely breed disaster.

My own prescription for the work load problem runs along less drastic lines. The chairman should apply more rigid control of the agenda and refuse to allow the JCS to spend time on administrative details. The Chiefs of Staff should delegate far more administrative responsibility to their deputies. But most important of all, the solution of the work load of the JCS rests on vigorous staff work and leadership in security planning from the State Department and the NSC. The JCS has operated like a small NSC. A proper reallocation of planning leadership will go a long way toward resolving the problem of the JCS schedule.

The third type of Pentagon management is found in the three civilian Secretaries of the service departments. The development of the Office of the Secretary of Defense has made the office of the service Secretary more and more a meaningless post. Caught between the Secretary of Defense on top and his service chief below, his *raison d'être* has been progressively attenuated. Clearly the post should be reformulated as an agency of the Defense Secretary so as to provide for the unification of civilian authority. Former Air Secretary Thomas K. Finletter believes that this move would seriously weaken civilian control because a lesser post would attract lesser men. This is an important point but not, in my opinion, decisive.

This leaves the Secretary of Defense or rather the office of the Secretary of Defense as the central position for assuring civilian control, for acting as a court of appeal for the JCS, and for representing the department before the

Congress and in the complex of relations with other governmental agencies.

But it is also the office to which the President, the Congress, and the public look to provide for the unification prescribed in the Defense Act of 1947. Absence of unification has continuously led to suggestions for increasing the powers of this office. As I have already mentioned, the key to unification is in the JCS not the Defense Secretary, and the reason is that the Defense Secretary is not really able to exercise the powers that have been given to him already.

He is not able to exercise these powers because of the basic disjunction between the civilian and military officers. The latter are members of a professional group with its own provisions for promotion and assignment and its own systems of rewards and penalties. In short, the authority of the civilian Secretary is more prescribed by his own knowledge and experience than by the powers provided by legislation or executive order.

There is no short cut around sheer know-how for effective civilian control of the military establishments and this know-how must be demonstrated in the councils of the executive arm or before the congressional committees before the military establishment will begin to take seriously the wishes of the civilian Secretary or his staff. Since this is so, the turnover of Secretaries of Defense (five in six years) has had a greater influence in limiting civilian authority than all the language in the statutes. In this light it can only be viewed as our great good fortune that W. J. McNeil, Frank C. Nash, and Walter S. Whitman² have continued over from one administration to the next. This is our greatest guarantee of effective civilian supervision and pressure for unified planning.

III

WE SHALL now turn our attention to the Department of State which is, of course, the key agency for all political and diplomatic considerations in the field of security planning. As a general proposition, the Department of State has adjusted itself far too

²Who hold the positions, respectively, of assistant secretary of defense (comptroller); assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and chairman, Research and Development Board.

slowly to the tasks that are inherent in this key role and as a result it has, in general, not played the part of the effective leader in shaping our cold war strategy.

Of course, the central reason for this disability is to be found in the essentially isolationist position that characterized the posture of the U.S. until recent years. World leadership has only recently been thrust upon us, and until one assumes the necessity for leadership one does not face the need for broad planning.

The first new responsibility that the State Department absorbed over and beyond the traditional business of normal day-to-day diplomatic relations with individual countries was in the field of foreign trade. Anyone who has had experience in the department is fully familiar with the organizational convulsions that have taken place in efforts to assimilate this area of consideration into established State Department organization. Be that as it may, by the outbreak of World War II the State Department had effectively taken leadership in the field of the trade agreements in particular and foreign economic policy in general.

The outbreak of World War II brought us face to face with the necessity for plans and operations in a whole variety of fields with which the State Department was almost completely unfamiliar and the net result was that agencies were established outside the department to handle these assignments. The Office of War Information dealt with the broad area of public information abroad, the Board of Economic Warfare with economic warfare, and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration with supplying our Allies with the goods and services they needed to conduct the war. The State Department was able to exercise only a minimum of control and direction over the activities of these agencies, with the result that whatever central management there was came from the White House.

The latter years of the war and the postwar period only increased the number and scope of United States activities abroad and departmental efforts to keep on top of this expanding universe have not been successful enough to assure the leadership that the situation requires.

The Department of State has made a number of important organizational moves in the

last six or seven years that will reduce the deficiency. The Policy Planning Staff was organized by General Marshall as a means of providing a place in the department that could concern itself with across-the-board matters. No planning staff is any better than the determination of a Secretary to use it wisely, and it is my impression that the members of the Policy Planning Staff have been used far too often in specific operating cases rather than for the purpose for which the staff was originally designed. Furthermore, the establishment of such a planning unit immediately brings with it the age-old difficulty of a proper marriage with the operating divisions. While no divorce has taken place I would gather that evenings spent around the fireside are at a minimum.

The second problem that must be faced is that planning is becoming more a regional than a country affair. This presents one of the more acute organizational problems for a department that has been organized on a country-desk basis. But once again, I gather that the department is slowly making moves to establish divisions with regional as well as individual country specialties.

But it is in the field of military and strategic considerations that the department is still woefully weak. As a general proposition I would say that there are more military officers who have a first-hand knowledge of diplomatic matters than there are State Department people who have an equivalent knowledge of military affairs. This imbalance has put, and will continue to put, departmental representatives at a tremendous disadvantage in evolving appropriate security strategy. The Department of Defense has recently made Frank Nash an assistant secretary with responsibility for the international aspects of Defense Department business. Is there any reason why the State Department should not have an officer who is concerned with the military aspects of State Department business?

Finally, the State Department will have to develop techniques of remote control. Large-scale military, economic, and informational activities will in all probability be carried on by agencies that are not part of the department, but it will be imperative that their operations conform to plans that the department lays out. I would not suggest for a moment that this is a

simple process, but I do strongly believe that imagination and vigor can go a long way toward assuring departmental leadership over the many agencies that will be dealing with matters of foreign affairs.

The development by the Department of State of effective planning, particularly on a regional and worldwide basis, an appropriate solution of the relationship of planning to operations, the development of sophistication in the field of military strategy, and the evolution of effective techniques in remote control will go far to redress the imbalance of security planning. These developments would have a most constructive and decisive effect on the very substance of our relations with the rest of the world.

IV

FROM a discussion of the Defense and State Departments one moves naturally to some comments on the National Security Council. The problem of the NSC is partly one of mechanics and partly one of substance.

The NSC suffers from a statutory definition of membership that has made the consideration of important matters a more complicated process than is necessary. Different problems require the participation of different agencies and the President should feel free to have the membership at the meetings adjusted to the problems. With prescription of membership, the problems are all too frequently adjusted to the membership. This is obviously absurd.

Another organizational failing has been the absence of a presidential agent with sufficient prestige and stature to provide the proper direction to NSC affairs. Leadership of the NSC is a full-time job which the President has, of course, not been able to provide. I understand that President Eisenhower has designated Robert Cutler as his man for NSC affairs. This will, of course, supply an important missing piece.

But the root problems of the NSC are not essentially matters of organization. They are, rather, matters of insufficient experience and expertise, on the one hand, and unwillingness on the part of its membership to have policy determined by such a body, on the other.

The absence of persons trained and widely experienced in the complexities of political-

military strategy is the first deficiency. A Secretary of Defense with the fullest possible powers will never be able to impress his will on his military subordinates without years of experience in dealing with the three military establishments. Just so, a Secretary of State or Treasury or chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will never be able to construct really sound and imaginative security policies and programs without wide and intimate contact with the various parts of this puzzle.

At the present writing military officers are far better grounded in broad security affairs than are our top civilian officials. Military officers can have their careers planned to include graduate work, staff colleges, embassy assignments, and work with a variety of civilian agencies. No similar provisions exist for the civilian counterpart where pay follows the job he is in rather than the man. Until such time as our civil service embraces a system for the specific assignment and wide training of the personnel required for successful dealing with broad security problems, decision-making will gravitate to the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs where more of this capability exists. The problem of the NSC is the problem of civilian expertise, and neither our academic training nor our governmental arrangements are calculated to produce any effective counterweights to the military capabilities in this field.

The essential disability on the part of civilians dealing with security matters has consequences that go beyond the NSC. It means that security considerations are heavily defined in military terms. But nothing is more essential than a full public realization of our political, economic, and social, as well as our military, affairs. Ten tactical air groups can be effectively neutralized if the bases from which they are to fly are surrounded by hostile populations. It may require a ten per cent increase in our fleet to assure access to raw materials that are no longer available because of improvident management of our domestic resources. Ten divisions may be added to our team because we have successfully mediated in a solution of the Egyptian problem. Security is not to be defined in military terms alone, and in a cold war situation it would be disastrous not to have factors over which civilians are

responsible kept front and center on the council tables.

But these factors can only be given their deserved attention when those responsible can weigh them in the scales with purely military considerations, and this in turn postulates the kind of experience and expertise in which we are at present deficient. In short, there is more at stake than the NSC—it is our imagination, understanding, and effectiveness in mobilizing world power and world opinion on our side.

V

FINALLY, we shall have to make some comments on the role of Congress and congressmen in the administration of our security program. In order fully to understand the way in which the legislature influences the administration of any executive program we shall have to unlearn a good deal of our textbook maxims about the separation of powers. Only if we realize the critical and sometimes decisive role that the Congress plays in shaping both the organization and the programs of national security will we understand the most complicating factor in executive planning at any level and on any subject. I should like to submit that students of public administration have generally neglected this highly important determinant of administrative arrangements and administrative action.

The basic difficulty stems from the fact that the real power in both houses is exercised through committees which are organized to deal only with parts of the total security program. This leads to committee consideration, committee decision, or at least committee pressure to effect administrative arrangements on one segment of the organization that may throw larger considerations out of focus. Arrangements for the Marine Corps were blocked by a congressional committee, which in turn brought great pressure for giving this service representation on the JCS. A search for subversives can vitiate the Voice of America which may have a top priority in plans for psychological warfare. Unification may be hindered by long-established contacts with, for

example, Navy bureaus whose independence is protected by friends on the Hill. All through the administrative machinery there are organizational arrangements that cannot be touched because of congressional protection and others that are changed or modified because of the heavy interest of a congressional group. In short, efforts to centralize and rationalize security planning run afoul of the dispersion of authority in the Congress. Of course, this is the continuing problem in most executive-congressional relations.

Aside from congressional influence on particular parts of the total operation, one general and pervasive influence must be noted. The more nearly a program can be described in military terms the more likely it is that that program can receive congressional approval. The further a program moves from military definitions the more the individual congressman will feel free to enter into and try to influence its nature and administration. The effect of this imbalance of attention is to put security affairs under a military hat wherever possible. Thus, Congress acts as an additional factor in weakening civilian orientation of our security programs.

A critique like this one always sounds more negative than the facts really warrant. A balanced view would show that organizationally we are in far better shape than at any time in our history to deal effectively with the broad and complex matters of national security policy and planning. Additional encouragement comes from the increasing interest of students of public affairs and public administration in the whole area of security affairs. Courses on military history and military policy are appearing in college catalogs. Excellent books and articles are coming into print that throw new light on these complex problems. The Social Science Research Council and the Council on Foreign Relations have recently begun to concentrate attention on the importance of these problems. Good starts have been made, but the magnitude and importance of the problems warrant our greatest concern in the years ahead.

Public Administration and the Press

By PHILIP L. GRAHAM

*President and Publisher
The Washington Post*

IN THE program for this conference, under the title of this session, four questions are raised about press coverage of public administration. These questions, and reasonably good answers, can be briefly stated:

1. What can reasonably be expected of the press in reporting and analyzing administrative problems of government?

Answer: Slow but steady improvement.

2. Is it enough to turn the searchlight on the bad spots?

Answer: No.

3. Can the press better educate itself to evaluate administrative problems and changes?

Answer: Yes.

4. Can administrators and students of administration help in this process?

Answer: They could help a lot more if they learned to use ordinary English words and phrases.

If conclaves like this had a wholly rational basis, we could now all quietly get our hats and coats and go out to enjoy the afternoon. However, in deference to the ceremonial side of such occasions, I hope you will bear with me while I drone on for a few minutes in elaboration of the obvious.

In the first place, I must confess to some initial bafflement when Harold Stein so genially lured me into discussing this subject. I was baffled because we of the press don't ordinarily think of covering public administration as a separate and distinct subject. Consequently, there is something artificial about the discussion I am launched upon. It is not unlike an attempt to discuss press coverage of the human character, or coverage of the development of mechanical power, or of popu-

lar literacy. That is to say, while we are constantly aware of reporting and editorializing on government, we are very little aware of purposely covering a separate discipline called public administration.

This can only partially be put down as evidence of a cultural lag on the part of the press. And, it seems to me, our unawareness of specific coverage of administration should not be a cause for very much serious regret.

Now that statement, I confess, is built on bias, and I had best get my bias right out in the open. My bias is, I believe, a general bias of the popular press. It is a bias against further growth of specialization—because this is already an age where specialists have succeeded in building an edifice of confusion much beyond anything that could be claimed for the Tower of Babel.

The economists, the lawyers, the physicians, the physicists and chemists, and so on and on are each creating special and private languages and sub-languages. Not only have they lost much of their ability to communicate with outsiders—the splintering is proceeding so rapidly that many are losing the ability even to communicate with their colleagues.

I don't think that anyone will deny that the same tendency—toward a private language adorned with opaque abstractions—is very strongly represented in the field of public administration. To some extent this is more true of the scholars than of the practitioners; but the difference is pretty much one of microscopic degree. The so-called discipline of public administration is relatively new, but I would doubt that the development of jargon has ever taken place in a more accelerated fashion.

I do not know the reasons behind this de-

NOTE: Excerpts from a talk at the closing session of the annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration, March 8, 1953.

velopment. Perhaps, as some have said, it is natural for members of a new and relatively insecure discipline to invent a forest of jargon to hide in. Or perhaps, as others have said, the jargon of public administration arises from your intimate connection with the social scientists; while the social scientists, in turn, reflect an intellectual dependence on the old German universities and a predilection for the abstractionist wonders of German prose style.

In any event, I am certain that the press cannot afford to indulge in an assumption that public administration is some sort of occult specialty, which deserves specialist coverage. And I further doubt that you in public administration can afford to either.

For there are few fields of conduct where it is more true that the area of the possible is coterminous with the area of the explainable. The lawyers, the doctors, the economists, the natural scientists may possibly be able to live and even flourish behind an intellectual iron curtain of jargon. But I visualize very little future for public administrators who aspire to be priests of a mystic order. With public administration the area of the possible must equal the area of the explainable, because this field is nothing less than supplying the best means for governing in an atmosphere of universal suffrage.

If there is anything at all to the foregoing, it follows that a very great deal can be done by practitioners and scholars of public administration to improve press coverage. And the dominant thing that can be done is simply this: bear in mind that ours is basically a simple, earthy language. The things you work with are things of everyday life. They must be explained as such by the press, if any readers are going to bother with them. The press can do this better if you relearn the simple language of the general community. It may help us all to remember a story about Winston Churchill. He was supposedly asked to say something about "the decisional factors created by managerial, technological, and logistical problems in the vast field of transportation in a period of belligerency." And he allegedly replied, "we moved all sorts of things with all kinds of means including a lot of wagons."

Well, that is more than enough of berating the field of public administration. Let us berate for a few *closing* minutes (that happy word "closing"!) the performance of the press.

The strengths and weaknesses of the press in this connection are just about the same as they are generally. The strengths arise from the power to communicate information and ideas for which the public is hungry—and to do this with an independence which our Constitution provides. Our weaknesses arise very largely out of our deadlines, our rush and bustle—out of the very fact that we are a daily press and not a group of contemplative scholars free to ruminate at leisure. The inescapable hurry of the press inevitably means a certain degree of superficiality. It is neither within our power nor our province to be ultimately profound. We write 365 days a year the first rough draft of history, and that is a very great task. But you must remember that just *that* is our task—and not something grander or fancier—if you would judge us correctly.

Being entrusted with a great responsibility and being also in a great hurry, we ought always to have our guards up against being too much influenced by the quick and angry winds that blow. We ought, even in our daily hurry, to keep in mind that the life of any day has some essential connection with days and months and years that have gone before and with others that will follow.

In the field of public administration the press often falls for nonsensical catchwords. A classic example was the attack on the governmental reorganization bill of the 1930's as a "dictator bill." Again the press has shown a tendency to be extremely superficial, if not even frivolous, about the alleged merits of so-called "czars" to handle complicated problems in time of emergency.

Part of such oversimplification may be inescapable. But our joint problem—yours and that of the press—is to keep it to the barest minimum. There is a tremendous opportunity for improvement in press coverage of all public administration affairs if you in the field and we of the press will consciously work for that improvement.

Management in the Judiciary

By WENDELL G. SCHAEFFER

Public Administration Service

FOR many years those concerned with the improvement of administrative organization and practices in government have concentrated their attention primarily upon the executive branches of national, state, and local jurisdictions. Such consideration of the executive process has been prompted in large part by the phenomenal growth in executive functions and authority; in some measure it has aided and supported that growth. Our legislative bodies have likewise received attention, and in the national Congress and a number of state legislatures important steps have been taken to improve organization, simplify procedures, and provide reference facilities to help members function more effectively. The literature of the public administration field clearly reflects a preoccupation with what have been considered management functions, and the interest in legislative activities has often stemmed from concern over the manner in which these activities relate to and impinge upon management practices in the various executive establishments.

Interest in the management aspects of court administration, on the other hand, has manifested itself among a relatively limited group of the more progressive members of the legal profession. New ideas have been advanced, revised procedures adopted, and some major reorganizations effected; but discussion of the possibilities, frustrations, and accomplishments of introducing in our court systems more effective organization and management practices has been confined largely to law review articles and bar association reports. The limitations of such changes have been mentioned scarcely at all. Administrative problems within the judiciary are certainly worthy of consideration in a broader frame of reference than has yet appeared.

The Movement for Court Reform

THE movement for judicial improvement took form in this country shortly after the turn of the century. Following certain precedents established in the English Judicature Act of 1873, it embodies two basic ideas: unification in court organization and judicial control over rules of procedure.¹ Dean Roscoe Pound stressed the need for application of modern management techniques in the courts over thirty years ago.² In 1914, the American Judicature Society, then a year old, produced its first draft of constitutional provisions designed to make possible the adoption of a model state court system. Since that time the American Bar Association, various state bar groups, and numerous judges and lawyers have thrown their weight behind court improvement programs. The Conference of Chief Justices has now been added to the ranks of those pressing for more effective administration of justice. Important changes have been recorded in recent years in a number of states, but, on the whole, progress has been extremely slow.

One of the principal difficulties encountered by advocates of integrated court systems and centralized administrative controls has been a general resistance to change on the part of the legal profession, which, as one judge has pointed out, has the trait of getting in a groove and staying there.³ On the other hand, leaders in other branches of government and the general public have given little thought to the matter of improving court operations. Many

¹ The American Bar Association, 33 *Reports* 578-95 (1909).

² Roscoe Pound, "Anachronisms in the Law," 3 *Journal of the American Judicature Society* 146 (February, 1920).

³ Richard Hartshorne, "Progress in Judicial Administration," 31 *Journal of the American Judicature Society* 12 (June, 1950).

bewail the failures of our court systems and decry the delays and costliness of litigation, but few outside the legal profession have taken the trouble to familiarize themselves with the methods and techniques advocated for judicial improvement. Even political scientists in our universities have tended to ignore the judiciary as an institution of government in the planning of curriculums and research, even while attention is devoted to the substantive products of that institution in the study of constitutional and administrative law. The judiciary has remained the domain of the lawyer and only the most intrepid laymen have dared to set foot on the legal preserve.

Those judges and attorneys who have appeared in the front ranks of the court reform movement have themselves delayed progress occasionally by their clannishness and professionalism. The statement that the bench and bar "alone have the requisite knowledge and experience to make practical reforms"⁴ expresses the attitude of many judges who have failed to recognize the fact that others, too, have a stake in the cause of administrative improvement in the courts and may contribute substantially to improvement programs. A more realistic approach is taken by Judge Charles E. Clark and William D. Rogers when they state that "it would be perverse blindness to overlook or discount the crucial part played by enlightened lay political leadership. Lawyers alone, it seems, are not likely to achieve court reform; there must be a movement firmly rooted in popular desires and political realities."⁵

Enormous increases in the size and scope of government operations, together with a general acceleration in the pace of our economic and social activities, have heaped great burdens on the judiciary in virtually all major population centers.⁶ This is true in spite of the creation of vast numbers of quasi-judicial boards and commissions to deal with all sorts

of legal situations requiring some kind of specialized adjudication. Crowded dockets, long delays before cases may come to trial, unnecessarily extended litigation, and adjudication of doubtful quality have often created public dissatisfaction with the courts and have made the utilization of judicial processes an extremely costly undertaking.

At a time when a strong system of independent and impartial tribunals is important to the defense of human rights and dignity in a fear-ridden world, many of our courts are failing in their mission because of inefficiency, antiquated practices, and low standards of professional competence on the bench. Consequently, the movement to bring about better performance of judicial functions by creating and staffing within the court systems focal points of management authority and supervisory responsibility carries with it considerable urgency. Reorganization of administration in the federal judiciary and in a few state systems has produced what appear to be significant results, and the course that is likely to be followed in other jurisdictions now seems relatively clear.

Basic Difficulties to Be Overcome

A NUMBER of factors have stood in the way of court management improvement, and four in particular should be mentioned. These are the autonomy of individual courts, the absence of central management facilities, the lack of adequate procedural and administrative rules, and the tendency of a number of court system reformers to overlook organizational and management fundamentals and get lost in the detail of procedural improvement.

Court Autonomy. In contrast with most state and municipal systems, our federal courts have been an example of a relatively uniform and hierarchically organized structure. The courts of many states and municipalities have been a hodge-podge of intricate jurisdictional subdivisions, levels of appeal, special courts, and multitudes of judicial officers to which the name "system" could scarcely be applied. The autonomy of the various units arises in large part from the absence of any basic scheme of judicial organization. Courts have come into existence by constitutional mandate or by legislative action as the need appeared. Fre-

⁴ The American Bar Association, *The Improvement of the Administration of Justice; A Handbook Prepared by the Section of Judicial Administration* (1949), p. 4.

⁵ Charles E. Clark and William D. Rogers, "The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization," 61 *Yale Law Journal* 1171 (November, 1952).

⁶ See comments on the state court systems as "big business" by Judge Hartshorne, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

quently, no provision exists for the exercise of central management authority.

The courts of a jurisdiction do not constitute a system, but exist as a series of independent judicial bodies having in common only legislative regulation on rules of procedure and the standardizing influence of appeal to the same higher tribunals. Often judges are subject to no form of supervision, receive no assistance in performing the numerous administrative tasks that go with court operation, and find themselves powerless to meet the demands of a caseload that grows heavier and heavier. Court autonomy, defined as the absence of integration within the judicial branch of government, is an autonomy of helplessness. Nevertheless, some fight to retain it to escape supervision and to defend themselves against what they believe is a threat to the dignity of their office. Others sincerely view management controls as a threat to judicial independence.

One of the most important elements affecting the management possibilities of a court system is the method by which judges are selected and hold office. In approximately two-thirds of the states judges are popularly elected, frequently after nomination in a party convention.⁷ In the remainder of the states, some form of appointment, either by the chief executive or the legislature, is provided. Forms of appointment vary considerably, some involving a degree of electoral participation and others not. Directly related to manner of selection are, of course, matters of tenure, salaries, and retirement benefits.

There is at issue the basic decision as to the degree to which judges should be subject to popular control. By and large, political theorists and the legal profession have agreed that courts are most likely to provide fair decisions based on sound legal principles if the judges are free from the pressures of partisan politics, have no call to consult the election calendar before rendering judgments, and can view their work on the bench as a distin-

guished and satisfying career.⁸ Often there is added the argument, never fully supported, that a better caliber of judge is likely to be chosen if the position is appointive rather than elective. The American Bar Association has been on record since 1937 in favor of selection by appointment with the executive choosing from a list prepared by a body composed of high judicial officers and other citizens selected for such purpose.⁹

Opposed to selection by appointment are many who fear domination of the judiciary by partisan executives and entrenched cliques within the legal profession, and these hazards are not altogether ephemeral. Less supportable is the desire of some political groups to have available as many elective offices as possible for political contest.

From the point of view of management, elective judgeships tend to foster individual court autonomy, for the judge looks naturally to his constituents rather than to the court system as a whole, even though he is an important part of that whole. Furthermore, judges are usually elected to individual courts or court units, and the possibility of judicial mobility is often virtually excluded. The possibility of central management of court personnel and supervision over the conduct of court business is greatly limited when the judge owes his office to a small group of partisan electors and when his availability in the general court system is restricted to the particular court to which the voters have sent him. Even when judgeships are appointive offices, the most effective utilization of judicial talent is difficult when the system is made rigid by designation of all judges to specific benches.

Proponents of stronger central management of court business call for simplicity and flexibility in the judicial system. Flexibility and individual court autonomy are held to be manifestly incompatible, and autonomy must give way if our courts are to be made more effective instruments for serving the public. In many cases, constitutional provisions and

⁷ For a complete survey of existing methods of judicial selection in the forty-eight states, see Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., *Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration* (National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1919), Chap. I. See also Table IV, "Final Selection of Judges of All State Courts," in *State Court Systems* (Council of State Governments, 1951).

⁸ Devices to isolate judicial officers from family, community, and partisan pressures are as old as history itself.

⁹ The American Bar Association, 62 *Reports* 893-97 (1937).

statutes must be modified before flexibility can be built into court systems.

Absence of Central Management. As indicated, a loose aggregation of tribunals does not constitute a manageable administrative entity or system. There is no point from which effective supervision may emanate and no one who may be held accountable if the system fails to function satisfactorily. In over half of the states there are virtually no elements of central supervision and only limited administrative controls in particular segments of the court structure. In some states, constitution or statutes assign vague responsibilities to the Supreme Court or to the Chief Justice thereof, but the assignment is not supported by adequate authority or facilities to make effective use of the authority granted. In a rather large group of states, real supervision is provided for some of the courts but not for the entire system. Supervision in such cases is concerned primarily with the distribution of judicial talent in such manner as to make possible prompt handling of caseload. In only a few states, California, Maryland, Missouri, and New Jersey among them, are considerable control and supervision exercised over virtually all courts within the jurisdiction.¹⁰ Recently, Puerto Rico, upon becoming a commonwealth with a new constitution, unified its court system and provided strong central management facilities.¹¹

Judicial councils in some states have provided a cohesive force for judicial administration. In California, the council and its chairman serve as a virtual administrative office for the entire state system with authority to transfer judges as the variations in caseload may require and to secure periodic reports on the status of court dockets.¹² The judicial councils have demonstrated their worth on many occasions, but there are many problems of business administration in the courts that they are not properly equipped or constituted to deal with. From a management view, the need is for a central administrative office that can

take up problems of caseload, statistics, and assignment, and that can serve the various court units on a continuous basis and assure the most effective use of the physical and human resources of the judicial system. Such central management authority and facilities require basic changes in the fundamental laws of most states similar to those embodied in the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 which gives to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court broad administrative authority over a unified judicial system.¹³

Inadequate Rules. The existence of court autonomy and the absence of facilities for central management are largely organizational problems. Other problems are procedural and managerial in a local sense; their existence in individual courts depends upon the firmness and skill of the judge in transacting the business of his court. Where judges are lax, courts may become arenas in which contesting attorneys strive to win battles by interminable maneuvering and procedural evasion designed to drag out the proceedings, wear down the opposition, and increase the size of their fees. Standards, rules, and administrative procedures designed to prevent these obstructions, adopted centrally and applied uniformly throughout the court system, may simplify proceedings, accelerate the work of the courts, and relieve the various judges of local pressures applied by the legal profession or interested parties. Central enforcement of such rules of administration, coupled with adequate reporting of judicial activity, may encourage punctuality and continuous effort on the part of judges to move the business of the court as rapidly as possible without affecting in any way full consideration of the merits of each case and proper judicial deliberation.

The question of administrative rules is in a sense distinct from that of rules of procedure, civil and criminal. Administrative rules concern court management. In a system with central management authority they are determined by a higher tribunal or authority. Volumes of discussion have been recorded on the subject of whether the legislature or the courts should establish rules of procedure. In general, the courts claim that they alone possess the competence and experience to make practi-

¹⁰ Vanderbilt, *op cit.*, Chap. II, describes in detail the extent of court supervision in the various states.

¹¹ See Charles E. Clark and William D. Rogers, *op cit.*; also A. Cecil Snyder, "Puerto Rico Modernizes Courts," 42 *National Municipal Review* 11-16 (January, 1955).

¹² Constitution of California, Art. VI.

¹³ New Jersey Constitution (1947), Art. VI.

cal and realistic rules,¹⁴ whereas legislators are loath to withdraw from a field that is so basic to the rights of citizens.¹⁵ The trend in recent years has been toward court independence in the determination of procedural rules with power of rejection or amendment in the legislature—an arrangement that may provide a reasonably satisfactory solution. However, the vesting of authority to enact or even to revise administrative regulations in a body outside of the court system has much less to commend it, and from a management point of view would be undesirable. Fortunately, it is a much less contentious matter.

In the majority of states, however, there exists no uniform pattern of administrative rules. Each court determines its own management processes, or virtually disregards the subject. The administrative rules of the federal court system, vesting management authority in a central administrative office, provide an excellent example of the kind of regulations that advocates of central management in the judiciary feel would prove extremely helpful in most state court systems.

Inattention to Fundamentals. Many efforts to bring about better court operation have ended in frustration because those interested in improvement have failed to grasp the fact that the organizational environment of judicial activity is a fundamental factor in the whole process of change. Procedural problems and their apparent solutions are often clear to men who work on and before the bench day after day, but the benefits to be derived from effective court organization and the application of tested management techniques to the business affairs of the courts seem to escape many judges and lawyers. Once the court system has been given some degree of integration and its fundamental structure has been strengthened and simplified, facilities should be available to cope with the problems of procedural improvement and courtroom practice.

¹⁴ Cf. Dean Wigmore, "Legislature Has No Power in Procedural Field," 20 *Journal of the American Judicature Society* (1936), and Vanderbilt, *op. cit.*, Chap. III.

¹⁵ Burton D. Esmond, "Rule-Making by the Legislature," 166 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 102-5 (May, 1933).

Objectives and Methods of Administrative Improvement

IMPROVED judicial administration is a worthy objective that has come to mean a variety of things to a variety of people and the interests they represent. To some it means the clearing of crowded dockets and the more rapid handling of caseload. To others it means lower costs of litigation and more ready access to the courts. To many in the judicial profession it means relief from overwork and constant work pressures, while to others it means more work and a larger share of the responsibility for getting the courts' business done. To many a young lawyer it may mean the opportunity for a satisfying judicial career without the necessity of entering politics. There is need for a clear statement of the prerequisites to and the essentials of improved judicial administration in order that the subject may be viewed in the framework of general administrative practices and attention given to the impact of these practices on our court structures and practices.

Service to the Public. The judicial system is a fundamental public service, offering a means for determining impartially the individual's rights and obligations in relation to other individuals and the state. Such service should be available to the public wherever and whenever needed, and it should be of a quality to engender confidence in its integrity and expertness.

Aside from the question of geographic distribution, courts are not adequately accessible if they are so specialized functionally or jurisdictionally that litigants are at a loss to know where to file their cases and the courts must spend a great amount of time in deciding where cases may appropriately be heard. Another difficulty arises when specialized courts are located only in certain large cities and litigants are forced to seek adjudication only in such localities. Experience has demonstrated that great specialization is often unnecessary, and that where specialization is needed it is often more efficient to move specialized judges from one court to another than to maintain individual specialized courts. Consequently, the trend in judicial improvement has been toward simplification in court structure, reduction in the number of specialized tribunals,

and consolidation of entire systems into general courts with appropriate divisions constituting flexible and manageable administrative units. Such units may include those devoted to cases of juvenile offenders, traffic violators, and other special groups.

In the public interest the process of adjudication needs to be accelerated. There are two basic causes for delays in the conduct of court business. One is the crowding of dockets and congestion of litigation in areas of intense court activity. The other is the existence of obsolete procedures and management practices that permit excessive continuances, unduly liberal time limits for answering and deciding upon motions, and laxness on the part of judges in writing opinions and closing the case after the trial has been held. Another factor is inattentiveness to duty on the part of some judges.

The present approach to correcting the first difficulty is the creation of authority at appropriate judicial levels to assign judges where they are needed and to the work for which they are best fitted. Because the power of assignment is a delicate one to be exercised only after mature reflection concerning the best interests of the court system as a whole, it is generally considered advisable to entrust it to the highest judicial officer in the jurisdiction. To make the assignment power really effective, it must be an administrative function based on careful analysis of workload statistics and on familiarity with the special abilities and work characteristics of the judges, all of whom are made subject to transfer as the needs for service require.

A number of jurisdictions have attacked the second difficulty by modernizing and tightening the rules of court management and by making the individual judges responsible for the prompt conduct of court business through a system of reporting that requires of each a weekly report on hours spent on the bench each court day, the number of cases and motions heard and disposed of, and the number of cases and motions heard but not disposed of at the end of the week and the reasons for carrying them over. The use of such reports, reinforced by strong leadership in the chief judicial office of the state, as in New Jersey,¹⁶

has assisted materially in the evaluation of workload and the assignment of additional judges in congested areas to meet emergencies. The circulation of report summaries among the judges may serve as a strong stimulus for those who might be inclined to lag behind in their work.

It has never been the intention of those advocating judicial reform to deprive judges in any way of the necessary time to review evidence, hear testimony, and make decisions. Rather, the methods of improvement are aimed at the elimination of procedural distractions, the provision of smoother work flow, and greater attention to the management of workload.

Service to the public is inadequate if judges are of poor quality or are lax in the performance of their duties. Low salaries and poor working conditions have often discouraged many able persons from selecting the judiciary as a career.¹⁷ Election of judges or other methods of selection and tenure that make supervision of work and effective management difficult have tended to prevent positive measures to improve the quality of the judicial system. These problems are usually most apparent in the lower trial courts. Leaders in the court reform movement advocate the appointment of judges for fixed terms and periodic review of performance before reappointment. They also favor high standards of selection, salaries adequate to attract those who meet the standards, periodic salary increases on the basis of merit, and adequate retirement benefits for those who make judicial service a career.¹⁸

The physical conditions that prevail in the courts are also important. Supreme courts and higher appellate tribunals may have excellent courtroom facilities and fine chambers, but other courts, and trial courts in particular, are often poorly housed, congested, ill-equipped,

new system of court administration in New Jersey, see Willard G. Woelper, "Jersey Justice Streamlined," 41 *National Municipal Review* 283-87, 315 (June, 1952).

¹⁷ For an old but suggestive study of the effect of training and background of judges on court status and prestige see Rodney L. Mott, Spencer D. Albright, and Helen R. Semmerling, "Judicial Personnel," 166 *The Annals* 143-55 (May, 1933).

¹⁸ See comments of Judge Vanderbilt, *op cit.*, pp. 25-28.

¹⁶ For a brief résumé of the accomplishments of the

and badly maintained. The lower courts largely determine the attitude of the public toward the court system, for it is with these courts that most people come in contact. Inadequate financial support is often the immediate cause for the poor appearance of these courts, but more basic is the absence of a good court administrative system that leaves a vacuum in matters of physical planning, housing and supply standards, and budgeting practices to provide for better conditions and justify greater financial support. The existence of the Administrative Office of the federal court system has provided the basis for greatly improved planning and budgeting within the federal judiciary; but at the state and local levels courts have often been given a low priority in salaries and physical facilities because they have had no spokesman to present their needs to budget bureaus, legislatures, and councils. The creation of a central office of court administration within the framework of a unified judicial system and directly under the chief judicial officer of the jurisdiction makes it possible to deal with managerial and house-keeping functions continuously, systematically, and efficiently. Such an office provides a focal point of attention to better judicial administration and is characteristic of the most modern judicial organizations.

Positive and Efficient Internal Management. The creation of a unified judicial system with management authority vested in the Chief Justice or other high judicial officer cannot of itself bring about good court management. The management function must be organized and procedures developed and placed in operation—procedures that tie the court system together administratively and provide for continuous central supervision of court operation. No chief judicial officer can be expected personally to perform the various managerial and administrative functions assigned the head of a court system and have time to perform the duties of the bench. A full-scale staff organization is called for.

A chief administrative officer appointed by and responsible directly to the chief judicial officer represents the developing pattern of judicial administrative organization. The administrative officer is provided with a staff organized to perform the various activities

that good court management implies. These functions have been recognized as falling into the two broad categories of management statistics and business administration.

Basic to good judicial administrative practice are the collection, analysis, and use of "live" statistical data that reflect the workload and general state of business throughout the court system. The efficient handling of judicial business is largely dependent upon the ready availability of management information. Such information makes possible the adjusting of judicial assignments to workload requirements, the identification of trouble spots, and the determination of the kind of remedial action necessary to correct operating difficulties. The design and maintenance of a well-developed reporting system is a key function of a successful administrative office.

The individual judge should be concerned primarily with the handling of cases on the bench and in chambers. To be fully effective he should be relieved to the greatest extent possible of the clerical, financial, and procurement functions of his court. Such business activities are a major function of a central administrative office. It may develop standards for the performance of business functions throughout the system, and, in many cases, actually do centrally many of the tasks heretofore performed by the individual courts on a decentralized and often ineffective basis. Thus the court system as a whole becomes a budgetary unit with a planned program of physical expansion or contraction. It also becomes the source of employment and assignment of personnel and fixes the standards of competence required of its administrative staff.

Conclusions

THE purpose of this article has been to summarize an emerging trend and to call attention to a major segment of government where management improvement practices are just beginning to be taken seriously. It has not included a discussion of many refinements in the processes of better court management, such as the use of administrative judges in large court sections and assignment officers in areas of intense congestion. Other fields for improvement that have not been discussed

are jury selection, appeal procedure, and a variety of other procedural matters.

The movement for improved judicial administration thus far has pinned its hopes on court consolidation, integration of court systems, and management supervision by the highest judicial officer, usually the chief justice of the highest appellate court. Some offices of court administration, under the direction of a chief administrative officer, have been established to provide the system with information on the status of its operations and to perform the general business functions which can be undertaken centrally for the various courts. Where an administrative office has not been made possible by appropriate legislation, a considerable amount of management authority may be vested in a judicial council or conference. These developments have taken place in only a few localities, but there are indications that other jurisdictions are likely to follow.

These organizational ideas and management practices are in no sense novel. They have long been considered fundamental in well-run governmental executive agencies and in many private enterprises. It is only their application in the court systems of the country that may raise questions. Probably no one will quarrel with the statement that there is need for simplification in many of our court structures. Likewise, the desirability of introducing into the operation of the courts good practices in budget preparation, property management, and activity reporting will raise little argument. The points that open basic issues are judicial centralization and greater professionalization of the bench, both of which are fundamental in the present court reform movement.

Executive agencies are commonly characterized by action programs and the carrying out of definite policies. Central direction is clearly called for. Most programs also involve the application of high degrees of professional and scientific knowledge and ability. Our courts, on the other hand, have long functioned as highly decentralized units in which emphasis has been placed upon the independence of

the judge in conducting his court and arriving at his decisions. Emphasis has also been given to keeping the bench close to the people it serves and to allowing the people a voice in the selection of those who are to sit upon it. As a consequence, it may be argued, in many smaller communities the coldness of the law is frequently tempered with an understanding possible only when the court takes its place as one of the basic elements of local community life. In metropolitan areas, much of this "closeness" has already been lost. The tightening of hierarchical lines and the increased professionalization advocated as a concomitant of appointive judgeships would seem to carry with them the possibility of organizational aloofness and a more bureaucratic, less personal judiciary.

Little attention has been focused on the role of the judiciary as an instrument for making public policy and particularly for the expression of policy in a legal context. Such a role implies a degree of responsiveness to shifts and changes in the social values that in their variety of expressions go to make up the public interest. Will not the end product of the present reform tendencies and trends be a more isolated and less responsive judiciary? This and other questions remain unanswered.

Perhaps the solution of the problems involved in securing more prompt, efficient conduct of judicial business requires central management and a greater professionalization of the judiciary. Yet control over assignment and promotion policy and participation in selection and reappointment are powerful weapons. Their use in the interest of efficient judicial operations is a worthy objective, but it should not be forgotten that they serve equally well in executive agencies to secure conformity with executive policy and to discipline those who deviate. It is certainly valid to question the appropriateness of placing such powers in the hands of a centralized judicial hierarchy. It is to the interest of all that issues such as this be freely discussed and their resolution participated in by all who are concerned with the future course of our political institutions.

The Revival of Whitleyism in British Local Government

By CARL J. SCHNEIDER

*Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Nebraska*

THE basis of Whitleyism is found in the reports of the Reconstruction Committee, appointed during the closing years of World War I and presided over by J. H. Whitley, later speaker of the House of Commons. These reports recommended the establishment of representative councils in British industry to negotiate agreements between employer and employed and provide a forum for the common discussion of grievances and problems. The principles of Whitleyism—which may be defined as the endeavor of employers and employees through representative councils to understand each other's problems, establish mutual confidence, and raise the efficiency of the enterprise in which they are commonly engaged—were early extended to staff relations within the central civil service. Since 1919 there has been in operation a system of Whitley councils on which the administration in its capacity as employer ("official side") and the civil servants ("staff side") are equally represented. These councils have become a well established and characteristic feature of the British civil service, providing the machinery through which virtually all phases of public personnel policy are discussed and the clash of contending interests ameliorated. Within the central civil service, Whitleyism has substantial achievements to its credit.¹

In British local government, however, Whit-

leyism achieved no major successes until recently, despite sporadic efforts on the part of staff associations to secure its acceptance by the local authorities. Today Whitley machinery is in operation for all categories of local government employees, a fact that has received but scant attention in the United States, despite its significance for the local official and for the status of local administration in the larger picture of British government. The universal application of Whitley principles to the local government service is more than a narrow victory for the staff associations who have long advocated it. It has a larger significance for the future of local government generally and heralds a new phase in local public administration.

The whole story is too vast to be susceptible of adequate treatment in a single article. Therefore we shall here concentrate upon its more important aspects, namely the consequences flowing from the establishment in 1944 of the National Joint Council for Local Authorities' Administrative, Professional, Technical and Clerical Services, hereafter referred to as the National Joint Council. Councils of a Whitley character have been created for other categories of local government employees, but the National Joint Council is of special interest because the officials with which it is concerned bear the brunt of the responsibility for the efficient conduct of local administration and, numerically, constitute the bulk of local government employees. Lest confusion develop, it should be noted that in British local government the term "employee" is sufficiently broad to include both "officer" and "official."

¹ See Leonard D. White, *Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service* (University of Chicago Press, 1933); H. M. Treasury, *Staff Relations in the Civil Service* (H. M. Stationery Office, 1949); Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929-31, *Report*, Cmd. 3909, ch. XIII; J. H. Macrae-Gibson, *The Whitley System in the Civil Service* (Fabian Society, 1922); E. N. Gladden, *Civil Service Staff Relationships* (William Hodge & Co., 1943).

The staff of a local authority comprises the personnel hired by a local council to administer its functions.

Background

TO ACCOUNT for this revival of local government Whitleyism it is helpful to refer to the earlier, abortive attempts to make Whitleyism work. As soon as it became apparent that the Whitley system was applicable to local staff relations, the associations of local government officers pressed for its adoption. Discussions with the local authority associations ensued, culminating in 1920 in the formation of a National Council and a number of provincial councils. The results were disappointing. "It was not long . . . before much of the enthusiasm for these new organisations had died, one reason being the attempt of the National Council to formulate national conditions of service. The Associations of Local Authorities took exception to this and withdrew from the National Council, which in consequence collapsed. . . ."²

A few of the provincial councils survived, however, to keep alive the concept of Whitleyism and bring about useful though limited improvements in service conditions. In 1925, in an effort to secure coordination among the provincial councils, a Standing Conference of Joint Councils was established. This, too, proved ineffective and was dissolved in September, 1936. Its place was taken by another national body, a National Whitley Council, consisting of representatives from the provincial councils, each council sending three representatives from each side. This council also failed to achieve any major successes and soon became moribund as the associations of local authorities continued to drag their feet.

Thus, throughout the interwar period efforts to establish effective national machinery embracing every local authority were fruitless. Prior to the reforms of 1944, only 700 out of 1,530 local authorities recognized and supported the national Whitley organization.

The result was an exceedingly spotty pattern of staff relationships with wide variations in recruitment policy, compensation, promotion,

grading and classification, and general conditions of service. Such national standards as existed came about either through chance or through prescription by the central government. The Local Government Act of 1933, for example, required the appointment of certain officers by particular classes of councils; and certain government departments exercised considerable control over appointments and dismissals of specified key officials. However, the number of officials so regulated constituted only a small proportion of the total local service. In no sense of the word did there exist an integrated local government service comparable to the central civil service; on the contrary, there were as many local government services as there were separate local authorities. Each local council was free to evolve its own practices and standards, and to organize its staff according to its own needs, resources, predilections, and prejudices. The freedom enjoyed by each local council permitted considerable experimentation which had obvious advantages. Nevertheless, the changing environment within which local government has had to function in time generated a demand for a more coordinated view of personnel policies. This demand became fairly apparent during the war and led to a recrudescence of interest in Whitleyism as a means of improving service conditions and raising the general level of performance of the staff.

Several factors were responsible for the resurgence of interest in local government Whitleyism. First and foremost, the heavy burdens thrust upon the local authorities and the changing relationship with Whitehall had reached a point where greater coordination and standardization of service conditions over the entire country was clearly called for. This point was authoritatively stated early in the war:

It is an important characteristic of much of the new work with which Local Authorities have been entrusted that it is essentially national rather than local, and that it is carried out under conditions which are uniform throughout the country. From this it follows that the conception of the local government service as a national institution has been strengthened by war circumstances. The plea for standardization of service conditions and their obligatory

² Norman Wilson, "The Local Government Service Since the War," 30 *Public Administration* 132 (Summer, 1952).

grading in backward areas has received a new and powerful justification.³

The same writer referred with approval to the claims of the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) for a "comprehensive negotiating machinery of a Whitley character embracing every local authority, together with salary and grading standards negotiated through that machinery and covering the entire country."

The need for a viable Whitley system was thus accentuated by the stresses and strains to which local government was—and would continue to be—subjected. The reallocation of functions among the local authorities and from local government to the central government raised doubt in the minds of many observers that local institutions could escape the fate of their French counterparts.⁴ This apprehension over the future of local government in the total governing process was in large measure responsible for the great interest in local government reform which flowered during and immediately after World War II. The inability of the friends of local government to agree on any specific proposals for reform, and the failure of the central government to furnish any constructive leadership, left the local councils and their staffs (and the national associations of both) to protect themselves by whatever means were available. Under the circumstances, the best immediate hope of local government lay in increasing its own capacity to act effectively. In this connection there was a growing appreciation of the primary importance of a high level of efficiency and performance if local

government was to hold its own against the claims of Whitehall for more power and authority. Herman Finer pointed out the moral:

Modern local administration, like modern central administration, becomes ever more heavily charged with business. It is true that there is a relative shifting of the weight of business to the central authority; yet, nevertheless, the absolute amount of business placed on local authorities becomes every year weightier, and this has implications in terms of the number and quality of its officials. . . . It is not merely for the good credit of local government that the training of officials is urgent, but for the credit of government generally, for though local authorities have a legitimate sphere of autonomy they are over an even larger sphere the partners of the central authority in joint enterprises for the good of the whole State. With the increasing claims of the central authority there is little hope for the maintenance of local self-government should it be properly convicted of incompetence. All, therefore, depends upon the quality of local officials.⁵

Local personnel administration thus becomes an issue of national, as well as of local, import. In considering the future of local self-government in modern Britain, it is necessary to keep in mind not only the broad problem of local autonomy versus centralization, which is the principal object of controversy, but the competence of the local administrative apparatus as well. Against this larger background, the revitalization of local government Whitleyism is seen in its proper perspective. There was general agreement that reforms were long overdue and that the status and standards of the local government service could no longer safely be left to chance. Professor Finer no doubt exaggerates when he says that "all" depends upon the quality of local officials, for obviously many factors outside the control of the local authorities will affect the future of local government. Nevertheless, the caliber of the local official is of paramount importance. Thus the exigencies of the war and the period of crisis

³ *Municipal Year Book*, 1941, p. 71.

⁴ An editorial writer in the official journal of the Association of Municipal Corporations summarized this situation as follows: "Local functions ought to be carried out, within the general framework of the policy laid down by Parliament, by independent local units exercising full authority in their own areas. The idea of a series of agents without individual rights, obligations and discretions, following the behests of the central government, is something completely foreign to this country and contrary to the very meaning of the term 'local authority.'" 20 *Municipal Review* 2 (June, 1949). See also D. N. Chester, *Central and Local Government: Financial and Administrative Relations* (Macmillan, 1951), *passim*. The annual numbers of the *Municipal Year Book* provide a convenient running summary of legislation affecting the functions of the various categories of local authorities.

⁵ *English Local Government* (Methuen & Co., 4th ed. rev., 1950), pp. 282 ff. A similar view was expressed by the then (1946) parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Health who told a NALGO conference that "one of our greatest problems today is to settle for ourselves whether or not the existing machinery of local government is going to be efficient enough to meet the problems of the next ten years." Quoted in C. H. Wilson, *Essays on Local Government* (Basil Blackwell, 1948), p. 12.

which British local government anticipated thereafter paved the way for the revitalization of the Whitley system in 1944.

The inaugural meeting of the new National Joint Council was held on January 13, 1944, after protracted negotiations among the local authority associations, NALGO, the government departments concerned (principally the Ministry of Health), and other interested bodies. Much of the credit for the success of these negotiations belongs to NALGO, which early in the war had seized the initiative in demanding the universal application of Whitleyism to the local government service. The local authority associations exhibited some reluctance to cooperate, protesting that the time was inopportune for such reforms. They obviously feared that a revived and strengthened Whitley system would rob them of control over their own staff arrangements. Toward the end of 1940, however, this reluctance was overcome—a fact which, along with the support of successive Ministers of Health, made it possible to initiate the discussions which culminated in the constitution of the National Joint Council.

The Constitution of the National Joint Council

THE constitution of the National Joint Council is short, only 21 paragraphs. In many respects it is modeled after the constitution of the National Whitley Council for the central civil service.⁶ No useful purpose would be served by reciting the provisions of each paragraph of the constitution; for our purpose the salient features of the new Whitley system revolve around the provisions relating to the competence, membership, organization, powers, and functions of the National Joint Council.

The competence of the Council extends to all administrative, professional, technical, and clerical staff except the clerks to the local authorities (e.g., town clerk, district council clerk), the heads of most departments, all officials with a salary of over £1,000 annually, all employees for whom a joint industrial council already exists, part-time officers, and technical staffs of public utility enterprises who come

within the scope of any related national or district organization.⁷

The decision to exclude the senior officers was reached only after prolonged discussion. Preliminary proposals advanced by the various local authority associations would have excluded an even larger number of officers. If accepted, these proposals would seriously have jeopardized any prospect for genuine national standards for the service; it was argued, particularly by the staff associations, that comprehensiveness was a *sine qua non* for effective Whitleyism. On the other hand, the employing authorities maintained, with some justification, that their relationship to the senior officers, particularly those who were heads of departments, was different in kind from their relationship to the rank and file official. Therefore the freedom of the local council in hiring these key officials should not be subject to the operations of a central negotiating body such as the National Joint Council. The local authorities, through their associations, took the position that the salaries and service conditions of their senior employees should continue to be determined by direct negotiation. This point of view was further supported by the fact that it seemed undesirable in principle for subordinate members of the staff to participate in setting salaries for their own superiors. Moreover, the senior officers were members of their own professional associations and their professional status tended to give them a somewhat different psychology from that of their junior colleagues. All things considered, the jurisdictional limits of the National Joint Council as finally fixed seemed well justified. Nevertheless, a gap was left in its competence.⁸

Membership on the National Joint Council follows a pattern common to all Whitley Councils, namely that employers and employees are represented equally. In this case each side has thirty representatives. Agreement as to how the

⁷ *Constitution* (rev., 1949), par. 3. The following chief officers are specifically excluded from the operations of the Whitley system: accountants and treasurers, engineers and surveyors, chief education officers and architects, "and such other chief officers as may hereafter be excepted by agreement between the Council and the bodies participating in the Joint Negotiating Committees for chief officers of local authorities."

⁸ On the relationship between the senior staff and the Whitley system, see *Municipal Year Book*, 1947, pp. 80 ff.

⁶ For the constitution of the National Whitley Council for the central civil service, see H. M. Treasury, *Staff Relations in the Civil Service*, Appendix III.

representatives are to be selected, however, was complicated by the fact that, unlike the situation in the central civil service, there is no single employer in local government; instead, there are several types of local authorities which differ markedly in size and resources. The problem was to balance somehow the relative importance of these different local authorities. Procedurally, the issue involved making a decision between direct representation of the local authorities (through their associations), on the one hand, and indirect representation (that is, with the members selected by the provincial councils), on the other. Indirect representation, which had been followed under the previous systems, was severely criticized by the larger local authority associations (particularly the County Council Association), which complained of being swamped by the smaller authorities. They therefore demanded direct representation. The result was a compromise whereby half of the employers' representation would be appointed directly by the local authority associations and half "by and from" the employers' side of each of the fifteen provincial councils.⁹ A similar agreement was reached for the staff side. Fifteen members are appointed "by and from" the staff side of the provincial councils and fifteen are appointed by the national staff associations.¹⁰

To maintain an equitable balance between the two elements of the National Joint Council, the constitution provides that no resolution may be passed unless it has been approved by a majority vote of each side. This mutually protective provision applies not only to action taken in the Council but also to action by any committee appointed by the Council. A quo-

rum consists of sixteen members divided equally between the two sides. The chairman of the Council is appointed by the Minister of Health and is independent of either side.

Agreement also had to be reached on the status of the provincial councils. Fifteen of these councils are provided for in the constitution but their position is clearly subordinate to the National Joint Council. They are authorized to deal with the application of principles approved by the National Council and to initiate the consideration of matters of local concern. But they may not take executive action except along lines approved by the central Whitley organ.¹¹ This subordination of the provincial councils is a definite departure from previous practice. The decentralization of authority which had weakened earlier attempts to extend the principles of Whitleyism to the local government service has been altered.¹²

The National Joint Council is constitutionally empowered to take whatever action is necessary "to secure the largest possible measure of joint action for the consideration of salaries, wages and service conditions within the scope of the Council and to consider such proposals in reference to these matters as are submitted to them from time to time by the Provincial Councils."

Specifically, the functions of the National Council fall within the following areas: (1) Collective agreements on salaries, wages, and conditions of service. This function involves providing machinery for the regular consideration of these subjects and taking measures to insure that local authorities will recognize such agreements. (2) Disputes arising between staff and employing authorities (or in a provincial council between staff and employers' side) on matters of salaries, wages, and conditions of service. Such disputes may be referred to the National Joint Council which shall attempt to settle them; failing settlement, the Council is empowered to constitute an appeals committee, composed of an equal number of representatives from each side, which may arbitrate. The Council is permitted to create machinery

*The local authority associations are represented according to the following formula:

Association of Municipal Corporations.....	6
County Council Association.....	5
Urban Districts Councils Association.....	2
Metropolitan Boroughs' Standing Joint Committee..	1
Rural Districts Councils Association.....	1

Constitution, par. 5(b)

** National Association of Local Government Officers.....	8
National Union of General and Municipal Workers.....	3
National Union of Public Employees.....	2
Transport and General Workers Union.....	1
Hospital and Welfare Services Union.....	1

Ibid., par. 5(c)

¹¹ For a discussion of the role of the provincial councils see, *Municipal Year Book*, 1945, p. 58.

¹² *Constitution*, par. 4 and attached schedule. See J. H. Warren, *The English Local Government System* (Allen & Unwin, 1946), p. 139, for reference to this situation.

"where it does not exist" to prevent or settle such disputes. (3) Information and education on matters bearing on the service of officers, with special attention to improving the quality of staff. This area includes the collection of relevant data and statistics, encouragement of the study of administrative methods, consideration of recruitment policies and staff training, and cooperation with education authorities in providing opportunities for study. (4) Health and welfare work among local government staff. (5) Development of the collective approach to problems of staff relationships. This function includes cooperation with other joint councils on matters of common concern as well as taking measures to strengthen the Whitley system by encouraging the participation of all parties involved and securing their loyal observance of collective agreements.

How effective the National Joint Council will be in dealing with the tasks assigned to it and how successful it will be in helping local authorities to develop the civil service demanded by the times remains to be seen. Since its inception it has functioned in a manner to suggest that it will become a permanent and valuable part of the British local government system. The progress made in injecting the principles of Whitleyism into this system may materially affect not only the performance but even the structure of local administration.

The Principle of Collective Bargaining

THE principle of collective bargaining within the local government service has now received universal acceptance. The fact that the employing authorities have cooperated with the national staff associations in setting up a strong national Whitley council is in itself a significant development. Questions and disputes relating to conditions of service are to be settled within a regular framework of collective negotiation and mutual support on the part of local government officers. Local authorities can no longer be a law unto themselves. Agreements reached by the prescribed methods of bargaining—the Whitley councils—cannot be treated lightly by local authorities who have agreed to participate in the work of the National Joint Council. A recalcitrant au-

thority would be in the anomalous position of parting company with its own colleagues.¹³

Under Defense (General) Regulations, 1939, the Minister of Labor and National Service was authorized to make provision for the prevention of trade disputes. Pursuant to this power, the Minister issued the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, which provided that all employers are bound to observe "recognized terms and conditions of employment" which had been arrived at by negotiation between associations of workmen and employers in any trade or industry in any district. The order also set up a National Arbitration Tribunal, to which disputes were to be referred.¹⁴ The question then arose as to whether employees of local authorities were "workmen" within the meaning of the order and whether a dispute between a local authority and its staff was a "trade dispute" within the order. An affirmative answer to both these questions was handed down by the House of Lords in the case of *National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation*, which is still good law.¹⁵

The provisions of the original order have been substantially continued by the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951 (S. I., 1951, No. 1376). As a result, the local government officer and his associations have the right to use the machinery of arbitration created by the central government to enforce agreements reached in the Whitley system; and the discretion which the employing authority has on terms of employment may be overridden by an award of the Tribunal. Collective bargaining thus has received what amounts to statutory recognition and Whitleyism has been immeasurably strengthened.

The National Scheme of Conditions of Service

THE most important consequence flowing from the revival of local government Whitleyism has been the attention paid to recruit-

¹³ This point is argued with great cogency by Neville Hobson, *The Borough, Urban and Rural Councillor* (Shaw and Sons, 1947), p. 622.

¹⁴ Defense (General) Regulations, 1939 (S. R. & O., 1939, No. 927). Regulation 58AA was added by S. R. & O., 1940, No. 1217; Conditions of Employment and Arbitration Order (S. R. & O., 1940, No. 1305).

¹⁵ *N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corporation* (1943) A. C. 166;

ment, training, compensation, and similar matters of personnel policy. The Whitley system provides the essential machinery through which local authorities are enabled to deal creatively with the task of securing and retaining the services of men and women properly qualified to cope with the problems confronting local government. The National Scheme of Conditions of Service (popularly called the National Charter), promulgated in 1946, represents the response of the National Joint Council to this challenge. The charter provides, among other things, for minimum standards of recruitment, including open, competitive examinations; a uniform system of grading and classification with attached salary scales; a system of centrally devised and administered examinations to establish eligibility for promotion to higher grades in the service; and encouragement for post-entry training, including such incentives as monetary grants and special leaves.¹⁶

Although technically the charter is only a recommendation to the local authorities, it has been accepted by nearly 1,300 local councils and promises to become a generally recognized code of employment. The word "promises" is used advisedly because the standards established in the National Charter have not yet been fully implemented by the employing authorities. In many cases this failure to meet the prescribed standards stems from factors clearly

beyond the control of any local council.¹⁷ In time the charter may well become a meaningful standard throughout the entire local government service.

While many problems are on the road to solution by means of the machinery of the Whitley Council and the standards established in the National Charter, important questions of staff relationships remain that affect the administrative efficiency of the local authorities. One, in particular, is the appointment of the senior officers who are specifically excluded from the purview of the National Joint Council.

The Senior Officers

It is established practice in the local service to appoint men with technical (or professional) training and qualifications as chiefs of the operating departments. The position of the technical expert vis à vis the lay administrator in the local service is thus the exact reverse of the situation found in the central civil service. There is no unanimity among informed observers that the best interests of local administration are advanced by appointing technical specialists as senior officers and the National Joint Council is, as we have seen, without competence so far as this group is concerned.

Yet by indirection, the National Charter may have repercussions for the senior officer which may slowly bring about a reversal of policy. We are dealing here with incipient developments which may never fully materialize; nonetheless, the seeds of change are present. A perusal of the charter—particularly the portions dealing with qualifications, recruitment, training, and promotion—reveals a growing appreciation of the officer with administrative ability. At the top of the classified service is the Administrative, Professional and Technical

(1942) 40 L. G. R. 273; 2 All E. R. 425; 167 L. T. 312. Defense Regulations 58AA has been kept in force since the war.

¹⁶ *Scheme of Conditions of Service* (2d ed., 1949). The National Joint Council has approved a number of amendments to the charter since 1949, but they deal mainly with details and have not altered any of its fundamental assumptions. Convenient summaries of the charter are found in the *Municipal Year Book*, 1947, pp. 69 ff., and Wilson, *op. cit.* For discussion of various aspects of the charter, see: *A Survey of the Local Government Service* (National Joint Council for Local Authorities' Administrative . . . Services, 1950); *Examinations for Promotion* (Local Government Examination Board, 1951). The *Survey of the Local Government Service* (hereafter cited as *Survey*) contains a wealth of data on current personnel practices and procedures. Many of the provisions of the charter were foreshadowed in *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Qualifications, Recruitment, Training and Promotion of Local Government Officers* (H. M. Stationery Office, 1934), the "Hadow Report."

¹⁷ These factors are discussed in *Survey*, especially Chs. 3-12; J. H. Warren, *The Local Government Service* (Allen and Unwin, 1952), *passim*; *Municipal Year Book*, 1948, p. 70; *Municipal Year Book*, 1949, p. 922. The National Council has allowed considerable discretion to the local authorities in applying many of the charter's provisions. For example, see "Decisions of the National Joint Council for Local Authorities' Administrative . . . Services for Insertion in the Second Edition of the Scheme of Conditions Service Booklet," amending Par. 8, Ref. M.2 (approved by the National Council, Jan. 17, 1950), and interpreting Par. 2, Ref. M.4 (approved Jan. 17, 1950) and Par. 8, Ref. M.4 (approved July 12, 1950).

Division (APT), which includes not only officers who must have professional or technical qualifications but also officers whose work is primarily administrative in character. For promotion into and within the APT Division the officer must pass an appropriate examination; in the case of the administrative post, the examination is devised and administered by the Local Government Examination Board.¹⁸ To pass the Administrative Examination the candidate must exhibit not only his grasp of the technical details of central and local government, but his general knowledge of and insight into the over-all problems of government as well. The object of this examination is to recognize a broad training in the social sciences with particular reference to public administration and to encourage the development of administrators—generalists who have the ability to see the problems of local government as a whole, free from the rigidity and departmentalization which frequently result from excessive specialization.

Officers aspiring to promotion to professional or technical posts within the APT Division must be accredited by an appropriate professional or technical association.¹⁹ These officers may in time hope for promotion into senior posts. The Local Government Examination Board had therefore to consider carefully the quality of the examinations provided by the professional and technical bodies. It expressed grave concern that they tend to become so specialized as to "impede the efforts to develop that broad training which one engaged in administration of a public service ought to have." The recurrent note in all discussions of qualifications is the need for capable administrators, for widely educated officials.²⁰ Local govern-

ment has reached the stage where officials with more than a narrow professional or technical training are in demand. The recognition accorded administrative ability is reaching a proportion unprecedented in the history of local government. It is reflected in the provisions of the National Charter, especially in the system of promotion examinations and post-entry training. It is also having its effect on the standards set by the professional and technical societies for certification.²¹

The importance which the National Council accords the broadly trained administrator cannot help but affect the status and standards of the senior staff. If the terms of the charter are successfully implemented, the quality of the men occupying key posts should improve—at least the chances will increase of obtaining men who combine with technical proficiency a broader vision of their place in the total administrative situation. The tendency to consider administration as a subsidiary art to be picked up by the professional expert will give way to a more realistic appreciation of the intrinsic value of a broader background in fields not directly related to a narrow specialty.

Should the reforms envisaged by the Na-

Planners recognized this need in the case of planning officials when it wrestled with the problem of defining the requisites of good planning officers. Cmd. 8059 (1950). Although some doubt as to the worth of special curriculums in public administration has been voiced, universities and colleges are being called upon to co-operate in training officials for administrative responsibilities. W. S. Steer, "Post-Entry Education and Training for Local Authority Staffs," 28 *Public Administration* 27 ff. (Spring, 1950). Local government officers are also eligible to matriculate at the newly established administrative staff college. "Greenlands: A Staff College for Administrators," 20 *Municipal Review* 6 (January, 1949).

²¹ Mr. J. H. Warren, while arguing that "public administration to-day calls ever more insistently for specific occupational knowledge," nevertheless points out that "professional bodies are giving increasing weight and scope to sections of their syllabus which provide a background knowledge of the kind specifically required for the public service. Moreover . . . many of the supplementary qualifications of Local Government Officers are entirely related to public administration." *The English Local Government System*, p. 144. For further evidence on this point, see the subjects covered in courses in town and country planning listed in the *Report of the Committee of Qualifications of Planners*, *op. cit.*, Appendix B.

¹⁸ The new system of promotion examinations is administered by the Local Government Examination Board appointed by the National Council. The board is assisted by an Examinations Committee whose duty is to "devise and manage its examinations and generally to advise the Board on examinations affecting the local government service, recruitment and other educational matters." *Examinations for Promotion* (Local Government Examinations Board, 1951).

¹⁹ The Local Government Examination Board has prepared a list of qualifying examinations which it is prepared to recognize for promotion purposes as alternatives to the Administrative Examination. *Examinations for Promotion*, pp. 33-35.

²⁰ *The Report of the Committee on Qualifications of*

tional Council prove abortive or incapable of fulfillment, their influence still cannot be ignored. In any case there has been a steady extension of the principles of Whitleyism to the senior staff. After some initial hesitation following the establishment of the National Joint Council, negotiations began for the creation of separate machinery to determine salaries and other service conditions for chief officers not covered by existing arrangements. Participating in this discussion were the local authority associations and a number of organizations representing the officials concerned. The result

was the creation of two joint negotiating committees, one for Town and District Council Clerks and one for the other chief officers.

The machinery of the Whitley system is providing a basis for a continuous strengthening and improvement of British local government administration. Although it is unlikely that local government Whitleyism will be able to bring about a thoroughgoing uniformity of practice with respect to staff (even if that were desirable), it has been instrumental in forging a better organized and more efficient local government service.

Cuts by the Score

The following extracts from a report by O and M after a visit to the Royal Festival Hall¹ in London may interest our readers.

"For considerable periods the four oboe players had nothing to do. The numbers should be reduced, and the work spread more evenly over the whole of the concert, thus eliminating peaks of activity.

"All the twelve first violins were playing identical notes. This seems unnecessary duplication. The staff of this section should be drastically cut; if a large volume of sound is required, it could be obtained by means of electronic amplifier apparatus.

"Much effort was absorbed in the playing of demi-semiquavers.² This seems an excessive refinement. It is recommended that all notes should be rounded up to the nearest semiquaver.³ If this were done, it would be possible to use trainees and lower grade operatives more extensively.

"There seems to be too much repetition of some musical passages. Scores should be drastically pruned. No useful purpose is served by repeating on the horns a passage which has already been handled by the strings. It is estimated that if all redundant passages were eliminated, the whole concert time of two hours could be reduced to twenty minutes, and there would be no need for an interval.⁴

"The Conductor agrees generally with these recommendations, but expresses the opinion that there might be some falling-off in box-office receipts. In that unlikely event it should be possible to close sections of the auditorium entirely, with a consequential saving of overhead expense—lighting, attendance, etc.

"If the worst came to the worst, the whole thing could be abandoned, and the public could go to the Albert Hall⁵ instead.

S. TONE-DEAF"

—Reprinted in *O & M Bulletin* 21, August, 1952 (published by the Organization and Methods Division of H. M. Treasury), from the Ministry of Transport *Bulletin*.

Editor's notes for U. S. readers:

¹ New concert hall built for Festival of Britain.

² Thirty-second note.

³ Sixteenth note.

⁴ Intermission.

⁵ Old established concert hall.

The JMA Program

By MILTON M. MANDELL

U. S. Civil Service Commission

FOR the first time in America we have an annual examination for entrance into the general administrative service of the national government that has become important enough to be widely controversial.¹ The examination of the United States Civil Service Commission for Junior Management Assistants seeks to fulfill at least in part a hope that leaders in public administration have expressed frequently over the past twenty years—a hope for a systematic program for the recruitment and identification of administrative talent in the United States public service. The widespread interest in this subject warrants a discussion of what the JMA program is, from what it has stemmed, and what its role in the future may be.

The task of developing a sound program for the recruitment and identification of administrative talent and of securing the support necessary to make it effective has been complicated by the fact that people who have studied this problem have differed in their opinions even on fundamentals. There have been differences about what abilities are needed for administrative positions in the federal service—even as to what administrative work is. There have been differences, too, about the kind of preparation needed for such positions; the validity, within the administrative and environmental conditions that have to be considered, of any examining method that would seem potentially useful; and the types of positions most appropriate for recruits from such an examination, including the possibility of creating new types of positions. As against the need for a special pro-

gram for administrative talent, some have stressed the dangers of an elite group. There have been differences about whether the development program should be government-wide, agency-wide, or bureau-wide, and about the proper role of a central government agency, such as the United States Civil Service Commission.

Historical Background

IN 1936, the Civil Service Commission, under the leadership of Commissioner Leonard D. White, announced an examination for Junior Civil Service Examiner. The examination was designed to obtain able young people for careers in government rather than to fill specific positions or a common type of position. The examination permitted college students with majors in any field to participate, and the test emphasized general mental ability rather than specific knowledge or skills.

The examination obtained for the federal government a significant number of the brightest college graduates, but it had some serious limitations. It was decided to emphasize number of placements rather than to concentrate on placing a more limited number in jobs with career development potentialities. As a result, many of the appointees went to positions which had extremely restricted career possibilities. Some resigned in disgust, while others with more initiative or better contacts found more challenging opportunities in the federal government. The amorphous character of the examination resulted in vagueness as to what was being "sold" to operating officials, and some operating officials would not use the register until it offered more concrete and definitive information about skills and abilities. The more refined aspects of a career service, such as tying together recruitment and

¹ Paul T. David, "The Development and Recruitment of Administrative Leadership in National and International Programs," in Robert A. Walker (ed.), *America's Manpower Crisis* (Public Administration Service, 1952), p. 163.

development, or systematically trying to identify able persons for promotion, were also lacking.

In view of these difficulties, the Civil Service Commission changed to a more specific approach through the Junior Professional Assistant (JPA) program. This examination also sought to identify bright, able young college graduates, but it emphasized separate minimum qualifications, specialized achievement as well as general mental ability tests, and separate eligible registers for major college curriculums such as economics or engineering. For the option in the administrative field, first announced in 1939 and called Junior Administrative Technician, the special test was based entirely on political science curriculums. The Junior Administrative Technician examination brought into the federal government a number of able young people who have been highly successful, but it, too, was an examination rather than a program.

After World War II, the Junior Administrative Technician examination was reannounced in 1947. The only major changes were omission of the achievement test in political science and refinement of the mental ability test. Similar changes were made in all the JPA examinations, primarily because the large volume of postwar examinations required the use of the most economical examining methods. Also, a theory prevailed that since a major in a particular subject was required as a minimum qualification, a satisfactory level of knowledge for junior positions could be assumed to have been acquired; therefore, the applicants should be differentiated on the basis of their mental ability. An additional important element was veteran preference, which has been a major influence in postwar examinations.

More than 3,000 persons passed the Junior Administrative Technician examination in 1947, but only about 15 persons received appointments. The situation was dismal. The Commission had invested a large sum of money and the returns were negligible. More important, the federal government had not recruited junior personnel for many years. And though the federal government was contracting sharply at the time, those in top positions were getting older and juniors who could

eventually fill the top positions were not being brought in. The agencies naturally were most concerned with their problems of reduction-in-force and placement of returning veterans; the future was left to itself.

In planning the JPA program in the summer of 1948 for the following year, a tentative decision was made to drop the Junior Administrative Technician option. At a regularly scheduled meeting at the end of July, 1948, the Commission's Advisory Committee on Administrative Personnel was informed of the projected elimination of the option and the reasons for it. A member of the Advisory Committee then made a counter, and seemingly radical, proposal. Instead of discarding or patching up the previous examination, he urged a bold new approach—an examination with a new name and new content and a program to "sell" the resulting register to the agencies. The committee endorsed the proposal; the Civil Service Commission adopted and put it into effect immediately.

Essential Elements of the Program

THE essentials of the new Junior Management Assistant program may be briefly described.

1. Those on the JMA register have to be of exceptionally high quality. The JMA program has become established in the federal government only because the JMA's have sold themselves through outstanding performance. The chairman of the JMA Committee paid tribute to this quality when, on behalf of the agencies represented on the committee, he referred to the work performance of the JMA's as "remarkably impressive."

2. Emphasis has been placed on putting the JMA's in jobs which will fully utilize their abilities in the administrative field, either immediately or in the long run. Nothing could harm the program more than to place JMA's in mediocre jobs with low promotion ceilings.

3. The importance of adequate training for JMA's has been emphasized. The agencies provide most of this training, but the Civil Service Commission offers training on a government-wide basis for a limited group of JMA's.

4. The agencies have had complete freedom in selecting from the register those they wish to appoint. Each agency is given an op-

portunity to review the records of all those who have passed and to inform the Commission which eligibles it wishes certified to it. Conversely, the JMA's can also indicate the agencies for which they would prefer to work. This procedure has been possible within the rule of three because enough requests are received for JMA's when the list is established to permit the certification of all who passed.

5. The JMA examination involves agency personnel at every stage. This participation has been formalized in a committee representing the twenty-one agencies which have JMA programs. The committee elects its own chairman and the Civil Service Commission appoints a staff member to work in a liaison capacity with the committee. The committee works to insure that the agencies use the JMA's effectively and provide adequate training opportunities; it works on recruiting, the wording of the examination announcement, and the minimum qualifications; it provides the people who prepare and review the special written tests, conduct the interviews, and review the written evaluations received from references and the training records of the applicants. This extensive Civil Service Commission-agency collaboration on a government-wide program is unique, although there are many examples of such cooperation where the examination involves only one or two agencies. Perhaps the best testimonial to the quality of the JMA's and the value of the program is the fact that this committee has maintained its vitality and the active participation of its membership over a four-year period.

6. The JMA examination has been timed to facilitate recruiting. The eligible lists have generally been available about April 1, which has given the agencies time before the end of the college year to interest the students in employment. To have the lists ready by April 1, it is necessary to announce the examination in October; the timing of the announcement causes some difficulty, as it comes shortly after the opening of the school year and long before most June graduates start thinking about jobs. Five months are needed, however, to distribute the announcement, arrange for testing some 10,000 competitors throughout the United States, score their papers, send out reference forms and evaluate the returns, and send out

teams to interview several hundred persons scattered throughout the country.

7. Promotion opportunities for JMA's have been excellent. Their outstanding ability and the competition among agencies to secure them have caused the agencies to offer them maximum opportunities. The training programs have contributed to promotion possibilities and equally important, many agencies have had vacuums in the lower and middle grades which the JMA's have been able partially to fill.

8. While the Civil Service Commission has emphasized that the JMA's are only one important source of future staff and line executives, and has assisted the agencies with programs for the identification and development of incumbent employees for administrative positions, there is no doubt that the JMA label carries prestige which is important in the early years of the career of an employee.

9. The selection processes for the JMA register are the most extensive used by the United States Civil Service Commission. They include three different mental ability tests, a specialized written test, a group and an individual oral, and an evaluation of references. The Commission carries on a continuous research program to help insure the quality of its selection techniques.²

The Civil Service Commission has found it necessary to explain continuously why such high standards are used for the JMA examination that only about one out of twenty competitors is rated eligible. This has been a contentious point outside the government, though the agencies find the high standards a vitally important element that is basic to the other aspects of the program.

There are a number of reasons for these standards. The agencies have emphasized that they will not be willing to invest large amounts of time and effort in orienting and developing JMA's unless they can be assured of their qual-

² For those interested in technical descriptions of these research studies and the data obtained, the following references may be of interest: Milton M. Mandell, "The Administrative Judgment Test," 34 *Journal of Applied Psychology* 145-47 (1950); Milton M. Mandell and Dorothy C. Adkins, "The Validity of Written Tests for the Selection of Administrative Personnel," 6 *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 293-312 (1946).

ity. Personnel people have obtained acceptance of the program from line executives in part because they can emphasize the high standards used. Each JMA who is eligible on the written test then goes through a group and individual interview, involving many miles of travel and requiring the time of high-level personnel. The costs involved in interviewing and the desirability of developing a register that can be circulated in its entirety require drastic weeding out through the written tests. Finally, it is good statistical theory that with any given validity of an examination, the smaller the percentage appointed the greater the percentage of desirable employees among the appointees.

Jobs for which JMA's are Selected and Trained

MOST of the JMA's thus far hired have gone into personnel, budget, and organization and methods work. A number have also gone into positions where there are substantial possibilities for advancement into line executive positions. Among these would be, for example, people with an engineering background who have gone to the Navy Department, the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Wright Field laboratories of the Air Force; people with a political science or economics background who have gone to the State Department; people with an accounting background who have gone to the Treasury's Fiscal Service; people with an economics or statistics background who have gone to the Office of International Trade in the Department of Commerce or to the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and people with a variety of backgrounds who have gone to the Rural Electrification Administration. There are also obvious possibilities for advancement to line executive positions in such central agencies as the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget.

It will take further creative efforts, however, to make maximum use of the potentialities of the JMA program. While the Civil Service Commission and the agencies have agreed that in placing JMA's the immediate job is relatively less important than are systematic efforts to develop the JMA for executive work; it is not yet certain that the complex negotiations needed to achieve a truly broad approach to

this problem will be successful. There is still some disposition to think in terms of narrow career leaders, and to emphasize specific experience rather than executive potential. There is a distinct need in the federal government for the establishment of new types of positions which, while providing for the accomplishment of productive work, will be used primarily for training purposes. Over-all, it may be said that the JMA's have been given assignments that interest them and that have definite career opportunities, but there is a continuing need for broadening the types of work for which JMA's are used.

Nature of the Examination

THE first step in any examination is the determination of the minimum qualifications for competition. In the case of the Junior Civil Service Examiner examination, these qualifications were extremely broad and permitted anyone with a college degree to compete. At the other extreme were the original minimum qualifications of the JMA examination of a large number of credits in the field of administration. The present JMA qualifications are between these extremes and require, generally speaking, for the GS-5 level, paying \$3,410 a year, a Bachelor's degree which has included 30 hours of credit in the social sciences, management, or business administration, and for the GS-7 level, paying \$4,205 a year, one year of graduate work in these fields. Appropriate experience can be substituted for these requirements.

The framework of the present minimum qualifications should be understood. It is felt that if the examination requires a high level of specialization in administration, an insufficient number of candidates will be obtained; also, persons majoring in other subjects may have as much potential administrative ability as persons specializing in administration. Further, the JMA is not the only avenue for entrance into administrative work in the federal government. It is therefore possible to justify limiting the JMA examination to persons having certain college majors, since persons with other majors can enter government service through other examinations and can rise to administrative positions through other avenues.

The written tests consist of two basic sections. The first section has three parts: (1) a test of verbal ability, to measure reading comprehension, effectiveness of expression, grammar, and vocabulary; (2) a test of quantitative reasoning ability including the ability to interpret charts and graphs; and (3) a test of abstract reasoning ability, that is, the ability to determine the general principle that binds together a group of non-verbal materials. The verbal and abstract reasoning parts are given the most weight in this section of the test. The candidate does not have to pass each of the three parts, but his total score for the section must be satisfactory. Usually about half of the candidates are eliminated at this stage.

The second section consists of a 3-hour written test of 70 questions, in which the candidate may choose between a test of administrative judgment and a test in the field of public affairs. When he receives his notice to appear for the written test he is told that he will have his choice and is given sample questions. In the examination room he is shown both tests and given fifteen minutes to make up his mind which he will take.

The public affairs test includes domestic and international problems, mainly in the fields of government and economics. Its coverage is broad, and, while many of the questions are concerned with current developments, it is much more than a factual test of current events.

The administrative judgment test is centered around the problems of line executives of large organizations. An effort is made to avoid highly technical questions that can be answered only by specialists in some phase of staff work. While many questions relate to the staff aspects of administration, the answers require only the knowledge that can be expected from a line executive rather than the detailed information that would be expected of a staff specialist. Also, the questions are aimed to test in the application of principles to new situations rather than in textbook knowledge.

The test covers such topics as relationships between central and field offices; staff-line relationships; coordination of diverse groups; relationships between several levels in an organization; research-operation relationships; the organization of an executive's office; the

carrying out of the personnel, budget, and organization and methods functions; the effect of personality and environment on administration; and the timing of programs.

The topics included are by no means the only ones that should be included in an administrative judgment test, such as the special problems of administration in the governmental environment, the special problems of administration in a world where nations are interacting to a great extent, and the dynamics of organizations as revealed by the latest findings in the field of social psychology. There are a number of reasons why some important problems have been neglected. First, it is difficult to phrase questions about some problems without ambiguity and at the proper level of difficulty. It is hard to prepare questions that are neither superficial nor a test of general intelligence only. Second, because of the great variety of needs of the federal service, this test attempts to be fair not only to students, but also to those with experience in business or public administration; therefore, a number of questions are omitted because they are not relevant to the backgrounds of one or the other group.

After a candidate passes the written tests, inquiry forms are sent to six references that he provides, usually professors. If the replies are unfavorable, candidates may be eliminated, but there is rarely occasion to do this. The information in the reference forms can be extremely useful, however, at the interview and employment stages. It gives the interviewer supplementary information to assist him in arriving at his decision, and it assists the agencies in reaching decisions on which eligible candidates to select.

The next step is the interview. Because of the number of interviews to be conducted, a number of teams of two agency employees each are used. Their task is to determine whether the performance of the candidate meets the high standards of the JMA program; they do not attempt to rank the candidates. They fill out a detailed rating form for each candidate and prepare a narrative report on his performance. This report assists in placing the candidate correctly and also provides means of evaluating the validity of the interviewer's decision.

Originally, in the JMA oral interview each candidate appeared individually before the two interviewers. In the third year of the program, for the interviews conducted in 1951, the group oral performance test³ was substituted, primarily because the number to be interviewed had increased greatly. In the 1952 and 1953 interviews, the individual interview was added to the group oral. It was felt that certain attitudes of candidates could not be measured in the group oral; also, the individual interview permitted obtaining additional information as a basis for decision in doubtful cases.

In the five years of experience with the JMA program about 5 per cent of the candidates have been placed on the register. The mental abilities tests have eliminated about half the candidates, the specialized written tests have eliminated an additional 35 per cent, and the interviews and reference returns have eliminated somewhat more than half of the remaining candidates.

Successful Candidates

THE following tables indicate the relationship between results on the JMA written test and amount of education, college standing, major subject, and veteran preference of the candidates. An inspection of these tables reveals that:

1. There is a substantial relationship be-

³This test is described in Milton M. Mandell, "The Group Oral Performance Test," 7 *Public Personnel Review* 209-12 (1946), and 15 *Personnel Administration* 1-10 (1952).

tween amount of education and success in the written test.

2. There is a substantial relationship between college standing and success in the written test.

3. Political scientists seem to do best on this examination, although the undergraduate and graduate majors of successful candidates cover a wide range of fields.

4. The five points that a veteran and the ten points that a disabled veteran obtain add significantly to their chances of passing the examination. This is not surprising in view of the difficulty of the examination.

Table 1
Amount of Education and Percentage Eligible and Ineligible as a Result of Written Tests, 1950 and 1952

Amount of Education	Percentage 1950		Percentage 1952	
	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible
Less than B.A.	3.0	16.0	3.2	11.1
B.A.	42.0	67.0	44.8	68.0
Some graduate work	25.0	12.0	24.2	10.8
M.A.	27.0	5.0	21.5	8.7
More than M.A.	3.0	0.4	6.3	1.4

Table 2
College Standing and Percentage Eligible and Ineligible as a Result of Written Tests, 1951 and 1952

Standing	Percentage 1951		Percentage 1952	
	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible
Upper				
10 per cent	47.3	21.2	51.1	26.7
Next 15 per cent	33.9	33.9	30.2	31.4
Second Quarter	17.0	33.6	15.7	31.4
Third and Fourth Quarters	1.8	11.3	3.0	10.5

Table 3
Major Subject and Percentage Eligible and Ineligible as a Result of Written Tests, 1951 and 1952

Major	Percentage 1951		Percentage 1952			
	Undergraduate Eligible	Major Ineligible	Undergraduate Eligible	Major Ineligible	Graduate Eligible	Major Ineligible
Accounting	8.8	9.2	1.3	3.8	0.8	1.6
Business administration	11.0	10.7	7.3	19.1	6.9	15.4
Economics	25.4	24.8	17.4	14.3	14.8	11.1
Government	26.5	15.4	30.9	17.9	32.1	22.6
History	17.1	22.0	16.7	12.5	14.6	9.5
Public administration	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.2	8.8	7.5
Miscellaneous	10.6	17.1	25.3	31.2	22.1	32.1

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Table 4
Veteran Preference and Percentage Eligible and Ineligible as a Result of
Written Tests, 1950, 1951, and 1952

Veterans Status	Percentage 1950		Percentage 1951		Percentage 1952	
	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible
None	10	18	21	33	31	47
Nondisabled	70	70	65	59	55	47
Disabled	20	12	14	8	14	6

Conclusions

1. By all relevant criteria, the first four JMA examinations seem to have been successful. Many of the best graduates of American universities have applied for this examination; the supervisors report that the JMA's are making an outstanding contribution; and there is continuing enthusiasm in the agencies despite the many hours of work they and the Civil Service Commission must put in in order to maintain the high standards of the examination.

2. There is need, however, for improvement of basic parts of the program. For instance, for several reasons JMA's have not been used to any great extent in the field service. Many JMA's are unavailable for field appointment, the field establishments have less interest than headquarters offices in securing JMA's, and many field establishments do not provide adequate career opportunities. The improvement of this situation is of prime importance.

3. There is an ever present need for research to insure that the best possible examining methods are being used. The Civil Service Commission has had a continuing research program in the field of management and administrative selection for the past eight years and the results of this work will be applied to

the JMA examination whenever appropriate findings are obtained.

4. Each agency should examine its needs in relation to the backgrounds of the JMA's so that it will select those who can make the greatest contribution to the agency program. Preliminary examinations have revealed that the evaluation of the interests of the candidates is of prime importance in their correct placement.

5. Except for a training program conducted by the Civil Service Commission for a limited group, the JMA after entrance into the government is a bureau and agency employee. Usually he does not get enough opportunity to develop a government-wide point of view and government-wide knowledge. JMA's are so few and so badly needed that agencies are not inclined to encourage them to accept employment in other agencies in order to broaden their backgrounds. A government-wide approach is particularly needed in small agencies because generally they cannot provide the gamut of experience needed for the full development of administrative personnel. There is also need to bring JMA's into new types of work so that they may be promoted into a wide variety of line-executive jobs.

The Rockefeller Public Service Awards

By JOSEPH E. McLEAN

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

A CAREER in the Federal Government has not looked too inviting of late. Public servants as a group have been made to suffer for the follies and misdeeds of a few of their number. Some critics have lumped them all together as inefficient, disloyal, or both. . . . This is therefore a healthy moment for the announcement of the first Rockefeller Public Service Awards. . . . The first winners are nine men and two women. They were chosen from among 750 nominations, representing just about every federal agency."

Thus commented the *Louisville Courier-Journal* on the announcement of the first Rockefeller Awards. The editorial, aptly entitled "A Break at Last for the Bureaucrats," further stated:

These are not the glamor boys and girls of public life. They are "bureaucrats," if you please. Actually they are technicians, whose skill is the oil that keeps the wheels of government turning smoothly. They accept lower salaries than their talents could command in business or industry, and they get no bonus in the form of public recognition.

In background they are average Americans. They come from such places as Kendall, Wash., Watertown, N.Y., Vicksburg, Miss. Their jobs illustrate the wide gamut of useful government service. One is an expert on tropical diseases in the Federal Security Agency. Another, who started as a laborer for the Army Engineers, now heads the Army's Technical Service Department. A third is Public Affairs Adviser to the State Department on European problems. A fourth heads the Test Analysis Section of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. Nobody knows whether these people are mostly Republicans or Democrats. They do a useful job, regardless of which party is in power. The ROCKEFELLER Awards may help to keep these capable in-

dividuals in public service, by giving them both recognition and a chance to develop their skills still further through a year's study. The awards may also serve to draw other desirable men and women into government.

The closing sentences of this editorial clearly indicate the basic purpose of the awards program, which was established at Princeton University through the generous and public-spirited action of John D. Rockefeller III. When the program was first announced more than a year ago, Mr. Rockefeller, who conceived the plan, stated his view that it seemed imperative that every effort be made to encourage specially qualified citizens to enter federal service as a career and to stimulate the sustained interest, growth, and development of those already in the service.

All of us are aware of the increasing magnitude and importance of the responsibilities of the Federal Government in terms of national and international affairs. The burden of discharging these responsibilities rests upon the employees of the Government.

And in accepting the initial grant of \$250,000 from Mr. Rockefeller, President Dodds emphasized the importance of recognition of high public service, stating:

There is no more honorable career than that in the public service and the incentive which the new plan provides should do much to advance and encourage the quality of the services rendered. The University and the Woodrow Wilson School in particular is deeply gratified that we have been chosen to administer this trust. In accordance with our mutual understanding this administration will receive my particular and personal attention.

Organizing the Program

AS ORIGINALLY established, the program called for awards to be made annually over a period of five years or less. Grants were to be sufficient to enable the recipients to spend from six to twelve months in residence at an institution in the United States or abroad, or in some comparable activity such as educational travel. It was intended that each award would be sufficient to enable the recipient to detach himself from active duty for an agreed period at no financial sacrifice. In general, it was expected that each award would be an amount not less than the recipient's federal compensation, plus an allowance for tuition, travel, and other necessary expenses.

President Dodds took several steps to get the program under way. Dr. Karl T. Compton, former chairman of the Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment, and now chairman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Corporation, accepted the chairmanship of a Committee on Selection that would recommend to the Trustees of the University policies for the program, candidates, and the number of awards to be made each year.

Both the chairman and the membership of the committee reflect the care exercised by Mr. Dodds in its formation. The other members are: Elliot V. Bell, chairman, Executive Committee, McGraw Hill Publishing Co.; Laird Bell, chairman of the Board of Trustees, University of Chicago; Ralph J. Bunche, of the United Nations; Philip L. Graham, president and publisher of *The Washington Post*; Dean Edward S. Mason of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration; Dean W. I. Myers of the New York State College of Agriculture, Cornell University; Dean Thomas Parran, former surgeon-general of the United States, and dean of the Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh; Anna Lord Strauss, former president of the League of Women Voters of the United States; Professor Leonard D. White of the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; and Charles E. Wilson, former head of the Office of Defense Mobilization, and former president of the General Electric Company.

A member of the staff of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

was designated to perform necessary staff work for the committee. In addition, Dr. Dodds conferred with several federal officials, exploring possible policies and procedures.

The program received the warm endorsement of President Truman and Chairman Robert Ramspeck of the United States Civil Service Commission. Letters from President Dodds to agency heads urging their cooperation were also well received; and cooperation was evidenced in a tangible way with the appointment of a top-level official to serve as liaison between the agency and the University. In many cases, the agency appointed a committee of high officials to evaluate nominations made within the agency.

One particularly significant policy decision was made at the first meeting of the Committee on Selection. Originally, persons were to become candidates by nomination by government officials and not by their own application. This policy was modified to permit direct application by individuals. The shift in policy was greeted with mixed feelings, but the consensus seems to be that a more "democratic" approach is being followed. The eligibility requirements were then stated as follows:

The program is open to federal career employees whose performance has been distinguished by intellectual maturity, leadership, character and competence and who evidence a sincere interest in public service as a career. The program is open to federal civilian personnel whether they be employed in Washington or in the field and without preferential regard to such factors as professional interests, age, sex, creed, color or national origin. The essential criterion is evidence of demonstrated value of the employee to the government service and evidence of future value in terms of general promise of usefulness or in terms of a specific future assignment. Candidates need not be graduates of a college or university.

One other factor may be noted at this point. Many observers, as well as members of the Committee on Selection, recognized the obstacles involved in obtaining the release of an outstanding employee for an extended period. Hence, as a general condition, it was stated that "an award recipient may initiate his study program at any time within one year following his acceptance of an award." It was hoped, thereby, that the award recipient and his

agency could work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement.

The First Year's Experience

INTEREST in the program exceeded expectations. Some 750 nominations or applications were received, representing virtually every federal agency. And surprisingly few were in the category of "easy to eliminate." The term "educational travel" was interpreted by only a handful to mean that there was an opportunity to see the world without joining the Navy. The committee was both pleased and embarrassed by the very large number of outstanding employees whose accomplishments and proposed study programs had to be evaluated. The evaluation task was further complicated by the difficulties inherent in any effort to weigh the respective merits of a nuclear physicist, a personnel specialist, a general administrator, an international relations adviser, and so on almost *ad infinitum*.

The wholehearted cooperation of federal agencies and officials to some extent eased the task of the committee. The care exercised by agency evaluation committees was especially helpful. In the Army, for example, a panel of top-level officials considered the applications of 52 candidates and, based on carefully developed criteria, placed these candidates into four groups:

Group I—Four applications: met all criteria and considered to be outstanding candidates.

Group II—Seven applications: met the criteria but considered to be less outstanding candidates.

Group III—Ten applications: met most of the criteria.

Group IV—Thirty-one applications: either failed to meet important criteria or the study plans, for various reasons, were not considered feasible.

In its evaluation, Dr. Compton's committee worked individually and in subcommittees. Since the applications were submitted in triplicate, copies were circulated from one member to another. The number of candidates was first reduced to approximately 250, then to 50. The entire committee then selected the 11 nominees and their recommendations were approved by the Trustees. The individual awards

varied from \$6,000 to \$15,000 and totaled approximately \$135,000.

The careers and the proposed study programs of the eleven award recipients reflect diversity in background and interest, as well as diversity in governmental activity. Only the briefest summary can here be presented:

DAVID E. BELL: administrative assistant to the President; he plans to spend one year at Harvard University studying the relationship between government and labor-management problems.

HOWARD E. DURHAM: regional director, Region 12, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; he plans to study in the field of labor mediation techniques at the University of Pennsylvania and in Sweden, Great Britain, and Denmark.

WILMOTH DUANE EVANS: chief of the division of Interindustry Economics, Bureau of Labor Statistics; he plans to study fundamental economic ideas and principles for one year at Cambridge University, England.

GUIDO E. HILBERT: chief of the Bureau of Agricultural and Industrial Chemistry in the Agricultural Research Administration; he plans to study at the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.

GEORGE WILBERFORCE HOWARD: chief of the Technical Service Department, Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Department of the Army; he plans to spend a year visiting public and private research agencies in the United States, Europe, and Canada to study and observe their methods of direction, planning, and management.

MRS. HELEN PAULL KIRKPATRICK: public affairs adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; she plans to study the techniques and evaluation of public opinion polling and other methods of estimating the effectiveness of propaganda media.

EMIL J. SADY: chief, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior; his program will entail a ten-month period of study and educational travel to the colonial offices and training centers of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands to study at first hand the organization and staff of these offices and their relationships with their territories. Visits to several territories in the Caribbean, and possibly Africa, and to several universities in the United States are also included in Mr. Sady's itinerary.

OSCAR SEIDMAN: head of the Test Analysis Section, Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Branch, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department; he will undertake one year of advanced study covering supersonic aerodynamic theory, principles of auto-

matic stabilization and control of aircraft, and related subjects such as operational calculus.

MARSHALL DARROW SHULMAN: special assistant to the Secretary of State; he proposes to devote a year to the study and observation of the new period of activity and changes that the international communist movement is entering, against the background of the history of the international communist movement. His study will include both Soviet doctrine and Soviet practice; it will involve study at Harvard University's Russian Research Center and in France.

MRS. DOROTHY MARTIN SIMON: aeronautical research scientist with the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory; she plans to spend ten months at Cambridge University, England, doing research in the field of aerodynamic turbulence and combustion and two months at laboratories in England and France.

MARTIN DUNAWAY YOUNG: scientist director, head, Section of Epidemiology, Laboratory of Tropical Diseases, Federal Security Agency; he proposes to enlarge his knowledge of the research and methods used in universities and national centers on the epidemiology of parasitic diseases characteristic of the locale involved. He will spend nine months in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia doing experimental work on tropical diseases.

Future of the Program

AS THE program starts its second year, an effort is being made to profit from the first year's experience. For example, it will be possible to give the agencies more time to evaluate candidates. Also, the eligibility requirements have been modified as follows: "although not a rigid requirement, preference will be given to candidates of from 35 to 50 years of age and with a minimum of five years' service in the Federal Government." The committee feels that such candidates have had time to demonstrate qualities of intellectual maturity, leadership, and competence; will have many years of fruitful public service ahead; and are ripe for a "sabbatical." Generally, they are in a good position to propose programs of study that are manageable and eminently desirable in terms of their career objectives.

Should the same exceptional keenness of competition continue, the program will provide ample evidence of the need for such off-the-job educational activity. And one may express the view that the public would benefit greatly if government itself were to assume responsibility for such a training program on a larger and continuing basis.

The Long Pull

As the honeymoon draws to its inevitable end, we no longer expect the President completely to fulfill our notions of what the symbol of the nation should be, but by the same token we tend to emphasize and insist upon our expectations that he will do for us certain specific things. We expect the President to be, first, a competent manager of the machinery of government; second, a skilled engineer of the economy of the nation; and, third, a faithful representative of the opinion of the people. These three expectations I have set down in the inverse order of their importance in popular esteem, but perhaps in their correct order with respect to the choices and decisions the President must make if he is to fulfill to the maximum what the citizens expect of him.

—Louis Brownlow, *The President and the Presidency* (Public Administration Service, 1949), p. 54.

The Public Service

THE London railway stations are full of children going back to school. Even in the South of France, the season is getting late, and the Prime Minister will be back from his vacation early next week. The holidays are over. Last year a real effort was made to see that the servants of the state, both the elected and the permanent, got their full meed of rest. This year, circumstances have prevented, and many ministers and civil servants have had a busy summer. Public affairs, indeed, have been going at very nearly full speed. In foreign policy, it is true, the myth of a summer lull died many years ago, and this summer, which has at least produced no August crisis, has perhaps been quieter than most, though hardly less active. But there has been little relaxation in the home departments either. The Cabinet has met regularly; the industrial front has been active; and several departments have been working hard getting ready for the meetings of Commonwealth officials next week, which are to prepare the way for the conference of Prime Ministers at the end of November.

It is therefore perhaps an appropriate moment to ask whether something cannot be done—whether something does not urgently need to be done—to relieve the unbearable strain in which the higher servants of the state live their lives. To say that the condition of the senior civil service is alarming is not to criticise a body of men to whose devotion the community owes a great deal. Indeed, the guess can be hazarded that there is not anywhere else in the world (save perhaps at Ottawa) a body of public servants who, with such slender resources, could have accomplished so much in sheer sloggish administration as the Home Civil Service has to its credit over the past fourteen years. But the plain truth is that the administrative class of the civil service has been taxed beyond its capacity for a decade and a half.

NOTE: This article is reprinted from 160 *The Economist* (London) 669-70 (September 20, 1952).

Not only has the volume of work multiplied itself over and over again as the state has assumed duties that nobody ever dreamed of before. The nature of the work of the higher civil servant has changed. Though in form every decision is still the Minister's, in fact it is very often the civil servant's—and must be, for reasons of sheer volume of business. This means that the higher civil servant nowadays has to take a large share of the responsibility from which, in theory, he is excused. And if he is a conscientious man (and the typical higher civil servant is conscientious almost to a fault), that means that he has to worry as well as to work.

Long ago, these conditions clearly began to affect the quality of the work done by the civil service. Everybody who has business with a government department (and who today has not?) knows how long it takes to get even a simple, low-level decision. Anything important enough to have to compete for the attention of a Permanent Secretary, or to require inter-departmental consultation, can sometimes drag on most harmfully. Overload gives birth to the breed of No-men to whom the Duke of Edinburgh made reference the other day, the men who say no to anything new and different. The no bias in our present civilisation is strong enough as it is. Far too many decisions now fall to men who stand to gain nothing if a new idea works and to be pilloried if it fails. That creates bias enough; but when the decider is a very tired man, who is consciously or unconsciously aware that to say yes is to open the gate to a whole vast new field of consequential puzzles and dilemmas—then the wonder is that anyone is ever given permission to stray from the paths for whose every grade and angle precedents exist and procedures have been laid down.

Further, overstrain leads men to take refuge in the *ad hoc* expedient when they ought to have a policy. They can see what ought to be done in the next week or two—or, more often,

what cannot be avoided—but they have a troubled feeling that it does not point in the direction that policy, if only they had a little time to think it out, ought to be leading. So the decision is given *ad hoc* and all the positions of principle are reserved, so that nobody can guess what will happen next time and the successive steps of a new policy have to be extracted one by one like teeth, not because there is necessarily any opposition to the new line, but because inability to find time to think it through creates timidity. The history of Britain's relations with Europe since the war provides some clear examples of this process at work.

Too gloomy a picture must not be painted; it is extraordinary how much imagination and vigour are left. But probably all those who, not being civil servants themselves, have frequent dealings with them would agree that the country would be better governed if the men at the top were not so tired and so hard driven. Moreover, there is reason to fear that there may be further deterioration. For reasons that probably go back to the first war, there is an unusual uniformity of age in the highest ranks of the service and far too many of the heads of departments will reach retiring age at substantially the same time. There have been two or three resignations of senior men in recent years to take posts in the business world that are probably better paid and certainly provide the boon of leisure. These examples are likely to be followed, especially now that recent changes in the rules enable civil servants to retire while still relatively young without losing all their pension rights. Vacancies at the top mean quick promotion, which can be very good for a service. But they also mean a loss of experience and ability, and vacancies on the scale that is possible in the next few years may be more than the service can stand.

The only possible short-term remedy for this state of affairs is a deliberate and determined recourse to the wartime expedient of the temporary civil servant—not, or at least not only, at the lower levels of the administrative grade but in the higher ranks. The very highest rank would, no doubt, have to be immune: a Temporary Permanent Secretary (though examples of the species have been known to exist) is a contradiction in more than terms. But an

incursion of Temporary Principals and Under-Secretaries would not only share the load; it might even enable some of the best permanents to take sabbatical leaves long enough to recharge their intellectual batteries. The American Government—not previously too well served by British standards—has profited enormously in recent years from its willingness and ability, in peacetime as in war, to call on businessmen, lawyers and university teachers for spells of government service that sometimes extend over several years.

That is what should be done here. But before it can be done, several obstacles will have to be overcome. That of scales of pay is not as severe as is often thought. It is true that the businessman of competence who is invited to enter a government department is likely to be deterred, not so much perhaps by the actual rates of pay in the civil service as by the absence of expense allowances and of the tax-free services that private industry has come to provide for its higher salariat. But, as a generalisation, it was not the businessman who adapted himself most successfully to government service during the war but the professional man, the don, the lawyer, the accountant, the surveyor, the consulting engineer. And for the professional man, the salary hurdle is not nearly so difficult to get over. Another obstacle is the fact that many men who leave their present posts for temporary government service do not know whether they will be able to make the reverse journey, and in any case may endanger their pensions. But these are matters that could be overcome if there were a more general recognition of the desirability of a free interchange of persons between the ranks of the governors and the governed.

The greatest obstacle, however, is the attitude of the Civil Service itself. All organised services which are proud of their high standards tend to be close corporations, and by no means all the motives for these instincts of exclusiveness are unworthy. But the Civil Service has seemed to become a closer corporation in proportion to the need for it to be more open. Higher civil servants have become dedicated men and a combination of choice and circumstance has cut many of them off from their fellow-men beyond the pale. They work long hours in their offices; they dine only with their

colleagues; and the dreadful wartime habit of sleeping in the office has not entirely disappeared. Some of the Permanent Secretaries and Under-Secretaries live in an invisible Kremlin. The hours they keep have killed their outside interests. The decline in living standards, which they share, though in an acute degree, with the rest of the professional class, has impoverished their social life. The burden of secret knowledge they carry—or, in some cases, the even heavier burden of knowing that they alone really understand the complex issues with which the public besports itself—inhibits the freedom of conversation with the layman. If there ever were country house parties nowadays, and if a senior civil servant were ever invited to one, and if he could find the time to go, he would still (unless he were one of the rare and refreshing exceptions) find it difficult to achieve a meeting of minds with his lay fellow-guests.

Is there an element of caricature in this picture? But caricature is only an exaggeration of recognisable lineaments. It is not good for civil servants to be cut off from the community they serve; nor is it good for the community, especially for one that has no tradition of reverence for the bureaucrat. It has become an urgent matter to establish a circulation between the civil service and the other professions. In much the same way as the change in the nature of war has forced the armed forces—once even closer corporations—to remodel themselves so that they can use the temporary services of amateurs, the civil functions of the state have come to play too large and too intensive a part in the life of the community for it to be possible or wise to leave their execution solely to a small detached elite. The new conception of the state requires a new conception of the public service.

Private and Public Life

370. A private Life is to be Preferr'd; the Honour and Gain of publick Posts, bearing no proportion with the Comfort of it. The one is *free* and *quiet*, the other *servile* and *noisy*.

376. Private Men, in fine, are so much their own, that paying common Dues, they are *Sovereigns* of all the rest.

377. Yet the Publick must and will be served; and they that do it well, deserve publick Marks of Honour and Profit.

378. To do so, Men must have *publick Minds*, as well as Salaries; or they will serve *private Ends* at the Publick Cost.

379. Governments can never be well administered, but where those entrusted make *Conscience* of well discharging their Place.

380. Five Things are requisite to a good Officer; *Ability, Clean Hands, Dispatch, Patience and Impartiality*.

383. *Covetousness* in such Men prompts them to prostitute the Publick for Gain.

384. The taking of a *Bribe* or *Gratuity*, should be punished with as severe Penalties, as the defrauding of the State.

385. Let Men have sufficient Salaries, and exceed them at their *Peril*.

386. It is a Dishonour to Government, that its Officers should live of Benevolence; as it ought to be Infamous for Officers to dishonour the Publick, by being *twice* paid for the same Business.

387. But to be paid, and not to do Business, is *rank Oppression*.

—From William Penn, *Some Fruits of Solitude*, printed as an appendix to William Penn Tercentenary Committee, *Remember William Penn, 1644-1944*, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Instruction, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1944.

A Code of Public Ethics

Excerpts from a Code prepared by the Citizens
Commission on Ethics in Government, Arlington County, Virginia

1. *Origin of the Code.* This code was prepared by the Citizens Commission on Ethics in Government, which was established on June 2, 1951, by resolution of the County Board of Arlington County, Virginia. The Commission was made up of five members appointed by the County Board on the basis of qualifications laid down in the resolution. The members were Frank L. Ball, John J. Corson, Chan Gurney, Paul R. Hunter, and Fritz Morstein Marx, chairman. . . .

2. *Use of Advice.* Before preparing this code, the Commission held public meetings to obtain the advice of men and women experienced in the public affairs of Arlington County. . . .

3. *Purpose of the Code.* This code is meant to help officials and citizens alike to come to a better judgment about what is right and what is wrong ethically in the exercise of public functions, including the conduct of political campaigns. . . .

4. *Use of Guidelines.* The choice between right and wrong as a matter of ethics comes down to specific decisions under specific circumstances. No code of public ethics could therefore give exact answers applicable to the wide range of different circumstances. This code sets forth general guidelines as a means of reaching ethically sound decisions, but does not presume to lay down the last word for each decision to be reached. . . .

5. *Limitations of the Code.* No code of public ethics, by itself, can drive selfishness from

public offices [or] make devoted public servants out of crooks. . . . It can draw attention to the importance of public ethics. It can restrain those who reap personal gain by ignoring public ethics. It can, above all, increase the influence of the large majority of people to whom a high standard of official conduct is a self-evident necessity.

6. *Applicability.* A code like this becomes effective only when it is applied. . . . It may be given binding effect by lawful authority in relation to particular groups, . . . but in giving actual effect to the code, the most important body in Arlington County are the citizens themselves. The code becomes effective in the fullest sense only when it is being applied as a desirable thing by a large number of citizens who impress their views upon both officials and candidates for public office.

13. *Basic Responsibilities of Public Office.* In a free society, all public offices are held for the benefit of the public, as all government exists solely so that the people may govern themselves. Those holding public office, as servants of the public, are not owners of authority but agents of public purpose. In the exercise of the authority given them by the people, they are under three basic obligations. They are bound to do their best—that is, to serve with efficiency. They are bound to do what they are told to do—that is, to respect legality. And they are bound to do right—that is, to heed the commands of morality. Public ethics is part and parcel of public office.

14. *Continuing Concern with Public Ethics.* There is no efficiency where those at work do their best only occasionally. There is no legality where people obey the laws only in

Note: Copies of the entire report of the Citizens Commission on Ethics in Government and its attachments, which include the Code of Public Ethics (42 articles), and Additional Recommendations (30 articles) for the initiation of legislation, for action by local authorities, and for consideration of citizens, may be secured at a cost charge of \$0.75 from F. Morstein Marx, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, Washington 25, D. C.

certain instances. And there is no morality of public office where officials give attention to public ethics only at infrequent intervals. Each official action needs to be put to the threefold test of efficiency, legality, and morality. . . .

15. *Seeking Advice about the Moral Test.* As the test of morality is no less important than the test of efficiency and legality, ethical evaluation of each official action must be made with the same care that goes into judging efficiency and legality. The ethical side of official actions becomes clearer when those who make the decision or participate in it seek advice from others in and out of office whose integrity, insight, and experience they respect. There is no better way of reinforcing public ethics than by adequate consultation on specific ethical points and by widespread sharing of the conclusions reached.

16. *Exercising Responsible Personal Judgment.* Getting good advice in relation to particular official actions is one step in reaching ethically sound decisions. No decision can be ethically sound, however, unless it rests on the kind of judgment which is the expression of personal responsibility. General agreement on the ethical merits of a particular decision is not always attainable. More important is the acceptance by those in public offices of a personal responsibility for applying the moral test to each decision to be reached.

17. *Disclosure of Relevant Facts.* However alike two decisions may seem to be, they are not alike when the ethically relevant facts behind them are different. When these facts are withheld, the ethical side of the decision is kept in darkness. Disclosure of the ethically relevant facts behind the decision is the only way in which others can come to a judgment about the ethical soundness of the decision. Because all official decisions are subject to public review, it follows as a general rule of public office that the ethically relevant facts behind each official decision are public property. They should either be disclosed in connection with the decision or kept on record for disclosure as questions are raised about the decision.

18. *Application of the Rule of Disclosure.* As a practical thing, the rule of disclosure applies especially to matters that involve points

of public ethics, whether these be large or small matters in a material sense. Disclosure of the ethically relevant facts behind the decision calls for a conscientious effort to get hold of all the facts. In addition, it is necessary to determine toward whom disclosure should be made. Here, again, the main requirement is to satisfy the public interest beyond reasonable doubt. Generally, in actions on the part of elected officials, disclosure must be made to the general public. For the great mass of administrative decisions of a routine character, disclosure needs seldom to be carried beyond the official superior.

19. *Resolving Conflicts of Loyalty.* As all public offices are held for the benefit of the community, public officials and employees owe a fundamental loyalty to the community as a whole. Each of them is a guardian of the public interest, even when his functions allow little discretion or may seem relatively unimportant. Each must serve equally all members of the community. This fundamental loyalty can not exist when it is overwhelmed by other loyalties—to a particular group of the public, to a particular economic interest, or to a particular political organization. Reconciliation is possible only as long as the narrower loyalties are subordinated to the basic allegiance. . . .

20. *Private Gain and Public Office.* Because those holding public office are not owners of authority but agents of public purpose, they have no right to exercise public functions or use public influence for personal gain or other private ends. Compensation for public office—sufficient to support competence and integrity—should be legally defined and made a matter of common knowledge. Official authority and public influence are not meant to be available for personal advancement or enrichment or for the benefit of any special interest.

21. *Disqualifications because of Self-Interest.* Unbridled self-interest, whether personal or through close association with particular elements of the public, inevitably interferes with a balanced view of the public interest. Each public official or employee must therefore take pains to stay outside the pull of self-interest. Nor must he give the public grounds to feel that this pull is actually at work.

22. *Use of Public Information.* As a matter of general practice, public officials and employees must keep the public informed by sharing their official knowledge with it. This is an essential part of responsible government. It therefore cannot be left to individual inclination but must be based on generally applicable procedure. No official or employee has a personal title to information that comes to him in the exercise of his functions. He is not free to use it or to permit its use for any but official purposes.

23. *Avoiding Obligations to Grant Favors.* It is easy to turn down requests for special favors when such requests are made in ignorance of public ethics or when the public official or employee has not been put under any personal obligation. Favors are asked for and granted in return for favors received or expected by the official or employee or by others to whom he is tied. When he thus puts himself under an obligation, the official or employee in effect disqualifies himself and betrays the public confidence vested in him. No one in public office is entitled to become involved in a situation where such obligation may be assumed to exist.

24. *Avoiding Wrong Appearances.* The final judge of official conduct is the public as a whole. But the public as a whole forms its judgment in broad generalization. It cannot look into the detail of the uncounted official actions performed each day and lost to public notice. This explains why wrong appearances may have no less damaging effect on public opinion than proved corruption. Each public official and employee must give continuous thought to the question of how his actions

and his behavior might be interpreted—and misinterpreted—by the public.

25. *Meeting Specific Suspicions.* Blind confidence in the integrity of those holding public offices is not a healthy attitude in a free society. Public wakefulness is to be cherished by all citizens, including those in public office, who also ought to appreciate that such wakefulness may run to excesses of reckless condemnation. One way in which public officials and employees themselves can contribute to keeping such excesses to a minimum is by taking steps promptly to meet any specific suspicions raised about their official conduct. . . . The pertinent facts must be laid out before the public, if necessary after special inquiry under impartial auspices, and well ahead of mounting public pressure.

26. *Importance of Personal Example.* All public officials and employees share in the distinction that is attached to public service. Each of them must remember that his failings as well as his achievements affect the standards of public service. That applies to every aspect of the reputation the public service enjoys—to its efficiency, to its compliance with the laws, and to its adherence to the commands of public ethics. A high standard of official conduct cannot last for any length of time unless it is bolstered in the daily work performed on all levels of public responsibility. In turn, each instance of unethical conduct endangers the standard—like a rip in a sail. Although the importance of personal example is not minimized by low position, it is particularly far-reaching in the higher positions because these cast the longest shadow across both the public service and the community.

I know of this sport [mountain climbing] that the qualities it requires are just those which I feel we all need today: perseverance and patience, a firm grip on realities, careful and imaginative planning, a clear awareness of the dangers but also of the fact that fate is what we make it and that the safest climber is he who never questions his ability to overcome all difficulties.

—Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General, United Nations, in an interview upon arrival in New York. *The New York Times*, April 10, 1953, p. 1.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Ways and Means for Recruiting Capable Federal Executives

By H. Struve Hensel, Special Consultant to the Secretary of Defense

EXECUTIVES FOR THE FEDERAL SERVICE; A PROGRAM FOR ACTION IN TIME OF CRISIS, by John J. Corson. Columbia University Press, 1952. Pp. 91. \$1.50.

AMERICA'S MANPOWER CRISIS; THE REPORT OF THE INSTITUTE OF MANPOWER UTILIZATION AND GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, AUGUST 22, 23, AND 24, 1951, edited by Robert A. Walker. Public Administration Service, 1952. Pp. 191. \$3.00. Publication No. 106.

THE ADVENT to executive power of the Republican party has brought into sharp focus the desperate need for capable administrators in the federal government. Many departments and agencies have to be completely restaffed at the top. The problem, however, is not new. It has been in an acute stage for several decades—ever since the federal government expanded its activities to meet the economic depression of the early thirties. The critical deficiencies were temporarily obscured during World War II when patriotic enthusiasm brought many experienced executives to Washington. The administrative mistakes made by inadequate personnel during President Truman's terms were generally blamed on his individual loss of prestige with the managerial groups. Recruiting by him of the proper executives seemed impracticable. The federal executive deficiencies are not, however, personal to any particular party or President. They are inherent in our system. Even if the emotional lift given the Republican party by victory after twenty years brings into government a more numerous supply of better executives, that enthusiasm will be temporary. Some reorganization of the practices and procedures

in recruiting and developing our federal executives is imperative.

John J. Corson's book, *Executives for the Federal Service*, analyzes our shortcomings with understanding and penetration. It is compact in form, comprehensive in scope, and readable. It is a "must" for any student of the federal executive problem. It also deserves careful reading by all those men in private life who to date have confined their interest in federal administration to luncheon table conversation. In addition to cataloguing the whats and the whys of the problem, Mr. Corson proposes and outlines certain carefully considered changes in organization and methods.

For those who find 91 pages too long, a more condensed exposition along identical lines will be found in a paper of 31 pages, but of smaller print, by Paul T. David, entitled "The Development and Recruitment of Administrative Leadership in National and International Programs." This paper is published in *America's Manpower Crisis*, which includes the essays and deliberations of the Institute on Manpower Utilization and Government Personnel held at Stanford University, August 22-24, 1951, to consider all phases of the national shortage of manpower.

If Mr. Corson's book or Mr. David's paper or both could be made required reading in our more intelligent circles, the lay understanding of our federal administrative inadequacies would be greatly sharpened. A major obstacle to improvement—public unawareness and inertia—might be overcome.

I

IN HIS analysis of the existing federal executive crisis, Mr. Corson has made an out-

standing contribution. His first four chapters reduce a perplexing problem to its basic elements and their causes. His dissection is brief, but he has not sacrificed thoroughness. The pressing demand for executive talent, the importance of immediate action, and the avowed and underlying reasons for our failures in this area are graphically presented and accurately weighed. If the experienced student will read the book with pencil in hand, jotting down notes in the margin whenever it seems that Mr. Corson's analysis has passed over a point, the copy will be marred with a series of crossed-out notes. The apparent gaps are always closed. One would have to be extremely precious to do anything but admire and commend Mr. Corson's first four analytical chapters. Here we have a sound starting point for all discussions of the federal executive problem.

The last five chapters contain Mr. Corson's suggested solutions. Here he enters upon less secure ground. While all of his ideas reflect careful consideration, many equally experienced men will doubt the practicability, without modification, of some of his major suggestions. The outlines of a pathway to improvement are, however, clearly presented.

Briefly summarized, Mr. Corson proposes that our corrective measures follow two lines: first, recruitment for the emergency of many "without compensation" assistants, supported by better utilization of our present career personnel; and, second, major changes in the recruitment, advancement, and reward of the present career service to provide more and better men on a permanent basis. For the present emergency Mr. Corson suggests that major reliance be placed on business and professional men serving in government on a "without compensation" basis, coupled with some basic steps toward better utilization and development of the career civil service. For the long-term future, he concentrates his attention on a vastly improved career service which, through increased pay, additional nonmonetary incentives, and recognized prestige, should, in his opinion, attract its fair share of able men and establish the federal career service as a respectable profession.

Mr. Corson realizes, however, that our federal agencies will for years to come be expanding, regrouping, and contracting in response to

crises in the world struggle for survival. To ease the peaks and valleys of demand in permanent agencies, he suggests creating an active pool of selected career administrators rotated among the departments and agencies, supplemented by a stand-by pool of experienced men in private life available for call in time of extreme urgency like the reserve Navy, Army, and Air Force officers. The stand-by pool for the long range parallels more or less the "without compensation" approach for the emergency.

Division of the problem and the solutions into an emergency agency phase and a permanent phase is more serviceable as a convenient split for chapter headings than as a guide to thought. Emergency agencies have been the regular order of the day for some years. Our "continuing need" will be to provide for a succession of emergency agencies, either within or completely outside the permanent departments. Our federal executive requirements are not solely an outgrowth of world turmoil. Foreign crises undoubtedly sharpen and deepen the pain of our administrative impotences. Our government, however, has undertaken a vast internal job. Unless federal activities are pruned ruthlessly, the government job will always be fantastic in scope. We do not attract into the federal service enough men of satisfactory executive caliber to do that job. Furthermore, those we do attract are driven away by haphazard and slow promotion and development. The over-all problem demands a comprehensive solution. A piecemeal approach on a temporary emergency basis may cloud our thinking. We are often prone to forget the future if we are "getting by" in the present.

When faced with an emergency we usually think of the "without compensation" executive. Our leaning toward this type of top-level federal employee stems from two assumptions: first, that there exists in industry and the professions a large reservoir of experienced and able governmental executives waiting to be tapped; and, second, that such reservoir of talent will flow into the federal basin if its members do not have to suffer a reduction of pay to the governmental level. Neither of those beliefs is necessarily so.

There is no inevitable identity between the successful business executive and the effective governmental executive. Many of the business

aptitudes, such as single-mindedness, profit consciousness, insensitivity to popular feelings, determined straightforwardness, dictatorial decision, specialized knowledge, and the like, are not so productive in government as in trade and industry. Many other qualifications, such as political touch, astute perception of popular reactions, sense of compromise, appreciation of the general as distinguished from individual welfare, are highly prized in government and generally considered of small value in business. Business tends to breed "money-makers" and not commercial statesmen. Governmental administration, with its series of legislative, executive, and electoral balances, is as different from business direction as golf is from tennis.

The successful business or professional man is, furthermore, a specialist. His triumphs usually lie in focusing a very intense beam on a very limited surface. Within the lighted area is brilliance; outside, darkness. Government administration involves the diffusion of light over a large area. The generalist is frequently as much of a rarity in business as in government. Yet the federal executive must be a generalist.

Administrative ability in business can, with a few other skills, be turned to account in government. If the successful businessman also has a flair for government, he can be doubly successful, but there is no guarantee that success in one endeavor means success in the other. The reservoir of latent governmental abilities is not so large or so obviously concentrated in private enterprise as might be expected.

Furthermore, "without compensation" is a misnomer which is more accurately translated "a waiver of government pay coupled with higher pay from nongovernmental sources." No one can give any substantial period of service without compensation from some place. And the availability of outside pay is no criterion of governmental adaptability. The idle rich can best afford to serve "without compensation," but they are usually the least desirable. Acceptance of governmental pay with its many restrictive regulations and disqualifications may bar some highly desirable men, but that is not always the case. We have recently witnessed a number of men sacrifice money and opportunities of profit for the inner satisfaction of

doing a job for their country. There is no logic in the theory that the good men will serve only "without government compensation."

The "without compensation" executives scored many successes during World War II. There were, unfortunately, an equal number of individual failures. Official opinion, even during the war, was split. Secretary Forrester established in the Navy Department a flat rule that "WOC" arrangements should not be made except for the most intermittent or part-time service. The "WOC" employee was often difficult to discipline. He frequently required special attention in respect of working conditions, office scenery (rugs, pictures), prestige, and time off, so that his presence sometimes affected adversely the morale of others. He regarded himself as definitely different from those receiving government pay. The attitude toward his job of a man dependent for his living on the pay from that job is seldom the same as that of the man not concerned with his pay. There was therefore a gap between the "without compensation" men and all others. And the others were not limited to the career servants. Many business and professional men were forced by statutes and other circumstances to resign their positions and give up their commercial pay. They regarded the "without compensation" men even more dimly than the career employees, who never had anything to give up, regarded them.

The conflict-of-interest statutes also restrict the activities of "WOC" employees, who can avoid the penalties of those statutes only by disqualification. They are, therefore, involuntarily handicapped. Mr. Corson appreciates this deficiency but suggests that, for the emergency programs, thought should be given to a modification of the conflict-of-interest statutes. Such penal statutes now on the books are admittedly vague, overlapping, and sometimes inconsistent. They could well be reviewed and revised. The basic prohibition against conflicts of interest will, however, be preserved. No statutory revision will ever change the general principle that a man can serve only one master and cannot satisfactorily act for the government in situations where he stands to profit on the other side.

II

IF THE "without compensation" proposal is laid to one side, Mr. Corson's major suggestion is the establishment of an augmented and improved career service. Our basic deficiency as he sees it is that "there is no continuing, orderly plan for the identification of capable young people and for their development." Here he is clearly right. Here is the nub of the problem. The use of "without compensation" employees is merely a temporary device to meet the present want. The active and reserve pools of administrative talent for the long run are also secondary resources. Mr. Corson, and also Mr. David, see no hope of success unless we build a capable, dynamic, and respected career service.

Mr. Corson's starting premise is definitely sound. There will be no improvement in the federal executive service until the public is really *aware* of the need for a change. "Aware" here means a pervading and energizing consciousness which produces action and not mere conversation. Such awareness does not yet exist. The federal career service is not accepted as a respectable profession. It does not appeal to our youth, when selecting their careers, as the coequal of law, medicine, engineering, the ministry, or business. It is generally viewed as a second-class calling, designed for dreamers and mentally stunted men who cannot meet the competitive test. It has no glamor or prestige. Only the foreign service of the State Department—a very restricted compartment—offers changes of scene. Promotion ends at a relatively low level. The financial rewards are few. The external intangible rewards, e.g., medals, titles, special privileges, which attract in Great Britain, are largely nonexistent. The reward to the capable career administrator is almost exclusively inward satisfaction. Our people must realize that able men are essential and that able men will never be attracted or held by our present system.

Mr. Corson believes that our civil service deficiencies can be overcome. Many of his suggested improvements, particularly with respect to compensation, promotion, rotation, and intangible rewards (nonmonetary incentives), have worked well in Great Britain. Is there any reason why the British methods would not produce the same results here?

To describe in detail the organization, procedures, and practices of the British civil service would be a monumental task and is not necessary for our purposes. There are so many exceptions and internal variations that a presentation of the complete picture would confuse more than it would clarify. Basically, however, the British civil service is divided into three major classes in order of seniority downward—administrative, executive, and clerical. The administrative class includes the permanent secretaries, deputy secretaries, under secretaries, and the men preparing for advancement to that level. In the United States, there is no career counterpart of the administrative class. The British administrative class is paralleled in our country by the more or less political and continuously rotating group of under secretaries, assistant secretaries, directors, administrators, and coordinators. Except for the position of one assistant secretary in the Treasury, there is no established channel by which a civil servant in our country can move from the bottom of the ladder up to the position of under or assistant secretary. If a civil servant does by chance graduate into the political hierarchy of Secretary, he risks not only demotion but discharge, if his political backers are defeated at the polls.

Comparisons between pay in dollars in the United States and pay in sterling in Great Britain are never easy. Translated into dollars at the official rate of exchange, the British pay scale for the administrative class seems low. The British price level and income tax, however, are such that many members of the administrative class feel they are able to live as comfortably on their net after taxes as many industrialists receiving much higher pay. What is even more important, the pay scale does not repel the college graduate selecting a profession.

Furthermore, once a Britisher enters the administrative class, there are practical and emotional reasons for staying there. If respect and apparent comfort attract the youth, the British retirement benefits for their civil servants hold them. After a few years, few can afford to leave. Upon retirement, the British administrative civil servant is entitled to an annuity computed by multiplying an average of his last three years pay by the fraction of which the number

of years he has served is the numerator and the figure 80 is the denominator. Men are expected to enter at 22, immediately on graduation from college, and to retire at 62. The retirement provisions are therefore designed for retirement on half pay after 40 years of service. Such annual annuity is taxable.

But, and this is most important, the retiring civil servant in addition receives a *tax-free* lump-sum nest egg equivalent to three times his annuity. A man attaining a rank paying a salary of £3,500 would thus, upon retirement at the end of 40 years, receive a tax-free lump-sum payment of £5,250 and an annuity for the rest of his life of £1,750. The recent increases in the British income tax rates have proportionately increased the value of the lump-sum payment. If one sticks with the British administrative class and lives, he is assured his cottage and enough each year to support it.

The British respect for a professional career and for titles and medals also constitutes a persuasive force. The professional man acquires a social standing by virtue of his profession and the civil service is a recognized profession. If a man in the administrative class becomes a permanent secretary, he receives the title of "Sir" and his wife becomes "Lady." The importance of these titles in England cannot be fully appreciated here. We have no equivalent. Furthermore, all along the way up the British career ladder administrators are given lesser honors and often acquire long strings of impressive initials after their names. These initials are printed with each such name on every public listing from garden party programs to newspaper announcements. The administrative civil servant is thus marked as a man of prestige. He demands and receives respect and honor in his community.

The men in the administrative class regard themselves as a monastic group worshipping at a single shrine. They think alike, dress alike, and in many respects grow to look alike. They are a group set apart and consecrated to the duty of seeing to it that the British government runs smoothly.

This spirit was the foundation of the extraordinary coordination of the many-faceted British war effort. Rotated through the various departments and agencies, the administrative class forms an integrated network of men with

similar aspirations and ambitions, bound together by identical conditions of employment and advancement. Automatically they check with each other and coordinate their work. They are the real coordinators—not the War Cabinet or the Prime Minister or the hundreds of directives and statutes. Strategically placed career men, who know and respect each other, live by the same rules, and correlate their activities, are the equal of thousands of committees.

The English generally describe the principal advantages inherent in their public service as (1) security, (2) adequate compensation, (3) respect in the community, (4) liberal pension provisions, (5) interesting work under pleasant surroundings with a congenial class of persons, (6) possible honors, and (7) opportunity for travel. All of those benefits add up to a dignified, interesting, and pleasant professional career with sufficient pay to live decently and educate children. If, in spite of the gulf between the British and American characters, a civil service profession with all of those attributes could be established in the United States, it would be certain to attract and hold its fair share of university graduates, irrespective of the competitive lure of medicine, law, the ministry, teaching, and science. We can have the equivalent of the British administrative class, if we want it enough.

III

WHY then do we hesitate to establish a career administrative class in the United States? There are serious psychological and political obstacles. Any such class must be absolutely protected against political reprisals. Its members cannot be subject to discharge or demotion with changes in the party in power. Administration of our departments and agencies would have to be given over to a nonpolitical group, set apart from the people and secure in their offices. Policy alone would remain the political prerogative. Yet we are painfully aware that policy can be molded and changed by administration. We often feel that practical administration is more important than general policy. There are solid grounds for believing that the American people would never accept a high-level federal administrative group completely insulated against political reprisal. We

are confirmed believers in the right to "turn the rascals out." That American political principle is more highly prized than continuity, coordination, and perhaps efficiency of administration. We can attain our goal, but do we really want it?

The late Secretary Forrestal gave this dilemma considerable attention at the close of the war. Efforts were made to visualize a transplanting of the English administrative experience to these United States. The tentative conclusion then reached was that the American people would never be able politically to accept a protected administrative service. It was felt that most, if not all, of the top administrative jobs carried some essential of aggregate political control, which must be completely responsive to the election returns. We may not believe in a "spoils system" but we seem inclined toward the theory that the victor must have power commensurate with responsibility.

But if it is assumed that this conclusion is sound, it does not demand rejection of Mr. Corson's proposals. As a matter of fact, a sound career service must be established and many of the British features could be adopted here. The only question is the scope and position of the service. The United States system must combine the continuity and coordination inherent in a career administrative service with the dynamism of sweeping political changes. That is difficult but not impossible. Capable men can be attracted into a career civil service if a path of promotion for merit is kept open from the bottom to a top administrative level. It is not necessary that all top jobs be thus open for attainment. It will be enough if a number of such jobs are made available and protected. On the other hand, political control must remain in the hands of men who periodically submit themselves to the electorate.

Can a system meet those two requirements? Obviously the Secretaryships cannot be reserved for the career service. The under secretaries must probably also remain political. It is doubtful whether the electors will be satisfied with political control exercised only in the person of the Secretary of a department or the head of an agency. There is no reason, however, why each department or agency could not be assigned one assistant secretary position (in some departments perhaps two such positions)

to be filled only from the career service. Such assistant secretaries would be concerned primarily with the methods and supervision of administration as distinguished from policies. They would not threaten political control; they would provide goals for satisfactory careers. Other top-level appointments to under and assistant secretary positions from the career service could be made optional with the President or with the Secretary concerned. The aim of every Secretary will obviously be to secure assistants possessing the most administrative talent available. If our career administrative service could attain the prestige position of the British administrative class, such optional appointments might become reasonably frequent.

Successful operation of this combined career and political approach will require three other provisions. Capable men should be permitted, upon competitive examination or some other method of selection according to merit, to enter the career service at every stage of advancement except possibly the highest level. A career service confined to those who enter at the bottom in their youth will not long survive. As a matter of fact, even in England provision is made for this method of entrance and in some cases for transfer from the executive to the administrative class. Second, an awareness must be created in the minds of the public that appointments to high-level executive positions cannot be made from the roster of party hacks and ward heelers. Our political appointees must be worthy of their career comrades. Third, younger men of promise in business, in the professions, and in the ranks of organized labor should be persuaded to take "a turn in government," much as they now attend special administrative, technical, and social courses in graduate schools. There will thus be created a body of men in private life with an appreciation of government administration. And our government will annually receive an injection of fresh vigor and ideas. Both private life and government will be better for it.

Mr. Corson's proposals can, therefore, be adapted to the American tradition and theory. Coordination, continuity, and dynamism are not necessarily inconsistent, but the areas of disturbance and the American political quirks must be specially dealt with. Even then, the

achievement of this end will take a considerable amount of propaganda for many years in the daily press, the magazines, and the trade journals and on radio and television. Mr. Corson has given us a start in the right direction. We all owe him and ourselves a shoulder to his wheel.

I regard only one suggestion, made by Mr. Corson and also by Mr. David, as dangerous. That is the proposal that the compensation and rank of a career administrator should be personal and based on the individual's experience and qualifications rather than on the job held at the time. This is an assimilation of the military theory of individual rank and pay into the civilian career service. It is undoubtedly appealing to those who have never tried to fit military rank into administrative or office organizations, but it creates just as many problems as it promises to solve.

Job and rank are interdependent. During the war, it was often found in the military departments that the officer most suited for a particular job had a lower rank than that of the officer normally assigned to the job. The lower rank could never do the job without promotion. The solution was the "spot promotion," which followed the civilian procedure of tying rank to the job. It was soon discovered that when the job ended or the officer was transferred, it was almost impossible, as a matter of human relations, to reduce his rank. The temporary problem was solved, but the permanent usefulness of the man was often destroyed in the procedure. Sometimes men of high rank were not qualified for the only office jobs open

for their rank. They found it impossible to step down in job position even if their rank was undisturbed. Military rank undoubtedly operates well in the field, but it is not suitable for civilian or governmental office administration.

IV

THE balance of the symposium *America's Manpower Crisis* can be dealt with very briefly. It is an unrevised collection of the background and other papers read at the sessions of the Institute on Manpower, several short seminar reports of the Institute discussions, and a catalog of rather general findings and recommendations for our manpower programs. Undoubtedly this symposium should be on the shelf of every scholar of the manpower problem. It is an excellent check list. It is comprehensive in scope and erudite in expression. It is not very readable. Considerable self-discipline is required to plod through the volume.

Papers written to provoke discussion at seminars are not good quiet reading. In sentence structure, word choice, and generality of expression, such papers have much the same soporific effect as the stilted tonal qualities of many long church prayers. Phrases and sentences can be read and re-read without conveying any distinct concepts. The print is also far too small. One must concentrate rigidly to avoid losing his place. Except for a few papers, the symposium could for general use have been confined to better edited seminar reports and more sharpened findings and recommendations.

Integration of Conflicting Regional Programs

By C. Girard Davidson, Davidson & Nikoloric, Portland, Oregon

UNCLE SAM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, by Charles McKinley. University of California Press, 1952. Pp. 673. \$7.50.

MOST people agree that the fundamental economic problem confronting society is that of providing our people with reasonable opportunity for equal access to the resources of the world around us. The efficient perform-

ance of this function in the Pacific Northwest is now primarily the job of Uncle Sam.

The importance of the federal government's role in administering the resources of the Northwest is evidenced by one dramatic statistic: the federal government owns 54 per cent of the land and most of the natural resources of the area. Furthermore, the economy of this area is founded upon the so-called extraction

industries such as agriculture, forest products, mining, and fishing. In this extractive economy the area has only one real competitive advantage—a fast-flowing river basin network and its corollary, cheap hydroelectric power. Labor and transportation in the Northwest are relatively expensive.

It is fairly obvious, therefore, that the manner in which the federal government manages its properties in the Northwest has controlled and will continue to control to a tremendous extent the way of life of the people in the area.

Charles McKinley is well qualified to analyze the government's record in this respect and to make recommendations for the future. He has been for many years a member of the faculty of Reed College in Portland, Oregon, concerning himself largely with problems of government administration. He has served as a consultant to various federal agencies and commissions. His book is an astute analysis of the past failure of federal administration in the Pacific Northwest, and he makes several recommendations for change.

I

ALMOST everyone who has concerned himself with the problem of federal administration is agreed that the basic difficulty has been the almost complete failure to integrate program and policy objectives of the multiplicity of federal bureaus and agencies.

There are somewhere between twenty and thirty federal bureaus and agencies (depending on how they are counted) directly charged with resource development and management in the Northwest. They are spread among several departments, including Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, and the U. S. Army. Each agency and bureau is given the job of administering a specific part of the program of regional development, but these duties frequently overlap. The result has been confusion at the best and certainly a failure to begin to tap the potentials of the Columbia River Basin.

In an economy that is faced with urgent defense requirements in the struggle against international communism, we cannot afford to be either profligate with our resources or unmindful of their development. In the Columbia River Basin we have been both. To cite only a few figures, every year, because of lack

of adequate flood control and soil conservation practices, we permit thousands of farms to float out to sea in the waters of the Columbia. In the flood of 1948 alone, the river washed away 160 million tons of topsoil—the equivalent of 1,300 first-class farms of 80 acres each.

The Columbia River Basin has an annual potential of almost 50 million kilowatt-hours of continuous power. We have developed less than one-tenth of that amount. The Northwest could shortly create over 50,000 new farms on 5.5 million acres of arable land needing only easy-to-get irrigation. We have all the potentials for a million immediate new jobs and could easily support two million new people. We are accomplishing little toward these goals.

Another problem needing immediate attention is the character of employment in the Northwest. Over 60 per cent of our factory employees are in industries associated with forest products. Two-thirds of the railroad tonnage originating from the Northwest is attributable to forest products. The bulk of the remaining employment is agricultural. Such work is unstable and seasonal. Furthermore, employment in the Northwest faces an even more dangerous hazard. Regardless of conservation and waste practices, we are cutting out our forests about three times as fast as they are growing, and almost half of every tree is put to no productive use. This basin must develop new industries and new jobs quickly. This is essential not only to the continued prosperity of the area itself but also to a strong and productive United States.

Coupled with its extensive ownership of resources in the Northwest, the magnitude of this job of development makes it clear that the federal government is the only fiscal agent big enough to accomplish it. Mr. McKinley has carefully documented our failures to date.

There are only a few broad functions involved in the development of the Columbia River Basin which concern the federal government. They are river navigation, power, preservation of fish and wildlife, land reclamation and conservation (including irrigation), flood control, recreation, mining exploration and research, and the management of federally owned lands. Yet these basic functions are variously distributed to bureaus and agencies with overlapping powers and conflicting jurisdic-

tions and policies.

A few examples should suffice. The Bureau of Reclamation is charged with the principal duty of reclaiming marginal lands. It is an adjunct of the Department of the Interior. Its most ambitious activity in the Northwest has been the Columbia Basin project, the reclamation of some 825,000 acres of land for agricultural purposes. Yet the fact is that the Bureau of Reclamation is the largest single producer of electric power in the world—greater by far than any privately owned public utility and greater than the Tennessee Valley Authority. The reason for this is simple; it must build dams to obtain irrigation water.

Every time the Bureau of Reclamation builds a dam it vitally affects functions performed by other agencies. It may flood out valuable timber resources or mineral reserves; it may affect flood control and navigation; it may interfere with fish spawning. The location may not be satisfactory in relation to grid systems of power transmission lines; valuable recreational values (the tourist and recreational industries are second in dollar volume in the Northwest) may be destroyed. These affected functions are delegated, generally, to a number of agencies: the Forest Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Mines, the Coast Guard, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the U. S. Geological Survey, the Bonneville Power Administration, the Army Engineers, the Park Service, and others.

In turn, each time one of these agencies and bureaus undertakes a program, it affects the objectives and programs of other agencies operating in the Northwest. For example, the manner in which the Forest Service, a branch of the Department of Agriculture, reseeds its timber tracts or manages its grazing lands vitally affects the water and snow run-offs—which, in turn, have direct bearing on soil conservation, flood control, power continuity, fish spawning, and navigation. Mineral rights and development are affected as the Forest Service sells its timber.

To date, each of these agencies has pursued its own objectives with little regard to the manner in which they affect the plans of other agencies. There has been confusion of the worst order, and inter- and intra-agency bicker-

ing, resulting in a lack of accomplishment.

Conflicting jurisdictions contribute to the confusion among agencies and bureaus in this area and their lack of coordination. For example, both the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior manage large tracts of timber, as to a lesser extent do the Park Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Forest Service has larger holdings, but the quality of the BLM timber is perhaps the best remaining in the Northwest. The manner in which these tracts are sold is very important to the lumber industry in the Northwest. Yet the policies of the two agencies are not uniform and in some instances are completely divergent.

The Forest Service, generally speaking, does not limit the size of its offerings; the BLM has attempted to encourage small operators by placing such limitations. Each agency has its own approach to the problem of sustained yield, i.e., restricting cutting to growth cycles. Here there are two basic problems: one, the rapidity with which we are depleting timber reserves and, two, the creation of ghost communities by the unplanned cut-out of the surrounding area. The BLM has established certain "master units" within which it will not offer timber for cutting unless it is processed within the towns of the area. These offerings are planned to gear into a 90- to 100-year cutting cycle within the master unit. The Forest Service has proposed "sustained yield" units whereby large operators or a group of small operators may acquire substantial tracts of federal timber to add to their own holdings, provided that certain conservation and research practices are observed and provided that all the holdings are cut on a perpetual basis.

II

IT HAS been my experience as Assistant Secretary of the Interior that these various policy and jurisdictional conflicts cannot be resolved on a "discussion" or "exchange of information" basis. This kind of "cooperation" simply means that nothing gets done.

The present organization is a vertical one. The various interested agencies report directly to bureau heads in Washington, D. C. These bureau heads report to their respective depart-

ment heads, such as the Secretaries of Interior or Agriculture. Little or no authority for overall regional planning is delegated to the field.

Several efforts at coordination have been made. In 1946, I was involved in an effort to establish an Interior Department Coordinating Committee for the Columbia River Basin. It has accomplished a little, but field representatives have lacked any real authority and local bureau representatives have reflected jurisdictional jealousies in Washington.

Also in 1946 a Columbia Inter-Agency Committee was established, made up of representatives of all the interested bureaus. It has had no funds and no staff. Again, achievements have not been spectacularly successful.

One of the primary difficulties has been that federal employees, bureaucrats if you wish, are, after all, human beings. They are subject to the same jealousies, ambitions, and desires as the rest of mankind. No one likes to see his authority undermined or the scope of his activities restricted. A member of an agency honestly feels that he alone can best administer its functions. A conservation man is primarily interested in conservation, a power man in power, and so on.

What is needed, as Mr. McKinley suggests, is a political entity with the power to coordinate and direct all of these various programs into a unified whole. It makes little difference what such an entity is called so long as it can do more than talk. It must also be able to direct.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, with which I was associated during the 1930's, was an effort to bring about such a political entity for the Tennessee River Valley. In creating the TVA, the Congress went outside the then operating departments and established a corporation for regional administration. It was given powers over the creating and marketing of power, land reclamation, soil conservation, mineral exploration and development, and timber marketing—in short, it could carry on practically all of the functions now so chaotically undertaken by many federal government agencies in the Northwest.

True, the Northwest differs from the Tennessee Valley; but there are important similarities. Both regions are predominantly dependent upon extractive industries centered around a basic river basin network. The point is, how-

ever, that not only has the TVA been profitable (it returns some 7 per cent or more on its investment); it has also coordinated the various activities in federal administration into an integrated regional program which has tremendously increased the prosperity of the TVA area.

A Columbia Valley Authority modeled upon the TVA has been suggested for the Columbia River Basin as a solution to the problems Mr. McKinley has raised. Although I have long been a CVA advocate, there seems little sense in arguing for such an authority during the coming few months, at least. The 83d Congress is in no mood favorably to contemplate any further extension of the valley authority formula, regardless of the fact that a CVA does not mean additional federal powers but rather a reorganization of those already in existence.

Mr. McKinley has an objection to a CVA in spite of his warm praise for the TVA. His argument is founded on the theory that valley authorities are purely regional in scope and do not readily lend themselves to integration into national policies and objectives. Suppose, he says, we were to establish six or seven separate valley authorities, each with a certain financial and policy independence. How would the activities of these various authorities be coordinated? And what will happen to those areas which do not lend themselves to such specific regional developments? Presumably they would continue to operate as at present so that in those areas, at least, the present confusion would continue.

It may be that the creation of several regional authorities would result in a problem of coordination. It could be met as the needs resulting from evolutionary growth arise. However, I do not agree that "regionalization" is necessarily an evil. It is perhaps as important as a national program, since it brings activities closer to the people of the area and leads to a decentralization of power away from Washington.

Mr. McKinley's alternative proposals are interesting. In essence, he advocates the division of functions into two basic categories, one concerned with water development including power and the other concerned with land administration. Water functions would all be given to the Department of the Interior. The

Army Engineers would be stripped of their dam construction functions. Thus the dam program with the attendant programs of irrigation, flood control, reclamation, navigation, and the marketing of power would be centralized in one agency and would presumably proceed pursuant to a unified over-all policy. Mr. McKinley would transfer to the Department of Agriculture all of the land management functions now generally undertaken by Interior. The Bureau of Land Management would be abolished and its functions would be assumed by the Forest Service.

Two so-called "special interests" would receive some autonomy. They are the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service. Mr. McKinley seems to feel that these agencies represent two important minority interests which should not be swallowed up in the administration of the larger water and land programs.

Mr. McKinley suggests continuing the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee for coordinating purposes, but he proposes to strengthen it by adding as chairman a representative of the White House who would also have some field authority to subordinate regional to national policy objectives.

If the trial balloons now being sent up by the new administration mean anything, there is a definite possibility that the realignment suggested by Mr. McKinley may be effected. It would certainly be an improvement over the present situation, but I see in it certain fundamental objections.

Most importantly, one cannot arbitrarily divide water and land management into separate categories. We have already had too much of this kind of division in the Northwest. The overwhelming emphasis has been on the development of kilowatts, which has taken about 95 per cent of our budget. Kilowatts, per se, are worthless. There is a need to coordinate the development of kilowatts with due regard for their function. In the Northwest that function is the processing of resources brought into the area or extracted from it. For this reason I would prefer to see power development more closely integrated with the development and management of our other resources.

In the absence of a CVA, my own preference is for the minority report of the Hoover Com-

mission Task Force dealing with this administrative problem. This minority report advocated the reformation of the Department of the Interior into a Department of Natural Resources. To it would be transferred from the other departments the administration of all of our basic resources—water and power development, land and timber management, conservation and reclamation, fish and wildlife, and parks—so that effective policies could be projected not only on a regional but also on a national basis.

This approach to the problem does not itself solve the matter of conflicting jurisdictions and objectives within the department. Nor does it by itself guarantee a regional program balancing all of the various ends to be accomplished. I feel that such a program can be helped considerably by requiring regional budgets to be worked out in the field by the various intradepartmental bureaus working together. In other words, faced with the necessity of requesting funds from the Congress to cover all aspects of a proposed regional program, the agencies would be forced to iron out their differences in various budget meetings and to integrate their various programs to the benefit of all.

Mr. McKinley criticizes the report of this minority on the ground that there are "many 'unities' in the relationship of water, land, and minerals, but so are there many diversities." He seems to feel that the proposal would unduly centralize various diverse programs which do not require such a close degree of unified operation. He may well be correct; but, for my part, I would prefer to see such an over-unification of program than to risk continuance of the confusion of the past.

I do not want to leave the impression that because I disagree with Mr. McKinley's answers to the problem of administrative structure in the Northwest I think any the less of his book. He has done a magnificent job of analyzing the organizational difficulties facing us. Effectiveness in administrative organization is, after all, a matter of degree. No system is perfect and no system is completely faulty. *Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest* provides a study on which to base continued improvement and perhaps effective solutions to the difficulties of federal administration in this region.

Report of Conference Sessions

Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration, 1953

THE summaries of most of the sessions of the annual meeting of the Society, prepared by their secretaries, are reproduced below. Summaries of the principal speeches of the opening and closing sessions, by Arthur S. Fleming and Philip L. Graham, respectively, appear earlier in this issue.

Foreign Affairs Administration Overseas

Chairman—Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Panel—N. E. Halaby, Department of Defense; James L. McCamy, University of Wisconsin; Harold Seidman, U.S. Bureau of the Budget; William J. Sheppard, Executive Assistant to the Director of Mutual Security; Bromley K. Smith, Department of State

Secretary—Leonard Kamsky, Department of State

Mr. McCamy opened the discussion with a brief historical summary of foreign affairs administration. Administration prior to 1940 is largely irrelevant to today's problems; the work of missions abroad is entirely different today except for consular affairs. Foreign affairs administration has moved from unification before World War II, to nonunification during the war, to a brief period of unification on civil functions immediately after, to the present state of nonunification. There has been a pattern of indecision and shift which can only be broken by bold experimentation with a new approach. There is nothing new or bold in suggestions now being discussed; "we are right back where we were during the war."

Mr. Seidman described briefly the organization and activities of a typical United States mission, centering upon the problem of how to assure that we speak with one voice at the country level when we have so many voices in

Washington. He reviewed the attempt at interagency coordination that was made through the International Security Affairs Committee. When this failed, the Office of the Director of Mutual Security was established. Executive order 10338 is important in defining agency and mission roles and particularly in establishing the positive leadership role of the chief of diplomatic mission.

Mr. Sheppard discussed the specialized machinery in Europe centering about the United States Special Representative in Europe, Ambassador Draper. SRE is a unique development in United States overseas operations; it has resulted in eliminating or combining numerous overhead staffs. Principal problems arise from two sources: the military chain of command and relations with missions at the country level.

Mr. Smith directed attention to the changed role of ambassadors and the added responsibilities that new programs have placed upon them. It is necessary to deemphasize the traditional role of social prominence and stress the importance of executive abilities. The National Security Council offers hope of developing general directives that will serve as a unifying force in foreign policy. Most important, however, is the need for a clearer idea of what our policy objectives are.

Mr. Halaby also emphasized the need for clear directives. Most of the perplexities of overseas administration are due to the constantly changing nature of the problem. Under the ERP the problem was strictly economic, then it became economic-military, and now it is dominated by military considerations.

Mr. Wilcox noted that congressional opinion is swinging back to the idea that responsibility should be centered in the ambassador. He emphasized the importance of executive departments presenting well coordinated plans to Congress.

Administrative Control in State Government

Chairman—Lloyd M. Short, University of Minnesota

Panel—Howard A. Calkins, University of Texas; Roger A. Freeman, Office of the Governor of Washington; Lynwood M. Holland, Emory University; Daniel S. McHargue, University of Michigan

Secretary—Barrett Hollister, Antioch College

Mr. Calkins described the Texas pattern as one of legislative domination based on constitutional and statutory requirements and tradition. Only in 1951 was the Governor given a budget staff, and only 20 per cent of the state's expenditures are included in the budget. The typical administrative agency is a board appointed by the Governor, subject to legislative approval, the members of which have overlapping six-year terms.

In this setting strong leadership in the staffs of two legislative agencies—a budget commission and a legislative council—has introduced some of the basic management practices. Should good government forces in Texas try to build up further these legislative forces of strength? No one on the panel or in the audience tried to answer this question.

Under its new (1945) Constitution, Mr. Holland pointed out, Georgia restricts the administrative authority of the Governor severely, although he has a veto power. The political party and election procedures, however, usually result in control of both houses of the legislature by the faction of the Democratic party led by the Governor. By custom all appointees to constitutionally established boards resign following elections and allow the new Governor to fill their places. Legally and constitutionally the Georgia Governor does not have effective powers of administrative control. Politically he does.

According to Mr. McHargue, the constitutional powers of the Governor of Michigan are reasonably adequate; they include strong authority for making appointments, removals, and investigations. The Governor has veto and item veto powers. The Governor's term, however, is two years, and his removal and investigating powers are in abeyance when the Legislature is in session. Other elective officers

share the executive authority. Under the existing situation in which the Governor is a Democrat and both houses of the Legislature and all the other elected executives are Republicans, an administrative board of the elective executives overrides the Governor.

The Governor's major tool for control is a Department of Administration established in 1948, with strong provisions for budgeting, accounting, and construction programs. By statutory erosion Michigan has undermined the adequate constitutional powers of the Governor, and there seems little political chance of strengthening the Governor's administrative powers.

Washington's Republican Governor, said Mr. Freeman, with strong appointment and removal powers has been able to make some progress in as adverse a situation of political control as exists in Michigan. His chief weapon has been an aggressive public relations program instituted after the state's credit was out of hand. One publication, *Your Dollar's Worth of State Government*, was used by every newspaper and radio station in the state and was crucial in securing adoption of the Governor's programs for real civil service and financial planning and control by the Legislature.

With state governments steadily losing the fight for effective administrative control, the chief needs are: better personal staffs for governors; higher salaries for the top administrative levels; accounting and budgeting by program items (performance) rather than by departments or objects; uniform accounting standards; and "good" people who will fight at the lobbying point in the Legislature.

Mr. Short added that Minnesota's Little Hoover Commission has been able to move on from the administrative pattern started under Governor Stassen in 1939 because there has been very little sliding back from the administrative controls instituted at that time.

Evaluating Education for Public Administration

Chairman—G. Homer Durham, University of Utah

Panel—Gilbert Chavenelle, University of

Michigan; Ben L. Ellington, U.S. Bureau of the Budget; E. W. Loveridge, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Edward Preston, Bureau of Internal Revenue; Karl E. Stromsen, Department of the Interior

Secretary—Mrs. Alice King, Radcliffe-Harvard

The panel, with considerable audience participation, debated the relationship between education in the broadest sense and public administration. Discussion revolved around such matters as "what is public administration?" "What ought it to be?" How effective are the present graduate training programs in producing qualified persons for careers in general administration? Have they "come of age" in the way, for example, that schools of law, medicine, and forestry have in their professional fields? To what extent do these other professional schools outperform the public administration programs in turning out people for general administration?

There was general agreement that the "professional approach" in public administration schools had been weighed and found useful.

Administration was acknowledged to be a part of all organized activity in professional-technical fields, a body of knowledge that augments the particular specialty, be it forestry or mental health. A person being educated for a professional career in public administration needs "breadth of understanding" or "grasp" to enable him properly to comprehend and implement policies—the result of "liberal" education. But he also needs specific tools in order to get a job in the first place. Obviously the point of balance is the issue for decision by the universities.

That a variety of approaches exist, all achieving some success, was apparent and felt to be important. Professional training in management techniques was pressed as a matter of extreme concern by the two recent graduates, Mr. Ellington and Mr. Preston—Mr. Ellington going so far as to favor a professional undergraduate major in core subjects in the field (he also strongly urged improved teaching methods on the part of many instructors, such as adequate use of advance syllabuses).

The chairman presented Mr. Ellington's proposition as one of two major considera-

tions for the group during the discussion period. Consensus emerged that to professionalize an undergraduate major in public administration at this time would be risky business, from the point of view both of educational institutions and of students adopting such a program.

The session ended during debate of an old conflict: where shall the balance be struck between liberal and practical courses in the graduate training programs? Two recent graduates indicated that, in retrospect, their most valuable studies had been tool courses; these had proved their practical utility on the job. Mr. Durham asked Mr. Preston if personality (plus either approach) was not a determining factor; would he, Mr. Preston, not have advanced in the Treasury Department at about the same rate had he studied the "philosophy of public policy," say at Littauer, instead of going to Syracuse. Mr. Preston's retort was that in such a case he would not even have been employed in the first place! On the other hand, the report of a survey conducted among Interior Department trainees, reported by Mr. Stromsen, indicated that it would be desirable to have more courses geared to enabling students to broaden their vistas.

The program ended with Mr. Durham suggesting that, in his judgment, education for public administration, despite its distinguished history since the "call" for its "study" by Woodrow Wilson, was still in search of an adequate theory or theories of public administration; that the matter of planning curriculums, recruiting and training students at the graduate level, professional or liberal, rested largely in the articulate or inarticulate theory-premises assumed by educational officers in the various training programs; that, as a result of increased laborers in the vineyard, material coinciding with the need and interest was available for the actual construction of theories; and finally, that a study panel, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, or the Society, or some other appropriate agency, might well be convened to examine the present state of administrative theory and its relationship to educational training for public administration.

Metropolitan Dilemma: One Community—Many Governments

Chairman—Luther H. Gulick, Institute of Public Administration

Panel—Carl H. Chatters, American Municipal Association; Winston W. Crouch, University of California at Los Angeles; Homer Hoyt, Urban Land Economist, New York City; Wilfred Owen, Brookings Institution and Institute for Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania; Hugh R. Pomeroy, Department of Planning, Westchester County, New York; Abel Wolman, Johns Hopkins University

Secretary—Priscilla M. Greeley, Wilson College at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

In analyzing the reasons for the changing population distribution patterns of our metropolitan areas, Mr. Hoyt emphasized the importance of the automobile revolution, although shifts of population outward did not occur immediately because of a natural lag between the invention of the automobile and the extension of good roads, water systems, and sewerage systems. The present more marked growth of population in the suburbs Mr. Hoyt attributes primarily to the following factors: (1) federal government loans to home builders, (2) a residential movement of people outward, (3) an industrial outflow of workers, and (4) the formation of suburban shopping areas. Mr. Hoyt also mentioned the postwar increase of underprivileged populations in our northern cities as pushing the older populations outward. Suburban communities with these newly acquired populations are anxious to attract "surplus producing enterprises" in order to lighten the financial burden of the small home owner.

The spreading out of the increasingly industrialized city of Los Angeles, Mr. Crouch called a result of the "psychology of the boomers." Outward growth was made possible by extension of steam railroad lines, development of interurban electric lines, and the coming of the automotive age. About 1910 the central city began a concerted effort to integrate the sprawling communities of the Los Angeles area by making annexation the price for extension of the water supply system. For

a time this worked, but finally the annexation movement was halted by three counter movements: (1) creation on the borders of the central city of a ring of newly incorporated municipalities, (2) establishment of various special districts, and (3) rise of the county as a metropolitan unit of government with power to make contracts for services to other units. Mr. Crouch concluded that in the Los Angeles area the problems of water supply and sanitation are now handled successfully, but the problems of transportation, air pollution, and provision of an adequate tax base are yet to be solved.

In considering the New York metropolitan area with its many units of government, Mr. Pomeroy spoke particularly of the great importance of the individual community gaining a perspective of the whole. For example, there is general recognition of the intercommunity problem of highways, but there is not sufficient recognition of the open space needs of the entire area. There is also failure to think in regional terms about the problems of tax-exempt land. Many wealthy communities wish to encourage the building of factory headquarters but at the same time zone the community so as to prevent workers at the factory headquarters from living there. Mr. Pomeroy sees a need for greater coordination in municipal zoning as well as in the handling of other problems such as sanitation and transportation. Mr. Pomeroy believes that it is essential to establish some official agency to facilitate collective thinking. He mentioned the Inter-County Planning Conference in the New York area as a step in this direction.

Recognizing the persistent resistance of municipalities to consolidation, Mr. Wolman stated that multiplicity of units is probably unavoidable. In considering the particular functional problem of environmental sanitation, Mr. Wolman said that *ad hoc* devices work fairly well, although they need adjustment every twenty or twenty-five years. However, the success of almost all techniques depends upon effective leadership. In dealing with a metropolitan problem, "the personality of a particular area" is more important than the administrative structure.

In the view of Mr. Owen, if the metropolitan transportation problem is to be solved,

consideration should be given to certain physical relationships. For example, the trucker must have access to the railroads and parking areas must be provided near highways. Mr. Owen emphasized that the traffic, transit, parking and general transportation problems of the central city must be attacked as the inter-related elements of a single problem before there can be any hope of solving the problems of an entire metropolitan area.

In concluding the discussion, Mr. Chatters cited the emotional factors of pride, prejudice, and parsimony as the greatest obstacles to solution of the problem of metropolitanism. Continued domination of state legislatures by rural sections is another difficulty. Mr. Chatters emphasized that solution of the metropolitan problem does not lie in making the city bigger; the difficulty is that cities are too big now. He suggested that we should do some new thinking. In his opinion considerable progress has been made in solving the metropolitan problems of water supply, sanitation, and public health but much more is yet to be done to solve such problems as transportation, highways and parking, schools, police, and tax exemption. Mr. Chatters believes that truckers and motorists should be forced to pay full costs for facilities used and that there is need for one highly productive tax (perhaps a municipal income tax). He also emphasized the need for determining the proper relationship between the city and the county. He concluded that perhaps control of land use is the basic problem.

Organization for National Security

Chairman—John D. Millett, Columbia University

Speaker—James A. Perkins, Carnegie Corporation

Commentators—Robert H. Connery, Duke University; John F. Meck, Jr., Dartmouth College

Secretary—Ruth M. Raup

In the discussion of Mr. Perkins' paper, which is printed in this issue of the *Review*, the chief problems considered were: Can the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfill their planning func-

tions while also carrying the major responsibility for operations? How can civilian control over military advisers be strengthened in the Department of Defense? What can be done to coordinate more effectively the formation of policy for national security throughout the government?

Both Mr. Connery and Mr. Meck suspected that Mr. Perkins was correct in maintaining that the Joint Chiefs could plan effectively only if they retained their operating responsibilities. Mr. Connery preferred to reserve judgment pending a thorough study of the present work load of the Joint Chiefs—a study that might be extended to cover such other planning groups as the State Department planning staff.

In response to a question about the proposal of Vannevar Bush for converting the Joint Chiefs into an advisory planning authority and giving their operating responsibilities to field commanders under the orders of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perkins cited what he believed to be two particular weaknesses of the plan: (1) continuity in operations would depend on lack of turnover in the office of Secretary of Defense, a condition that experience indicates cannot be assured; and (2) the Joint Chiefs would not be able to plan realistically without maintaining intimate connections with the operating field commanders, and such intimate connections would almost inevitably interfere with proper command lines between the Secretary of Defense and the field commanders.

As evidence of the indispensability of immediate contact with operations in strategic planning, Mr. Millett observed that General Marshall looked to General Somervell, who had operating responsibilities, rather than to his strategic planning staff, for advice on logistic support of overseas operations. Mr. Millett stressed the need for reorganizing each of the three armed services internally in order to relieve the Joint Chiefs of routine administrative tasks and give them more time and energy for planning.

Mr. Connery inquired whether the present system of having three civilian Secretaries under the Secretary of Defense might not be helping to weaken civilian authority in the Department. While the civilian Secretaries

have been useful to the Secretary of Defense—relieving him of responsibility for such matters as promotion, discipline, public relations, and commissions—they have tended to be unable to withstand the separatist pressures of their military advisers. Instead of being a team of advisers to the Defense Secretary, they have sometimes become the most stubborn defenders of the special interests of their services; Forrestal's greatest difficulties as Secretary of Defense arose not in controlling his military advisers but in coping with his civilian Secretaries. It might be possible to strengthen the positions of the civilian Secretaries somewhat by abandoning the system of staffing their offices primarily with military "executive officers" and replacing these officers almost entirely with civilians.

A special problem is presented by the Joint Boards—e.g., the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board—in the office of the Secretary of Defense. As presently organized, according to Mr. Perkins, the boards could be dominated by their military representatives who could connive to prevent their civilian chairman from exercising any deciding authority. One solution might be to transfer all responsibilities for such matters as supply and research to a "Fourth Force" separate from the three existing services. While such separation might solve some problems, it would also be likely to create new difficulties in coordination.

In order to coordinate policy for national security throughout the government, Mr. Connery believes the State Department should be encouraged to take as active a role as possible in long-term policy-making. Mr. Meck noted that the State Department is gradually overcoming its initial reluctance to cooperate with other agencies in making foreign policy. He was concerned by evidence that the Defense and State Departments and other members of the Council tended to bypass the National Security Council in planning their activities, and agreed with Mr. Perkins that the Council would probably be fully effective only with strong presidential leadership.

Mr. Harold Stein urged that it was more important to prevent dangerous mistakes in military and diplomatic policy arising from lack of coordination between such authorities

as the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency than it was to save even a billion dollars wasted here and there because of overlapping of the three services under the Defense Department.

In-Service Training and the University

Chairman—Lynton K. Caldwell, Graduate Program, State of New York

Panel—Lashley G. Harvey, Boston University; Norton E. Long, Western Reserve University; Edwin O. Stene, University of Kansas; Lewis B. Sims, U.S. Public Health Service; Stephen B. Sweeney, University of Pennsylvania; Kenneth O. Warner, Civil Service Assembly

Secretary—C. Herschel Jones, Bucknell University

There is no single role that universities generally may assume in relation to government in-service training. In considering the appropriateness of various roles, we encounter a basic conflict in educational theory. Is the university performing a proper function when it teaches job skills to satisfy the needs of a community for technical and manipulative skills? Some educators contend that academic training should not be job-related. Others hold that a university should assume an obligation to the community to teach technical skills or professional or administrative know-how when these are the primary needs of the community.

The organization of university in-service training in the form of institutes, short courses, or certificate programs also entails numerous problems. Each must be adapted or appended in its own unique way to the work of the parent institution. Some choose to consider a pure staff relationship as most appropriate to a university in meeting in-service training needs; the university faculty may counsel, advise, or recommend, but may not assume command or operating responsibilities. In contrast is a position that suggests an obligation of universities to take on staff or operating responsibilities on a contract basis wherever such relationships may be thought to improve agency performance.

It is generally agreed that universities have responsibilities to make available their resources to agencies of government. The educational institutions should work with all levels of government to help to determine their needs. Ways should be found to make available professional know-how whenever and wherever the need is recognized. There is a responsibility for universities to provide leadership in reviewing the content of training programs with which they may be associated—to concern themselves with such matters as standards of performance and adequacy of instructional procedures. State-supported institutions may be obligated in ways that private colleges and universities are not.

In rural areas or in communities which are small, emphasis may be placed on training needs for elective officials, peace officers, and appointive administrators such as city managers. Larger population centers, which in many instances are regional capitals, may afford occasion for administrative training programs of the intern and executive development types and for training in professional and technical skills as well. Programs growing out of these different conditions are now being carried on in a number of university bureaus, institutes, and research centers. The United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School, a semi-official training center of the department, is cooperating in areas where there are substantial numbers of federal employees.

Numerous problems of a practical nature are encountered when a university embarks on a program of training government employees. Not the least of these is the matter of finance. In cooperative programs, what decisions should be made by the colleges and what by the cooperating agencies of government? How can top officials be persuaded that they can do a better job if their subordinates are better trained? Whence must the initiative develop? These questions will be of concern for a long time to come.

Roads to Improvement in Local Administration

Chairman—Stephen K. Bailey, Mayor of Middletown, Connecticut

Panel—Schuyler Lowe, Director of General Administration, District of Columbia; Edward S. Overman, University of Virginia; Sherwood Reeder, City Manager, Richmond, Virginia; Carleton Sharpe, City Manager, Hartford, Connecticut

Secretary—Russell E. Carlisle, George Washington University

Mr. Bailey has found in his five months as Mayor of Middletown that he has to contend with nearly all of the problems in local government and public administration mentioned in textbooks. In his "weak mayor" position, with extreme decentralization and autonomy of departments and lack of budgetary and hierarchical controls, he is like the country doctor who must treat the diverse ailments of a large number of different people.

Mr. Lowe described the current reorganization of the government of the District of Columbia, which is having its first major overhauling since the 1870's. The reorganization has involved (1) appointment of a Citizens' Advisory Council of nine members to advise the Board of Commissioners on all matters and encourage citizen participation, which has been almost completely lacking in the District; (2) establishment of a Department of General Administration to make necessary organization and management studies and begin grouping common tasks on a functional basis; (3) approval by the commissioners of a basic reorganization plan predicated on familiar principles of public administration; and (4) development of agreements with those affected by the plans on how they are to be executed.

Improvement in administration of county governments was the area covered by Mr. Overman. Such improvement, while difficult, is by no means impossible or impracticable. County officials, like most other public officials, have a desire to improve governmental operations in every way possible. The problem is to encourage and maintain this desire, and to direct it to progressive solutions—holding on to the realistic view that there are no panaceas.

Mr. Reeder pointed out four ways to improve local administration: (1) improve basic laws which now fail to allow sufficient flexi-

bility; (2) revise organization structure, especially with a view to eliminating misassignment of functions; (3) obtain closer cooperation of the judiciary to secure better law enforcement; and (4) eliminate as much lost time as possible.

Mr. Sharpe mentioned that lost time was often considerably reduced by improving communications, working for more coordination, and allowing more flexibility. He emphasized the need for improved city planning and more intergovernmental cooperation in solving the problems of hub cities surrounded by satellite suburbs, and pointed out the advantages of standardized debt administration. In dealing with unions of public employees, he suggested that public employees be trained as stewards and that the administration deal with the union through them rather than a lawyer representative. He pointed out the advantages of one large union of public employees rather than several small ones.

In concluding, Mr. Bailey stated that citizen participation is an important value to be considered in reorganizing local governments. Improvements should be executed without undue haste, with a balancing and weighing of the values and problems involved.

The Organization and Management Function in Government

Chairman—Frederick Mosher, Syracuse University

Panel—William M. Arnstein, New York State Budget Division; Ralph J. Burton, U.S. Bureau of the Budget; T. Jack Gary, Jr., General Accounting Office; John Macy, Department of Defense; Enrique Tejera Paris, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration

Secretary—Martin C. Clapp, Economic Development Administration, Puerto Rico

Mr. Arnstein believes that organization and methods units should be management tools rather than advisory and consultative agencies. O & M's primary concern should be with the operating divisions; it should avoid being isolated in an "ivory tower." For success, this type of activity requires the continuing support of top management. There are numerous

advantages in locating the O & M unit directly under the agency head; he also suggested that the budget office is an appropriate location.

Mr. Arnstein indicated that decentralizing O & M functions to the operating divisions is undesirable because O & M personnel may be drawn into day-to-day operations and lose sight of the staff nature of their work. The \$64 question relates to the qualifications for O & M personnel. Ability to get along with people, an analytical mind, and general resourcefulness are of top priority. Practical experience in operating problems is probably more important than formal schooling.

Effective working relationships between O & M and operating units are of prime importance. They will ultimately depend on the extent to which O & M units provide satisfactory services. If O & M is linked to fiscal processes, "findings can be made enduring through effective utilization of the fiscal power"; however, O & M should not become involved in detailed fiscal matters but should concentrate on organization, management, and methods problems.

Mr. Burton said that O & M work concerns the sum total of executive authority and activity, as distinct from substantive determinations. O & M officials must know program objectives and goals, but they are directly interested in the distribution of responsibility for functions and activities and in organizational relationships, processes, and factors of executive leadership and direction. Their activities range from over-all reorganization surveys to time and motion studies. O & M officials must also be able to assess the characteristics of the total environment in which administrative phenomena take place.

The appropriate organizational location of the O & M function is a subject of controversy, Mr. Macy said. Most commonly it is linked to budget, personnel, or controller offices or immediately to top management. In any event, it must have close relations with other staff functions. Mr. Gary said that O & M might appropriately be located under the principal finance officer or directly under the executive head. As the accountant on the panel, he said that accountants are not necessarily management experts.

An understanding of operating problems

and diplomacy are needed for successful O & M performance, Mr. Tejera indicated. Training and practical experience are of the utmost importance in staff development. It would probably be well to require several years of practical experience before permitting graduate work. A social science background is also necessary to provide balance and perspective for O & M staff.

In the discussion the importance of building O & M "know-how" into day-to-day line operations was stressed. O & M staff must be fully aware of policy and program at all times. If "M" stands for "management" rather than "methods," O & M must participate actively and significantly in substantive program matters.

Aptitude tests to measure probable success in the O & M field were believed desirable in the selection and development of personnel. Extensive on-the-job training in specific techniques was also stressed.

Public Administration in Underdeveloped Areas

Chairman—Herbert Emmerich, Public Administration Clearing House

Panel—Paul Appleby, Syracuse University;
John F. Gange, University of Virginia;
Walter Sharp, Yale University

Secretary—Edwin A. Bock, Public Administration Clearing House

The session was addressed by four well-traveled members. Mr. Emmerich had just returned from South America. He presided in place of Gordon R. Clapp who is recovering from an airplane accident. Mr. Appleby was back from a five-month public administration mission in India and Mr. Gange had just been on a five-week consulting tour in Formosa. Mr. Sharp had spent six weeks in Indo-China last year on a special assignment.

The speakers carried humble attitudes rather than white men's burdens. Mr. Emmerich referred to technical assistance in administration as "a brash assignment, considering the state of our own governmental affairs." Mr. Appleby cautioned against attempting to reform the objectives and policies of foreign

governments. All three panel members referred to their short stays abroad and disclaimed expert knowledge of the countries they had visited.

Running strongly through the talks was the opinion that technical assistance in public administration should not consist of transplanting American methods to foreign situations. All speakers emphasized that the consultant must work with foreign governments on the problems they think are important and within the existing constitutional and procedural frameworks. Mr. Appleby stated that the major aim of administration programs should be "to stimulate local people to think of improvements that you can't think of yourself." Mr. Sharp said that American consultants in administration should realize that they do not have the answers for foreign problems and that they must move slowly when in foreign countries and learn as they go along. Mr. Gange said Chinese officials on Formosa are eager for assistance in administration, but they do not want to be told how to do things. Rather, they desire working cooperation.

Mr. Appleby, using India as an example, advanced ten categories for assessing foreign administrations: (1) the vitality and character of political democracy; (2) the type of political system; (3) religious conditions affecting government; (4) degree of centralization or federalism; (5) economic conditions; (6) strength of the administrative system compared with power of pressure groups; (7) attitudes of government and people toward other nations; (8) maturity of leadership; (9) capacity of government to take on new load; and (10) relation between stage of political development and stage of economic development. He described the Indian government as one of the most advanced in the world, but, because of economic underdevelopment, it is also one of the most overburdened. American consultants should not expect "to wave an administrative wand" and see quick results. Finally, he reminded the session of a lesson learned at home, namely, that "a hillbilly can make better music on his own musical saw than on a piano he's never seen before."

Mr. Gange, describing conditions in Formosa, concluded that a major defect of United States technical assistance there was

lack of continuity. Government programs, agencies, and personnel change. He expressed the conviction that sufficient continuity to enable Chinese administrators to know personally and to depend upon United States personnel could only be provided by non-governmental programs. He suggested that ASPA, the universities, or other private agencies such as Public Administration Service could conduct long-term and continuous assistance programs. He also drew attention to the need for training programs. Chinese administrators feel the need for teachers in administration who can conduct training programs that will provide substantive help and also improve the morale and the interest of civil servants in their work.

Mr. Sharp, after describing conditions in Indo-China, also gave first importance to the training of personnel. He explained briefly a new two-year training program organized by the French. Students are drawn from the civil service and from the University of Hanoi. Americans can help by cooperating with the French in this program. There is a need for teachers and for teaching materials which are less specialized and in other ways more suitable locally than materials now used in the United States. He hopes such a program can be undertaken through the UN, or with MSA help, or by a multinational team which includes French and Belgian members.

In the discussion period, Mr. Appleby, reinforced by Mr. Emmerich, warned that technical assistance programs which by-pass national governments to concentrate on provincial or local levels may encourage separatism or other dangerous centrifugal forces. This would be particularly unfortunate in India, where a high degree of federalism is required by the constitution and is mitigated at present largely by the control of the Congress party over both national and state governments.

Mr. Hyde, of the Technical Cooperation Administration, disagreed with a caution of Mr. Appleby against technicians in other fields suggesting administrative improvements in foreign countries. He cited administrative improvements stimulated by TCA public health technicians, particularly arranging meetings of state and national health ministers. Mr. Appleby agreed in part, but said he

felt that sometimes suggestions made by technicians had been too specific and made without full appreciation of the wider or more long-term administrative repercussions.

Mr. Emmerich, in closing, described some obstacles which have handicapped United States technical assistance efforts. We are too specialized to be of much help in some areas. We are undereducated about local conditions. We seldom speak the local language. There is a tendency to be in too much of a hurry; one cannot change ancient civilizations in time for the fiscal year. Our missions are often too short term; there is not enough learning by living with the people. He was inclined to feel that "more of our public administration missionaries" should be young as well as well trained, since young men are less inclined to want always to travel first class. Finally, programs allow too little time for briefing before personnel go abroad and too little time for orientation in local conditions and customs after personnel arrive in the foreign country.

All speakers expressed dislike for the term "underdeveloped"; a possible substitute would be "overburdened."

Civil Defense

Chairman—Robert A. Walker, Stanford University

Speaker—Otto L. Nelson, Vice President, New York Life Insurance Company

Commentators—Justice M. Chambers, Federal Civil Defense Administration; Presley Lancaster, Jr., National Security Resources Board

Secretary—William C. Thomas, Jr., Columbia University

In setting the stage for the discussion, Mr. Walker pointed out that a major difficulty of our civil defense program is arousing public interest in an extended period of sustained crisis. Considerable planning has been done for civil defense, and the major effort of this kind is the recent East River Project report on nonmilitary defense measures which was headed by Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Nelson called attention to the fact that we are entering the atomic era, and that one hundred airplanes can now carry more de-

structive power than the British and United States Air Forces together carried to the Germans and the Japanese during all of World War II. Atomic bombs are more effective against civilian than against military targets. Civilian defense must be a permanent partner of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. In planning for civil defense it is necessary to recognize and accept certain constant limitations, among them the inadequate manpower supply and the need for local autonomy. In the face of these considerations it is not wise to expect a smooth-running, highly centralized organization. Limited personnel and budgets, due largely to military demands, make it necessary to use people who have responsibilities outside of civil defense. While it is necessary to use volunteer workers we can have a core of government people supplementing them.

Mr. Lancaster drew attention to three broad goals outlined by the East River report: (1) reduction of target vulnerability; (2) air defense sufficient to make saturation attack impossible and crippling attack unlikely; and (3) a permanent civil defense system capable of minimizing loss of life and destruction of property. Multiplicity of governments in metropolitan areas creates a problem that must be solved; the generally accepted answer, a board headed by the mayor of the principal political unit, is not working very well.

According to Mr. Chambers our civil defense manpower needs at their peak will be roughly 10 per cent of the population, with from five to seven million needed at present as a cadre. We have around four million people engaged in this work at present. The bulk of the equipment needed, i.e., trucks, bulldozers, etc., must be privately owned. The federal government has accepted the responsi-

bility to fill in shortages in critical items. The Federal Civil Defense Administration is building as much civil defense as possible into federal departments and emphasizing the building of only one civil defense organization as such. The FCDA accepts the responsibility for coordinating civil defense efforts across state lines. The federal government has not done as much as it could to disperse industry through means at its command, such as contract letting.

In answer to his own question of what is wrong with civil defense, Mr. Chambers stated that the people are overlooking the fact that the operating responsibility lies with them, that all FCDA can do is to integrate national know-how and send it on down to the lower levels. The recent presidential attitude indicates that there will be a freer flow of information in the future. He deplored the fact that matter sent out by FCDA is often not read and sometimes not even distributed by the states. Civil defense may have a positive aspect when it is viewed as a means of reducing the effectiveness of our enemy's stockpile by minimizing casualties and property damage.

In discussion from the floor, Mr. Carl Chatters, of the American Municipal Association, expressed the view that the FCDA had shown too little interest in the views of the cities, and that a good deal more could be accomplished if FCDA spent more time in local organization and less in preparation of printed matter. Mr. Chambers replied that staff and other considerations made it necessary that FCDA work through the established state civil defense organizations. Other discussion centered on the question of more effective public relations, and particularly on ways and means of developing greater public concern.

Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Public Administration Clearing House

Change in Dates for the Istanbul Congress

The International Institute of the Administrative Sciences announces that the dates for the IXth International Congress, in Istanbul, Turkey, have been changed to September 6-14, 1953. The working sessions will end on Friday, the 11th, leaving the week-end free to see the sights of Istanbul or take advantage of official arrangements for a one-day visit in Ankara.

The American Express Company will be the travel agency for the Congress and will handle all Istanbul hotel accommodations for the delegates. The Institute and the American Express Company hope to be able to work out reduced travel costs from a central point in Western Europe to Istanbul and return. Inquiries from persons in the United States and Canada may be addressed to Edwin T. Haeefe, U.S. Section, International Institute of the Administrative Sciences, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois; inquiries originating in Europe should be sent to Paul A. Schillings, at the Institute's headquarters, 205 rue Belliard, Brussels, Belgium.

International Management Congress in Brazil

The Xth International Management Congress of the International Committee for Scientific Management (CIOS) will be held in São Paulo, Brazil, February 19-25, 1954. These management conferences, which convene every three years, are participated in by the twenty national committees which form the CIOS and are held for the purpose of free exchange of the latest developments in management methods and techniques.

The national committees of all twenty CIOS member countries are contributing reports and papers on the following eight subjects which will be presented at the Congress. One country

is assuming primary responsibility for each subject.

1. Management methods of improving human relations (Belgium).
2. Policy determination, direction, and control of marketing (Netherlands).
3. Controls for top management use (Switzerland).
4. Executive development and training (Italy).
5. Developing an effective and cooperative organization structure (Sweden).
6. Policy making as affected by conditions outside the control of management, particularly those related to credit and taxation (France).
7. Top management's responsibilities toward modern managerial techniques (United States).
8. Application of modern management techniques to the smaller enterprise (Great Britain).

Further information concerning the Congress can be obtained from the National Management Council of the U.S.A. Inc., 501 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y., which is the American member of the CIOS. The American Society for Public Administration belongs to the Council.

IIAA Public Administration Consultants Conference

Ten public administration consultants assigned to Latin American governments under the technical assistance program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs assembled in Montevideo, Uruguay, for a five-day conference, February 15-19. Meeting with the consultants as they exchanged experiences and discussed common problems were Chauncey O. Rowe, acting director of IIAA, and Robert E. Culbertson, director of the Division of Industry, Government and Technical Services. Following the conference the consultants remained in Montevideo to attend the IV Inter-American Congress of Municipalities.

Among the general conclusions emerging

from the consultants' discussion were the following:

1. Although Latin American countries face many similar difficulties in the administrative sphere, the differences in their situations and needs make it necessary to plan programs and evaluate their progress on a country-by-country basis.

2. The need and demand for public administration training is widespread, but there is a serious lack of local facilities and suitable training materials in the Spanish language.

3. An important contribution to administrative improvement can be made by giving suitable emphasis to the administrative aspects of technical assistance in the various subject-matter fields.

4. Some form of participation by national leaders in the development of each country's public administration program is essential.

The value of local participation is illustrated in Brazil, where a Board of Advisers on Technical Cooperation in Public Administration has been established. Members of the board are prominent Brazilians from all levels of government and from academic and private life who advise on projects to be undertaken, selection of trainees, and other aspects of the Point IV public administration program. Although the board, as such, has no authority to commit the Brazilian government to specific projects, the influence and positions of the members as individuals is such that agreements on public administration priorities reached in the board tend quickly to result in formal requests for technical assistance. The number of important projects either under way or waiting only for appropriate staff is evidence of the effectiveness of this form of consultation.

Rapid progress has been made in establishing public administration as an essential part of the Point IV program in Latin America. Although the first regular public administration consultant was assigned only in April, 1952, there are now two full-time consultants in Brazil and in Costa Rica and one each in Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. There is also one consultant available for regional assignments in Paraguay. Despite some initial uncertainties, public administration consultants appear now to have demonstrated their usefulness and acceptability both to the officials of host countries and to the other personnel of the U.S. technical assistance missions.

The scope of public administration technical assistance operations is illustrated by the following list of significant projects—all official activities of the host governments—upon which assistance of the consultants has been requested: comprehensive administrative organization studies of the "Hoover Commission" type in Chile, Panama, and Uruguay; development and installation of new classification and salary systems, for the federal government of Brazil and the state of São Paulo; reorganization of the area development program for the Northeast drought area, Brazil; reorganization of the medical assistance *servicio*, Brazil; establishment of a school of public administration in the University of Minas Geraes, Brazil; new budget system, state of Minas Geraes, Brazil; reorganization of the civil service system, city of São Paulo, Brazil; administrative reorganization and amalgamation of all health, welfare, and social security services, Chile; administrative reorganization, Ministry of Health, Mexico; establishment of a merit system, a budget system, a tax collection system, and census and statistical services, Paraguay; establishment of a merit system, Costa Rica; administrative reorganization of the Free Zone, City of Colón, Panama; and O & M studies of ministries of health in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, and Venezuela. An IIAA regional consultant also spent several months in Montevideo helping to organize the IV Inter-American Congress of Municipalities.

The public administration consultants now assigned in Latin America are: Brazil, J. Lyle Cunningham and Hugh M. Mohrbacher; Chile, John H. England; Costa Rica, Paul Hazur and Hiram Phillips; El Salvador, Felix A. Nigro; Mexico, Carroll Shaw; Panama Robert S. Avery; Uruguay, John O. Hall; regional consultant, Earl V. Bradsher. The appointment of Irving McNayr, county manager of Montgomery County, Maryland, as consultant-designate for Colombia was recently announced, and recruiting for several other consultant positions is continuing.

Inter-American Congress of Municipalities

The IV Inter-American Congress of Municipalities was held in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay, February 23-27, 1953.

A report of the Congress by the chairman of the American Committee for the International Municipal Cooperation indicates that this Congress was in many respects the most successful one thus far. The city council and *intendencia* (municipal administration) of the city of Montevideo had gone to great lengths to provide a splendid environment for the Congress, an excellent staff, and appropriate luncheons and dinners. German Barbato, *intendente* of the city, and an organizing committee under the chairmanship of architect Eugenio P. Baroffio, provided the leadership for the organization of the meeting.

The themes of the Congress were:

1. Evolution of municipal functions
2. Municipal finance
3. Housing
4. City planning
5. The use of leisure time

In spite of the great travel distance involved for most of the delegations, there was an excellent attendance. Twenty-two nations are eligible for membership—the twenty-one American republics and Canada—and all but four sent delegations. Approximately 250 delegates and observers were registered for the Congress and if one includes the wives and other family members who accompanied the delegates and for whose reception and entertainment special arrangements had been made, a total attendance of 400 persons could be safely estimated.

The United States had a representation of eighty, the largest delegation that it has ever had at any Inter-American Municipal Congress. The President of the Inter-American Municipal Organization, Mayor deLesseps Morrison of New Orleans, Mayor John D. Butler of San Diego, and Mayor Quigg Newton of Denver represented the American Municipal Association. Daniel W. Hoan, former mayor of Milwaukee, represented Mayor Zeidler of his city as well as the United States Conference of Mayors. President Morrison presided at the Congress sessions; he addressed the delegates in the Spanish language.

The American Committee for International Municipal Cooperation and the Public Administration Clearing House were represented by Herbert Emmerich. He was accompanied

by John J. Kennedy, assistant professor of political science, University of Notre Dame. Herman G. Pope represented Public Administration Service of Chicago.

Before the Congress opened, Mr. Emmerich paid a visit to Rio de Janeiro at the invitation of the Getulio Vargas Foundation where he met with the Brazilian Institute of Public Administration and with the Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público (DASP). In Montevideo he met with the public administration consultants of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs on the last day of their conference. (See above).

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, of the U.S. Department of State, greatly assisted in the advance planning of the congress by assigning Earl V. Bradsher to act as liaison officer between the organizing committee in Montevideo and the secretariat in Havana for four months prior to the congress. The Institute was represented at the Congress by Robert Culbertson of Washington and its ten public administration consultants stationed in Latin America.

International organizations represented were the United Nations, which sent Miguel Albornoz, of the Technical Assistance Board, and Fernando Rivera, head of the Latin American Section, Division of Public Administration, Technical Assistance Administration. The Organization of American States was represented by Anatole A. Solow, head of the Division of Housing and Planning, Pan American Union, Washington.

The V Inter-American Congress of Municipalities will be held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, probably in September, 1955.

International Development Services

International Development Services, Inc., a new, nonprofit organization in the field of technical assistance, was established in New York in March. Director of the new organization, which plans to render managerial and technical services to self-help programs in foreign countries, is Robert W. Hudgens, formerly director of the American International Association for Economic and Social Development.

The company is offering its services to either public or private agencies to manage de-

velopment programs aimed at increasing the buying power and productivity of people in undeveloped areas—programs such as demonstrating farming know-how, improving health and sanitation, locating and building farm-to-market roads, and training local technical personnel.

For foreign governments, the company's experts will recommend the proper organizational machinery to carry out a desired development program. They are prepared to survey resource potentials of underdeveloped areas and recommend to the national government concerned what fiscal and investment policies should be adopted to get the greatest use of the resources at hand. They will also set up standards of personnel qualifications and help organize schools and training centers to build a corps of local technicians.

International Development Services has contracted to manage a program in India jointly sponsored by the American International Association and the Cooperative League of the USA. Negotiations are under way for similar arrangements with World Neighbors, Inc., a philanthropic organization of church groups, and with the Cuzco Development Authority, an agency of the Peruvian government partly financed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration.

The American International Association has signed a one-year agreement with International Development Services whereby the new corporation will provide managerial services to the rural development program in Venezuela and will also perform some administrative services for other AIA programs.

Area Information

An unofficial approach to the problem of helping the foreign technician understand the country in which he works was initiated recently by "Odysseus," commentator for the New Delhi *Eastern Economist*. Noting that "the average foreigner of any nationality in India, knows little of India's history and social background," he published, in the issues of December 12, 1952, and January 16, 1953, a bibliography, annotated by an Indian and an Englishwoman, covering the following aspects of Indian life: history and general; autobiography; biography; social history and back-

ground; countryside and village life; fiction; trees, plants, and birds.

Technical Assistance Study

The National Planning Association recently announced the start of a two-year study to evaluate technical assistance in Latin America. The inquiry will cover the programs of the United States, the United Nations, and other international bodies, as well as the activities of voluntary organizations and business firms.

H. Christian Sonne, NPA chairman, stated in announcing the study that people in both the United States and Latin America want a careful, factual evaluation of the effectiveness of what has been done to date. The why, how, how much, and how well of existing technical assistance programs are matters of public concern, "because of their broadening effects upon private enterprise, cultural patterns, and international relations of the countries involved," Mr. Sonne said. Latin America is felt to be a logical area for such a study because technical assistance programs have been under way there longer and on a larger scale than in other regions.

The project, which is being financed by a \$440,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, will be conducted under the direction of a special NPA Policy Committee made up of twenty-eight United States and Latin American leaders in agriculture, business, labor, and other fields. Laird Bell, an NPA trustee, will be chairman. Theodore W. Schultz, chairman, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, will be director of research for the project, with headquarters at the University. Professor Schultz will be assisted by staff members and consultants drawn from appropriate fields, including public administration. A large part of the data will actually be gathered in Latin America.

Among the major objectives listed for the study are the following:

1. To discover whether technical assistance programs are making and can make a significant contribution to the long-range interests of the United States and Latin American countries in world peace and growing international prosperity.
2. To identify the present objectives of technical assistance programs and judge their validity; to weigh results achieved so far in terms of such ob-

jectives; and to indicate criteria for deciding which programs have greatest value for the future in Latin America as well as other parts of the world.

3. To clarify the role of public technical assistance programs in relation to private enterprise.

4. To point out new and improved techniques of providing assistance, especially ways to get better administrative coordination all down the line of technical assistance programs.

5. To indicate how technical assistance programs can be developed so that future technical aid will not be required.

Comparative Fiscal Administration

A recent publication of the United Nations reports on a ten-day seminar on fiscal administration in Geneva in July, 1951, attended by responsible officials and other experts from Chile, Denmark, France, Haiti, India, Mexico, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The theme of the conference was fiscal policies for underdeveloped countries; the approach was to explore the extent to which principles and practices of the more developed countries are transferable or applicable.

The conference discussed the conditions for the successful use of various forms of taxation and their effects in promoting or impeding economic development. Among the taxes analyzed were: personal income, business profits, capital gains, agricultural taxes, indirect taxes, and export duties. The conference also discussed administrative problems of the establishment and control of central budgets.

The recently issued report contains a succinct 18-page summary of the discussion and an annex of 80 pages summarizing the recommendations of nine recent public finance missions to Central and South American states, Turkey, and the Philippines which the conference considered.

The report is prefaced by a 28-page paper on "Fiscal Policies for Underdeveloped Countries," prepared by Professor Walter Heller of the University of Minnesota, covering briefly but systematically current thinking on such questions as: fiscal policy and capital formation; financing government's share in economic development; taxation and private investment; fiscal measures for economic stabilization (particularly in the "exposed" economies of states depending on exports of

raw materials to world markets); and the relation of fiscal policy and the distribution of income.

A limited number of copies of this report (UN Doc. ST/TAA/M/3) are available for distribution from Henry Bloch, director, Fiscal Division, United Nations.

Administrative Problems of Newly Independent Nations

The International Institute of the Administrative Sciences has been asked to prepare a report for UNESCO on the administrative problems confronting newly independent nations in their relations with the United Nations and with the Specialized Agencies in which they participate. Roger Grégoire, Directeur de la Fonction Publique for France, has undertaken the preparation of this report, which will supplement an earlier publication, *National Administration and International Organization*, based on a study carried out jointly by UNESCO and IIAS. The original report deals with the administrative arrangements of fourteen countries for participation in international organizations. However, with the exception of India, all of the countries covered had long been fully independent states. Since that time UNESCO has focused more sharply on the problems of the newly independent nations and the request for the present study grew out of a special meeting called by UNESCO last November to discuss the legal, administrative, and sociological aspects of this problem.

Federal-State Fiscal Relationships

The need for revision in federal-state fiscal relationships was stressed in messages given by a number of governors to state legislatures in session this year. Principal emphasis in the messages was placed on the possible relinquishment of the federal gas taxes to the states, but the state executives also expressed a general interest in a reappraisal of the existing division of federal and state tax sources and of the federal grants-in-aid system.

The Governor of New Hampshire opposed major changes in his state's tax system until the new federal administration has had time to sponsor a clear-cut division of federal-state tax authority. The Governor of New Jersey

stressed the need for a thorough overhauling of federal and state tax laws and suggested that a reduction in the federal government's budget might enable it to relinquish some taxes to the states.

Governor Dewey of New York indicated that the federal government might be reexamining its fiscal relationships with the states so that additional tax resources could be given to the states, which would make them less dependent on federal aid. The Governor of Iowa proposed that his state's Legislature memorialize Congress to return the federal gasoline tax to the states. The Governor of Idaho urged that the federal and state governments reach some agreement with respect to a division of tax sources. The Governor of Utah recommended a legislative resolution urging the federal government to return its gas tax collections to the states, to relinquish some of its revenue sources, and to drop all but the most urgent grants-in-aid programs.

New York State Civil Service Reorganization

The administrative and policy-making functions of the New York State Civil Service Commission are separated and the commission president is made solely responsible for the administration of the Civil Service Department under the terms of a reorganization measure passed by the State Assembly in February.

The three-member bipartisan commission retains all of the policy-making, appellate, and quasi-judicial duties it had under the law previously, and Governor Dewey emphasized, in a memorandum filed in connection with his approval of the bill, that "complete protection is afforded for the merit system through the continuance of the three-member bipartisan commission with appropriate powers in matters involving rule-making, appellate review, and the supervision of the municipal Civil Service.

"The legislation was sponsored by the temporary Commission on the Coordination of State Activities and is the product of the joint efforts of the commission, the Department of Civil Service and the Civil Service Employees Association. It has the enthusiastic support of the Civil Service Reform Association and other

organizations devoted to the improvement of public service."

State Excise Rates

State tax systems show a marked similarity in the types of excises levied, but the rates applied vary rather widely from state to state. According to a recent survey by the Federation of Tax Administrators, all forty-eight states tax gasoline. All of the forty-six states in which liquor sales are legal (Mississippi and Oklahoma are the exceptions) either impose liquor excise taxes or operate state liquor monopolies. Forty-one states tax cigarettes, and thirty-one states levy general sales taxes.

Increased reliance of the states on the general sales tax to provide a new major source of revenue has been a significant development in state taxation since the end of World War II. Since 1946, eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted general sales taxes. Four other states are taxing sales at higher rates than prevailed at the end of the war. A 2 per cent rate is imposed by most of the states using the sales tax. However, the number of states with levies above 2 per cent has increased from five in 1946 to nine in 1952.

Of the states adopting sales taxes between 1946 and 1952, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina enacted 3 per cent rates. Connecticut originally imposed a 3 per cent sales tax rate, but subsequently lowered the rate to 1 per cent and then raised it to 2 per cent. States adopting new sales taxes at a 2 per cent rate were Maine, Maryland, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia. Rhode Island enacted a 1 per cent sales tax, and later raised it to 2 per cent.

In contrast to the rate pattern for the sales tax, which is imposed at either a 2 or 3 per cent rate by all but one of the states using the tax, a wide range exists between the lowest and highest rates in effect for the other principal excise taxes. Gasoline tax rates range from 3 cents to 7 cents per gallon; cigarette taxes from 2 to 8 cents per pack; and liquor taxes from \$0.75 to \$2.75 per gallon. State income taxes, levied in 34 states, are similarly diverse, with varying rates, a varying degree of graduation in rates, and varying exemptions.

The Federation attributes the lack of uniformity of tax rates among the states to a number of factors. One is the distribution of state

and local functions and the revenue sources available at each level. Another is the extent to which property taxes are used as a source of state revenue. Third, there is an apparent difference in legislative thinking as to whether a state should obtain increased revenues from further use of broad-based taxes or from selective taxes.

A state's excise tax rates also may be influenced by the rates prevailing in an adjoining state and by population density in border areas. In raising excise rates, a state must consider potential revenue loss through evasion by out-of-state purchasing.

Urban Redevelopment Studies

The findings and recommendations of a three-and-a-half-year survey of redevelopment were published during March in two comprehensive volumes entitled *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices* and *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*. The research project which produced these books was financed by a grant from the Spelman Fund of New York and was directed by Coleman Woodbury, Norton Professor of Regional Planning at Harvard University, who also edited the two books. The project was conducted under the supervision of an administrative committee which included the directors of the American Society of Planning Officials, the National Association of Housing Officials, and the Public Administration Clearing House.

Contributors to the two volumes include nineteen experts in such fields as city planning, housing, and metropolitan government, as well as in law, sociology, economics, and political science.

The study has been broadly defined as treating those policies, measures, and activities which would do away with the major forms of physical blight in cities and influence their future growth in a manner contributing to a favorable environment for the healthy civic, economic, and social life of all urban dwellers.

The first volume, *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices*, draws upon the experience of leaders in redevelopment all over the country and deals specifically with major operating problems and methods. The second volume, *The Future of Cities*, takes people for its point of departure and deals with the hu-

man problems that create the need for planning and that should define its objectives. It reflects two primary concerns. First, it includes careful analysis of those underlying factors in urban growth and development that have helped produce the problems now faced by redevelopment agencies. These are the factors that must be understood and dealt with if long-term objectives of redevelopment are to be realized. Second, consideration is given to broad objectives and values of urban life that underlie many of the actual programs and policies.

The need for long-term planning is greatly stressed by the contributors to the study and a number of essays in the two volumes are devoted to specific phases of this subject. One on industrial location and urban redevelopment tries to identify the trend of American industry in an age which advocates decentralization. Others discuss the need for a great deal more variety than is now permitted under existing planning and zoning techniques.

Attention is given to the regional city concept, in which a number of communities with their own homes, shops, schools, and factories radiate from the central community and relieve the congestion which now clogs the older central areas.

Finally, the study makes evident the fact that in a world of fast-moving technology, not only do cities and buildings become obsolete but city plans grow out of date. For this reason, periodic reviews should be made, particularly as to new needs and priorities in execution.

Independent Department to Enforce Housing Code

A Department of Slum Rehabilitation and Prevention has been established in Miami, Florida, to enforce the city's housing code. The new department operates directly under the city manager and the city's five-man governing body of commissioners, with guidance from a nine-man advisory council.

Enforcement of housing codes is customarily carried out by city health departments. However, sentiment in favor of the separate agency appears to be growing. Boston and Cleveland are considering separate departments to enforce their housing and building codes and Morristown and New Brunswick, New Jersey,

have already taken steps toward concentrating responsibility in special city agencies.

In Boston, a report of the New Boston Committee on Rehabilitation of Housing, issued in late 1952, advocated creation of a modern housing code with a single agency responsible for its administration. In its recommendations it asked that the mayor appoint a "housing steering committee for coordination of all municipal housing improvement activities"; that "the committee review and compile all existing housing codes as they affect sanitary, structural, fire, safety, and occupancy as a basis for a code enforcement campaign"; and that "responsibility for inspection and enforcement of such a code be delegated to a single agency to secure uniform and efficient administration."

In Cleveland, the mayor has announced that he is considering the establishment of a new municipal bureau to deal exclusively with housing rehabilitation. The suggestion was made because Cleveland city officials are probing what the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* called the city's "ailing and ineffectual housing inspection machinery."

In Morristown, the city's board of aldermen has appointed a supervisor of rehabilitation and dwellings who is in charge of enforcement of both building and dwelling codes. In New Brunswick, the city commission has also appointed a supervisor of rehabilitation and a committee, made up of the city engineer, fire chief, health officer, and three laymen, who are responsible for demolition of unsafe houses and rehabilitation of substandard dwellings.

In Los Angeles, however, where the various housing laws were recently unified into a single code, the main responsibility for enforcing the city's new housing code was assigned to the building department.

Comparability of Municipal Statistics

Two major obstacles plague those who attempt to make sound comparisons of the finances of various cities of similar size: (1) official city records and reports involve funds, agencies, and terminology which differ widely from one city to another; and (2) the pattern of local government structure and assignments differs considerably as between various city areas. As the Census Bureau points out in its detailed report on 1951 finances of the forty-

one cities of over 250,000, "some of the cities administer public welfare, highway, or other activities which elsewhere are administered directly by the State or by overlying counties. . . . Ten of the cities administer and finance local public schools. . . . In most of these cities, however, school services are provided by independent school districts."

The problem of diverse official records is handled through the Census Bureau's reports on city government finances, which provide uniformly classified figures annually for individual cities. In most of the half-century that it has been reporting on municipal finances, the Census "city" figures here included a prorated portion of amounts relating to some of the overlying local governments, as well as amounts for the city corporation. For the cities of over 300,000, but not for smaller cities, a share was included for the county government. Proration was based upon the fraction of the assessed valuation of overlying units which was within the city area. Since 1941, the annual Census figures have been for city corporations only, excluding any amounts for independent overlying governments.

The Census Bureau's former system for supplementing city government figures with prorated amounts for other local units—never a completely satisfactory answer—would now be even more questionable than when it was abandoned a decade ago, according to various authorities in this field. Although the property tax is still a major source of local government revenue, the growth of state aid and of charges for services has lessened the soundness of any proration system based on assessed values.

In 1947, the Census Bureau issued a study on *Governmental Units Overlying City Areas*, which analyzed the pattern of responsibility for major local functions, as among different types of governments, within the areas of cities of over 25,000 population. Additional evidence of the complexity of the whole situation will appear in the forthcoming Census report *Governments in the United States in 1952* (published by the Government Printing Office in May, 1953), which shows that special district governments have increased in number nationwide by about 50 per cent in the past ten years, and now total over 12,000. More than 600 of

these are in the counties or county-type areas where the nation's forty-one largest cities are located. Altogether, there are 2,890 local governments, including 1,251 school districts, in these areas.

There was widespread expectation that a Census of Governments for 1952, as authorized by law, would provide some of the additional information needed for ready comparison of local government finances in various urban areas. As planned, that survey would have supplied complete totals of local government revenues, spending, and debt for each county area of the nation, with additional detail for each of the metropolitan counties to show figures separately by type of government and individually for the major central-city units.

However, the 82d Congress turned down budget proposals for the 1952 Census of Governments. If, as was proposed at last year's Annual Conference of the Governmental Research Association, a group is established to explore ways to obtain a better comparison of urban government finances, it may consider the kind of metropolitan county totals—rather than merely city statistics—that were expected from the Census of Governments. Nearly 30 per cent of the nation's population is located in the counties which include the forty-one cities of over 250,000. Information could be assembled annually covering all local governments in these areas without too much effort.

Payments in Lieu of Taxes

An act passed by the Ontario, Canada, Legislature last year undertakes to assist municipalities by authorizing payments in-lieu-of-taxes on provincially owned property approximating the amount that would be paid if the property were privately owned. Under the terms of the act, real property (buildings and structures) owned by the province is to be valued by the Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs on the same basis as real property liable for taxation in the municipality concerned. Where provincial property occupies or uses land for the purpose of, or in connection with, any business, the province is authorized to pay the municipality in which such property is located an amount equivalent to what a privately owned business would pay on a similar business assessment.

The act excludes several types of property, including unpatented lands, provincial property used for parks, hospitals, penal and reform institutions, educational institutions, museums, libraries, highways, jails, cemeteries, and experimental and demonstration farms, and real property subject to taxation under the province's Assessment Act.

Payments in-lieu-of-taxes authorized by the act are permissive, not mandatory, payments.

Capital Budgeting

Long-range capital improvement budgets have been adopted recently in a number of local communities.

In Milwaukee, the capital improvements committee of the City Council recently issued a five-year capital improvement budget entitled *Blueprints for Civic Progress*. The report calls for the expenditure of \$104,660,000 by 1958 for streets, buildings, parking lots, and new equipment. About half of this amount, or \$56,200,000, would be raised by bond issues and the remainder would come from current revenues. A total of \$16,690,000 for capital improvements is included in the 1952 annual budget and \$23,400,000 is recommended for the 1953 budget.

In Philadelphia, the City Council recently adopted a six-year capital budget involving estimated city expenditures of \$425,086,715 in 1953-58. Of this amount, 27 per cent is authorized for 1953. The capital budget and the program supporting it were prepared by the City Plan Commission and submitted to the Mayor and Council. The Council is required under the new charter to adopt the capital budget prior to the passage of the annual operating budget.

Other cities and counties which have recently issued long-term capital improvement plans include Montgomery County, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Murfreesboro, Tennessee; and Arlington County and Richmond, Virginia. In Boston, the Bureau of Municipal Research pointed out that a capital budget makes it possible to develop a well-rounded program of capital requirements and schedule them in a logical sequence within the city's ability to pay. Such a program also encourages the preparation of detailed plans well in advance of construction and gives both public

and private groups a complete picture of the city's future plans.

"Citizen's Day" Established in Tokyo

An ordinance to celebrate "Citizen's Day" on October 1, each year has been unanimously adopted by the Metropolitan Assembly of Tokyo. The ordinance specifies that on Citizen's Day, the Tokyo metropolitan government and its agencies are to open their institutions and facilities to the public in order that citizens may be better informed about metropolitan administration. Various kinds of memorial events are also to be conducted during the day. Admission fees and other charges normally required for use of metropolitan establishments and facilities may be reduced or omitted during the Citizen's Day celebration.

Another ordinance approved by the Metro-

politan Assembly establishes the title of "Honorary Citizen of Tokyo Metropolis." The object of this ordinance is to show appreciation for the distinguished services rendered by those "who have made substantial contributions towards the progress of culture in community and the enlightenment of the whole citizens." According to this ordinance, the title of Honorary Citizen may be conferred upon those qualified individuals "who are distinguished in their services for the promotion of public welfare and the advancement of science, arts and crafts, thus contributing to the progress of the citizens' life and culture . . . and are worthy of receiving the citizens' respect for their distinguished services as prides of the Metropolis." Honorary Citizens are to be selected by the Governor with the consent of the Metropolitan Assembly.

SOCIETY FINANCIAL STATEMENT

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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, STATEMENT OF INCOME, DISBURSEMENTS, AND BALANCE FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1952

Earned Income:

Memberships and Subscriptions	
- Senior Members	\$13,455.50
Junior and Student Members	2,222.25
Sustaining Members	840.00
Subscriptions	
Domestic	4,743.25
Foreign	547.50
Total	<u>\$21,808.50</u>

Sales of Journals	602.80
Sales of Reprints	391.27
Sales of Cumulative Indexes	139.25
Journal Advertising	348.45
Miscellaneous Income	269.07
Conference Income	988.60
Subvention from Public Administration Clearing House	2,900.00

Total Earned Income \$27,447.94

Disbursements:

General Operations	
Personal Services	\$14,117.04
Telephone and Telegraph	198.96
Stationery and Supplies	998.71
Furniture and Equipment	162.30
Postage and Express	1,217.57
Mailing Charges	716.76
Printing and Mimeographing	1,084.44
Annual and Other Services	287.31
Accounting Service	660.00
Institutional Memberships	700.00
Conference Expense	664.00
Travel Expense	360.06
Advertising Expense	42.50
Building Service Fee	846.00
Essay Awards	100.00
Total	<u>\$22,155.65</u>

Public Administration Review

Commissions	\$ 17.35
Postage and Express	296.19
Mailing Charges	167.15
Printing	6,461.28
Reprints	375.28
Cumulative Index	35.20

Total \$ 7,352.45

ASPA Newsletter

Printing and Paper	\$ 1,427.97
Postage and Mailing	476.76
Total	<u>\$ 1,904.73</u>

Total Disbursements \$31,412.83

Deficit \$ 3,964.89

Balance Carried Forward January 1, 1952

\$ 8,090.18

Excess of Disbursements over

Earned Income, 1952 3,964.89

Balance at December 31, 1952 \$ 4,125.29

Deferred Income (dues paid in 1952 applicable in 1953)

9,935.50

Total Balance and Deferred Income \$14,060.79

Represented by:

Cash in Banks	\$13,984.48
Petty Cash Fund	25.00
Accounts Receivable	79.00
Clearing Accounts	27.69

Total Cash and Receivables \$14,060.79

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